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Executive Summary 
 
While Paraguay is known internationally for being the largest hydropower exporter in 
the world, the domestic economy suffers from regular outages and high system losses. 
Furthermore, electricity only constitutes around 15 percent of final energy demand. 
These problems need to be addressed to unlock Paraguay’s domestic economic 
potential. Electricity is also one of Paraguay’s pre-eminent exports, yet Paraguay does 
not reap the full benefits of its great endowment of hydroelectric power because Brazil 
systematically underpays for Paraguay’s electricity exports.  In view of these challenges, 
the Government of Paraguay (the “Government”) has asked the Earth Institute to 
support the country in leveraging its hydropower potential for sustainable economic 
development.  
 
This report gives recommendations on a high-level hydro-based sustainable 
development strategy with the following pillars: (1) institutional reform and technical 
improvements of the domestic electricity sector; (2) drafting an industrial-strategy 
based on Paraguay’s comparative advantages and reliable access to clean energy at 
competitive prices; (3) more favorable and fairer pricing on Itaipú’s sales to Brazil; (4) 
devising a plan to transition to a green economy; and (5) ensuring that revenue 
collection and management systems are efficient to fund this strategy. All of the 
recommendations deserve more in-depth study and should only be considered as 
general guidance on the key issues. 
 
The problems of the electricity sector in Paraguay are addressed in Chapter 1. At the 
institutional level there is limited regulatory supervision of the monopoly state-owned 
power utility company Administración Nacional de Electricidad (ANDE). As a result, the 
power utility company does not face sufficient incentives to cut losses in the system, 
improve operational efficiency, and increase its low execution rates. Lack of 
coordination among Government institutions has not allowed for long-term planning of 
energy infrastructure investments. Furthermore, the electricity tariff decision is a 
political process rather than a reflection of long-term investment needs and 
maintenance and operating costs.  
 
System losses have increased steadily over the past decade from 21 percent in 1999 to 
30.9 percent in 2012. This can be traced back to the lack of 500-kv transmission lines, 
high voltage fluctuations, improper load management and inadequate reactive 
compensation in substations. As the current transmission system has reached its 
maximum capacity and the backbone 220 kV transmission lines are carrying loads well 
above capacity, the infrastructure is operating close to its technical limits, causing 
frequent outages and shutdowns during peak consumption periods and/or adverse 
weather conditions.  This is estimated to cost companies between 0.8-2 percent of 
annual sales. Further commercial losses are caused by electricity pilferage, errors in 
accounting and record keeping due to defective equipment and a low bill collection rate.  
 
To address the backbone capacity constraints, the Government is planning to build two 
500kV transmission lines, which will connect the electricity sources to high demand 
regions. To reduce distribution losses, the Master Plan foresees to adapt the distances of 
the 23kV feeder lines and increase the number of substations. However, further 
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emphasis should be placed to reduce distribution losses, which account for 75 percent 
of total electric losses in the country. The creation of a Ministry of Energy in charge of 
monitoring the power utility company, as well as developing and coordinating the 
energy policy and strategy of the country would help to address the institutional and 
coordination problems. A performance/management contract between the Ministry of 
Energy and ANDE with clear objectives and performance indicators can serve as a tool 
to improve ANDE’s efficiency. Municipal zoning would help facilitate the electric 
infrastructure planning process. The Government could also consider outsourcing 
technical services at the distribution level to private sector companies and regulate 
these with performance contracts. This will increase bill collection rates and improve 
the performance of the distribution system. Advanced metering systems to medium and 
large consumers will optimize consumption patterns. The installation of Direct Load 
Control programs and introduction of dynamic pricing methods will reduce 
consumption during peak hours. 
 
Reliable access to clean electricity at competitive prices will help to unlock the potential 
of the domestic economy. This is the topic of Chapter 2. To guide future investments, an 
industrial strategy and policy could be drafted based on the comparative advantages the 
country has to offer and the goals the Government aims to achieve. In the short term, 
the agro-processing sector could be prioritized, seeing that it adds value to agricultural 
goods and has the potential to provide many employment opportunities. To diversify its 
economy, Paraguay could use the product-space or related methodologies to prioritize 
sectors within its industrial policy. It could also make use of spatial development 
corridor planning and place industrial parks along these corridors to provide improved 
infrastructure access to the manufacturing firms it aims to attract.  
 
The energy-intensive industries and particularly the aluminum-smelting sector do not 
by themselves create many employment opportunities, and linkages to the local 
economy are not guaranteed. In considering the sale of electricity to energy-intensive 
foreign investors such as the proposed Rio Tinto Alcan (RTA) aluminum smelter, the 
Government should be careful to consider the opportunity cost of the electricity.  Unless 
there are truly significant spillovers from the RTA project, the proposed project should 
not pay significantly less in tariffs and taxes than Paraguay would receive from selling 
the electricity directly to Brazil or other foreign markets. We believe that such revenue 
losses are unlikely to be made up by significant non-monetary benefits such as 
employment creation and cross-sector linkages.  
 
If Government revenues from electricity exports are higher than from the RTA project, 
the Government could and should use the higher revenues to build up its infrastructure 
and human capital, both factors that are rated highly when foreign companies decide to 
invest. A better-educated workforce and lower infrastructure bottlenecks will 
incentivize investment in the future and hence create even more employment 
opportunities in the long run than a capital-intensive mega-investment such as the 
RTA. Countries that are successfully focusing on attracting mega-investments and 
building linkages are already advanced in terms of their infrastructure and human 
capital. The return and multiplier effect on improved infrastructure and education for 
Paraguay will likely be higher than the return on the RTA investment. Furthermore, 
with additional revenues, the Government can itself create jobs in the public sector such 
as health and education. 
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The decision of the Government to accept an RTA investment proposal is highly 
dependent on the expected post-Itaipú debt negotiation and the price that Paraguay can 
expect to receive from future electricity exports. Under current and anticipated 
aluminum prices, and given the business model of the aluminum industry, it is likely 
that the Government would need to sell its electricity to the smelter at a lower price 
than if it were exporting it to neighboring countries at the market price.  We express our 
caution over any such arrangement. If the Government moves forward with the 
proposal, it is recommended that: (1) it accepts the project proposal only if Government 
revenues from the project are not significantly lower than the revenues it would receive 
from electricity exports; (2) it creates the right regulatory and business environment to 
attract downstream industries; (3) it includes local content provisions in the contract to 
establish technology upgrading and backward linkages to the local economy, (4) it 
requires the RTA to set up a training/business incubator program to help local SMEs 
meet the quality standards for goods and services to the smelter, and (5) it ensures that 
high environmental regulations are in place and adhered to. 
 
The pricing of Paraguay’s electricity exports to Brazil is the topic of Chapter 3.  The 
entire basis of the Itaipú project is a fair price (un precio justo) on electricity exports.  
We do not believe that Paraguay has been receiving a fair price, though we are 
optimistic that through transparent discussion of the issue with Brazil, such a price can 
be achieved. Paraguay’s neighbors, including but not limited to Brazil, are experiencing 
rapid increases in electricity demand, and at marginal generating costs that are typically 
far above the US$52.7/MWh (US¢5.27/kWh)2 that Brazil is currently paying Itaipú 
Binacional (IB) for the guaranteed electricity it is importing from Paraguay.  Finally, we 
note that Paraguay will most likely absorb much or all of its current electricity capacity 
in its own domestic use within the next 25 years, moving from a large net exporter of 
electricity to a situation where domestic demand is roughly balanced with supply. This 
is even more reason not to commit Paraguay’s electricity potential to low-return 
projects.  
 
Within a hydro-based industrial and economic policy, the Government could consider 
building a green economic development strategy that will reduce Paraguay’s 
environmental footprint and focus on job creation, the topic of Chapter 4. In 2010, 
Paraguay’s petroleum import bill was above $1.5bn with an upward tendency. This cost 
could be reduced or even eliminated, most likely at a significant gain in net present 
value, by putting an electricity-based transport system in place for at least part of 
Paraguay’s needs. The Government could take the first step by basing its Pya’e Porâ Bus 
Rapid Transit (BRT) system on electricity-run buses, an option that should be examined 
by the Government in detail. This could be expanded to further corridors and planned 
railway projects. While the initial investment cost of an electricity-run public transport 
system is roughly 1.7 times higher than that of a petroleum-run one, the operating costs 
are about 6.5 times cheaper.  The Net Present Vales (NPV) of the electricity-based 
system should therefore be lower, though a more specific follow-up analysis will be 
required to confirm this hypothesis.    
 
                                                        
2 Proyecto Planta de Aluminio y Complejo Inudstrial en Paraguay (PPT, Junio 2012) 
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Over time, there may also be the possibility of moving decisively to electric passenger 
vehicles, especially given that technological progress will lead to an accelerated decline 
in the cost of lightweight passenger vehicles for urban use. Investing in infrastructure 
for electric buses and cars can be a public investment that will infuse money into the 
economy and create employment opportunities.  We recommend that the Government 
pursue the possibility of an initial deployment of electric vehicles in Asunción and other 
cities, with one or more international producers of such vehicles, on a competitive basis.  
In this report, we provide only rough estimates of the potential national savings and 
electricity demand of such a transition. We suspect that some of the international firms 
would be interested in supporting Paraguay’s investments in the needed infrastructure 
and early deployment of electric passenger vehicles.  
 
Stricter deforestation regulations and better enforcement mechanisms also need to be 
enacted to slow deforestation rates. Almost half of Paraguay’s domestic energy 
consumption is made up of biomass. In turn, 70 percent of this biomass is fuel wood and 
charcoal, making Paraguay the largest per capita producer of fuel wood in the region. It 
is estimated that 50,000 hectares, of which only 12 percent are managed/reforested 
areas, are cut down annually to satisfy its domestic fuel wood and charcoal demand. The 
main reason for this situation is the availability of fuel wood at a minimal cost of around 
US¢1.05/kWh versus an average electricity cost of US¢7.53/kWh. More stringent forestry 
regulation enforcement in Paraguay will drive up the price of fuel wood and charcoal, 
thereby incentivizing the private sector to switch to electricity as the main source of 
energy. For these initiatives the Government could benefit from obtaining REDD+ and 
other carbon-credits. 
 
To manage increased electricity revenues efficiently, better revenue management 
systems need to be put in place, which is the topic of Chapter 5. These should be 
transparent, incentive-oriented and closely monitored.  The FONACIDE and Fundo 
Social programs have been set up to earmark electricity sale revenues from Itaipú for 
infrastructure and social projects. This is forward looking and commendable. However, 
as the departmental and municipal budgets are not connected to the central financial 
administration system at a sufficiently disaggregated level, it is difficult for the central 
Government to monitor expenditures. The local population is also unable to hold local 
governments accountable, as there is a lack of participatory local development planning 
and little information available regarding the allocation of electricity revenues. Because 
these funds are distributed to departments and municipalities without taking into 
account tax collection and spending efficiency, there is no incentive to increase tax 
collection. Requiring local development plans, insisting on publishing these plans, 
contracts and funds online and rewarding departmental/municipal governments for 
improved tax collection and successful project implementation could help reduce 
inefficiencies at the decentralized level. 
 
At a central level, it is recommended that electricity revenues primarily be spent on 
public investments in health, education and infrastructure.  The Government pays its 
public servants relatively high wages, but does not reap the benefits of quality public 
administration services. Designing a Fiscal Responsibility Law, as the Government is 
considering, will help in part with this issue and lead to more predictable and credible 
fiscal policies, improving governance and transparency and creating greater 
commitment among local governments to improve fiscal discipline.  
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Prospective increases in electricity revenues should also not deter the Government 
from continuing to increase the tax burden. Since the 2004 tax reform, the Government 
has tripled its tax collection rate by increasing its tax base (formalizing its economy). 
This has been achieved by reducing the corporate income tax from 30 percent to 10 
percent.3  The 10 percent flat tax the Government of Paraguay currently has in place for 
value-added (with the exception of food and drugs), personal income and corporate 
income taxes, as well as the excessive fiscal incentives offered to investors, is not 
sufficient to provide the Government with the revenues needed for an adequate level of 
public investments.   
There is, in short, room to increase taxes to invest in infrastructure and human capital. 
These investments are paramount for sustainable inclusive growth and diversification 
of the economy. To guide Government spending, we recommend that Paraguay adopt a 
20-year strategic plan for the country, which can be developed in close cooperation 
with the broad public and expert communities. Targets could be set for all aspects of 
importance to the Paraguayan people, including education and training, health, social 
equity, infrastructure, the environment, and economic development. These targets 
could be financed by a Medium Term Expenditure Framework that would ensure 
improved fiscal discipline, greater budgetary predictability for line ministries, more 
efficient use of public resources, greater political accountability for public expenditure 
outcomes through more legitimate decision-making processes and greater credibility of 
budgetary decision-making.  
                                                        
3 Ministry of Finance (April 2013): Tax system analysis and outlook  
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Introduction  
 
The Government of Paraguay has embarked on a plan to leverage its currently exported 
electricity to unlock the potential of its domestic economy. In this context, the Ministry 
of Finance has approached the Earth Institute to advise on an energy strategy spurring 
industrial and economic development.  
 
The report is divided into five chapters. The first chapter will assess Paraguay’s 
electricity sector and ANDE’s 10-year Master Plan. It provides policy recommendations 
at both the institutional and technical level. Paraguay can only unlock its energy 
potential for local development once it addresses the crisis that the electricity sector is 
facing. The second chapter addresses how the economy and particularly the 
manufacturing sector will benefit from reliable access to electricity at competitive 
prices. It suggests a potential methodology the Government could use to draft an 
industrial policy in order to guide future investments. Particular focus is placed on 
energy intensive industries given that Paraguay received a proposal from Rio Tinto 
Alcan (RTA) to invest in an aluminum smelter. This investment proposal is used as an 
example to show the type of analysis the Government should undertake before 
accepting such energy intensive mega-projects.  
 
The third chapter assesses whether the price at which Paraguay exports electricity to 
Brazil from the Itaipú dam can be considered fair. This is done by comparing historical 
market prices in Brazil with the payments it made for Paraguay’s electricity during 
those periods. To estimate the excess electricity that Paraguay is likely to export in the 
future, domestic supply and demand projections are made. As the price of future 
exports should be determined by the regional electricity market, neighboring country 
power supply and demand projections are also made. This analysis will provide the 
Government with a framework for Itaipú tariff negotiations going forward. 
 
The fourth chapter proposes how, within a hydro-based industrial and economic policy, 
the Government could develop a green economic development strategy that will reduce 
Paraguay’s environmental footprint. The costs and benefits of transforming Paraguay’s 
transport sector from a fuel-based system to an electricity-based one are assessed. The 
importance of decreasing Paraguay’s charcoal and fuel wood consumption from an 
ecological and health perspective are highlighted, and the resulting electricity demand 
from substituting the energy sources in these two sectors are estimated. The fifth and 
final chapter of this Report provides recommendations on how to better manage 
electricity revenues going forward and suggests a planning framework that could help 
the country reach the ultimate goal of economic diversification and long-term 
sustainable development. 
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1.  The Domestic Electricity Sector  
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section analyzes the current 
electricity situation in Paraguay by providing an overview of the power sources, 
domestic supply and demand, generation costs, and electricity tariffs. The second 
section highlights the institutional constraints and technical issues the sector faces. The 
projected electricity demand and the electricity Master Plan are the topic of the third 
section. The fourth section provides recommendations on how the Government can 
address the problems of Paraguay’s electricity sector and fill the gaps identified in the 
energy strategy, before summarizing the chapter’s findings in the fifth section. 
1.1 Current Situation 
 
1.1.1 Capacity and power sources 
 
Paraguay is a country with some of the highest hydroelectric power potential per capita 
in the world. It has been estimated to have the resources to produce 130 TWh/year of 
hydroelectric power, of which 101 TWh/year are thought to be economically 
exploitable.4 Nearly all of Paraguay’s electricity comes from three hydropower plants 
located on the Parana River. Most of its 8,816MW of nominal generation capacity comes 
from the Acaray dam (210 MW) and two bi-national hydropower plants, Itaipú and 
Yacyretá. The Itaipú dam is jointly- owned and operated with Brazil (7,000 MW for each 
country), while Yacyretá is a bi-national project with Argentina (1,600 MW for each 
country). 
 
Table 1: Paraguay’s Power Sources 
 
Source: CRU report, 2011 
 
1.1.2 Domestic supply 
 
Hydropower represents 99.99 percent of the electricity supplied in the country. Most of 
this hydropower is purchased from the two bi-national hydroelectric entities of Itaipú 
and Yacyretá.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/hydro_country_notes.pdf 
Nominal 
(MW)
Nominal Paraguay 
(MW)
Real Paraguay 
(MW)
Energy available 
(GWh/year)
Itaipu Hydro 14,000.0        7,000.0                     6,067.5                       45,179.0                  82.6%
Yacyreta Hydro 3,200.0          1,600.0                     1,440.0                       8,578.0                     15.7%
Acaray Hydro 210.0              210.0                         210.0                           901.0                        1.6%
Others Thermal 6.1                   6.1                              6.1                                27.0                           0.0%
Total 17,416.1        8,816.1                     7,723.6                       54,685.0                  
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Table 2: Electricity Supply 
 GWh (2011) % 
Generated   
Acaray 949.9 8.5 
Thermal 0.9 0.0 
Total generated 950.8 8.5 
Bought   
Itaipú 8,036.0 72.0 
Yacyretá 2,174.6 19.2 
Total bought 10,210.6 91.5 
Total supply 11,161.4 100.0 
Domestic use 11.020.7 98.7 
Sale to EBISA (Argentina) 140.8 1.3 
Source: ANDE, Resumen Estadístico 2011 
 
1.1.3 Demand 
 
Electricity coverage expanded rapidly over the last decade and reached 98 percent of all 
households in 2009,5 up from 84 percent in 2001.6 Residential use is the main driver of 
electricity consumption (42.3 percent), ahead of industrial use (22.6 percent) and 
commercial use (18.6 percent).7 
 
Table 3: Electricity Demand 
 GWh (2011) % 
Residential 3,205.0 42.3 
Commercial 1,404.8 18.6 
Industrial 1,709.5 22.6 
General 592.3 7.8 
Government 489.3 6.5 
Street lights 169.7 2.2 
Average (domestic use) 7,570.5 100.0 
Exportation 135.9  
ANDE consumption 12.9  
Total 7,719.2  
Source: ANDE, Resumen Estadístico 2011 
 
Figure 1 shows that average per capita consumption in 2009 was far lower than in 
neighboring countries,8 and closer to consumption levels observed in Peru and 
Colombia.9 Paraguay stands out among regional averages with the highest share of 
residential consumption. 
 
                                                        
5 Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), 2011, “La Infraestructura en el Desarrollo Integral de 
América Latina. Diagnóstico estratégico y propuesta para una agenda prioritaria. Energía eléctrica” 
6 ANDE, Resumen Estadístico 2010 
7 ANDE, Resumen Estadístico 2011 
8 Argentina (2,904 kWh/cap), Uruguay (2,763 kWh/cap) and Brazil (2,384 kWh/cap) 
9 World Bank data, 2010 
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Figure 1:  Electricity Consumption in Paraguay Compared to the Region 
  
Source: International Energy Agency (2009 data) and World Bank (2009 population data) 
 
Peak power demand has grown at an average of 8 percent per year from 425MW in 
1990 to 1,892MW in 2010. In recent years, peak demand has been growing faster and, 
according to Ande’s 2012-2021 Master Plan, is expected to reach 2,576MW by 2013.10 
 
1.1.4 Cost and price of electricity 
 
Due to the electricity sector’s unique feature of almost exclusively being based on 
hydropower, the cost of generation is particularly low, averaging US¢2.57/kWh in 2010. 
Most of this cost is currently driven up by debt servicing, so it can be expected to fall 
even further in the future. 
  
Figure 2: Cost of Generation: US¢2.57/ kWh in 2010 
  
Source: ANDE, 2010 
                                                        
10 ANDE, Plan Maestro de Obras de Generación, Transmisión y Distribución 2012-2021 
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Transmission costs amounted to G32.5 per kWh in 2011 (around US¢0.78/kWh), an 
increase of 9.2 percent between 2010 and 2011. In addition, distribution costs 
increased by 16 percent over the same period, reaching G55.9 per kWh in 2011 (around 
US¢1.33/kWh).11 
 
Table 4: Cost of Electricity Sold in 2011 
 G/kWh US¢/kWh* 
Generation 9.8 0.22 
Electricity bought 156.0 3.72 
Transmission 32.5 0.78 
Distribution 55.9 1.33 
Consumers 23.8 0.57 
Total 278.0 6.63 
*Average exchange rate year 2011: 1US$=G4,191.4212 
Source: ANDE, Resumen Estadístico 2011 
 
The national average electricity tariff is equivalent to about US¢7.6 per kWh,13 well 
below that of the Latin American median rate of US¢14 per kWh.14 Tariffs have been 
stable over the last decade and are still above the cost of electricity sold (by almost 
US¢1/kWh).15 
 
Table 5: Tariff Structure 
 G/kWh (2011) US¢/kWh* 
Residential 362.0 8.64 
Commercial 343.2 8.19 
Industrial 241.1 5.75 
General 273.7 6.53 
Government 262.2 6.26 
Street lights 376.9 8.99 
Average (domestic use) 318.2 7.59 
Exportation 311.1 7.42 
ANDE consumption 271.1 6.47 
*Average exchange rate year 2011: 1US$=G4,191.42 
Source: ANDE, Resumen Estadístico 2011 
 
Table 5 shows that the tariff structure includes an implicit cross-subsidy from low 
voltage commercial and residential customers to industrial users. Moreover a social 
tariff benefited 302,661 customers (24.7 percent of domestic customers) in 2011 and 
cost the Government G53 billion (around US$12.6 million).16 The social tariff (Law 
3480/2008) targets low voltage residential customers consuming less than 300 kWh 
per month and is applied proportionally to the consumption.17 Beneficiaries of social 
programs administered by the Social Action Secretariat (SAS) are automatically eligible 
                                                        
11 ANDE, Resumen Estadístico 2011 
12 World Bank Official Exchange Rate (LCU per US$, period average) 
13 ANDE, Resumen Estadístico 2011 
14 Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), 2011, “La Infraestructura en el Desarrollo Integral de 
América Latina. Diagnóstico estratégico y propuesta para una agenda prioritaria. Energía eléctrica” 
15 Average tariff for domestic use (US¢7.59/kWh) – Cost of electricity sold (US¢6.63/kWh) 
16 ANDE, Resumen Estadístico 2011 
17 Decree 6474/2011 regulating the Law 3480/2008 
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for the social tariff.18 Households can apply to benefit from the tariff if they present an 
affidavit justifying their low level of income.19  
 
Table 6: Social Tariff Structure and Beneficiaries 
Household consumption Discount rate on 
electricity tariff 
Beneficiaries 
0 – 100 kWh per month 75 percent 199,369 
101 – 200 kWh per month 50 percent 82,387 
201 – 300 kWh per month 25 percent 20,905 
Total  302,661 
 Sources: ANDE, Resumen Estadístico 2011 and Decree 6474/2011 regulating the Law 3480/2008 
 
Figure 3 shows that the highest percentage of residential customers benefiting from the 
social tariff in 201020 were in the North and Central provinces21 where the majority of 
the poorest population lives.  
 
Figure 3: Distribution of the Social Tariff by Region 
 
Source: ANDE, 2010 
 
Given the cost of electricity subsidies of around US$ 12.6 million,22 there is a need to 
closely monitor the beneficiaries’ willingness to pay as well as constantly adjusting the 
level of the subsidies to the purchasing power of the beneficiaries. The social tariff and 
cross-subsidy from low voltage commercial and residential customers to industrial 
users also increases the risk of ANDE not charging a tariff that is on average at cost-
recovery-level, which takes into account the total cost of electricity supply plus 
investments necessary to expand and improve electricity supply. A regular technical 
                                                        
18 Vice-Ministério de Minas y Energía, 2011, Informe de Gestion al 16 de Junio de 2011 
19 Decree 6474/2011 regulating the Law 3480/2008 
20 ANDE, Resumen Estadístico 2010 
21 The North region includes the departments of San Pedro and Concepción, the Central region includes 
the departments of Caaguazú, Caazapá, Guairá and Paraguay. 
22 ANDE, Resumen Estadístico 2011 
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evaluation of the tariff level is crucial to ensure that tariffs are always set at the 
adequate level.  
 
1.2 Problems Faced by the Electricity Sector 
 
1.2.1 Institutional constraints 
 
Paraguay’s state-owned power utility company - Administración Nacional de 
Electricidad (ANDE) – is solely in charge of generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity within the country. There is a lack of incentives for ANDE to cut losses in the 
system and increase operational efficiency. Its execution rates are low23 and collection 
performance is estimated at only 70 percent.24 Given the low cost of generation and the 
way tariffs are set in Paraguay,25 the operational margin ANDE currently generates is a 
surplus. However, this is transferred to the Ministry of Finance and hence ANDE does 
not benefit from higher operating margins. Although ANDE is a financially sound public 
utility company with good technical capacity, its financial ratios may deteriorate if it 
does not improve its distribution and collection performance. To keep tariffs at 
competitive levels, investing in the transmission and distribution system, as well as 
improving the distribution management system are key to sustain ANDE’s financial 
performance. The Ministry of Finance has recently set up a monitoring unit for public 
enterprises and consequently the scope of control of the Ministry of Finance over the 
public entities has improved.26 
 
The second major institutional constraint in the electricity sector is the lack of 
coordination during the planning phase for future investments. While the Vice Ministry 
of Mines and Energy (VMME) is responsible for the nationwide energy sector strategy, 
there is little coordination with ANDE’s Master Plan for the electricity sector. The VMME 
is meant to be driving the planning process but has significant financing constraints. It 
receives a budget of US$1.5 million out of the total Ministry’s budget of US$1 billion27 
and therefore has neither the capacity, nor the financial means to effectively design and 
implement a nationwide energy policy in coordination with the other Ministries. 
ANDE’s size (3,755 staff in 201128) and influence allow the public utility company direct 
access to Government executives, thereby bypassing the Ministry. The US$2,573 
million29 required to finance the planned investments in the electric system over the 
2012-2021 time period will be directly paid out to ANDE and not channeled through the 
VMME.30  
                                                        
23 Meetings in Asuncion with various stakeholders 
24 World Bank, 2010, Project Appraisal Document for the Energy Sector Strengthening Project, Report No: 
57459-PY 
25 While ANDE proposes a yearly tariff rate, this needs to be approved by the National Economic Team, 
which consists of the Central Bank and the Ministries of Public Works and Communications, Finance, 
Agriculture and Livestock, Commerce and Industry. Therefore, the electricity tariff decision becomes 
highly politicized rather than reflecting the true operation costs and investments needs. 
26 Meeting with the Ministry of Finance 
27 Meeting at the Vice Ministry of Mines and Energy with Ing. Hugo A. Cacace A., Vice Minister, 12 
February 2013 
28 ANDE, Resumen Estadístico 2011 
29 ANDE Master Plan  
30 Meeting with ANDE 
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1.2.2 Technical problems 
 
The electric system lacks high-voltage transmission lines. The National Interconnected 
System (SIN) heavily relies on a backbone network of 4,090 km of 220 kV transmission 
lines, complemented by 1,409 km of 66 kV transmission lines and 70 transmission 
substations. With only 16 km of 500 kV transmission lines and 0.002 km of 500kV 
transmission lines per GWh produced, Paraguay has the lowest transmission line ratio 
in the region (0.066 km/GWh in Brazil, 0.089 in Argentina and 0.079 in Uruguay).31 
With this configuration, the reliability of the power supply is highly vulnerable to 
failures in the transmission system. 
 
System losses remain very high (30.9 percent in 2012) and represent a revenue loss 
estimated at US$266 million per year. These losses have increased steadily over the 
past decade, from 21 percent in 1999 to 34.5 percent in 2009. A US$100 million loss 
reduction program launched in 2006 and co-financed by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) has helped to reduce system losses to 31.1 percent in 2011 
and 30.9 percent in 2012. These overall system losses, split between transmission 
losses (around 7.6 percent in 2010 and 2011), technical distribution losses and non-
technical distribution losses (around 23.5 percent in 2011 equally split32), remain very 
high and well above the 13.5 percent weighted average for Latin America and the 
Caribbean region,33 as shown in Figure 4. These are only estimates since ANDE has no 
reliable metering system in place to measure losses at different voltage levels and in 
different geographical locations. Given that transmission losses have been estimated at 
840,186 MWh in 2011,34 and account for 24 percent of total electric system losses, total 
system losses represent an estimated revenue shortfall of US$266 million per year for 
ANDE35. 
 
There are many reasons that can explain these excessive losses in Paraguay’s 
transmission and distribution network. The lack of 500 kV transmission lines and the 
long distances (about 300km) from the hydroelectric plants to Asunción metropolitan 
area, which is the main load center in the country, result in voltage fluctuations. Under-
investment in the electricity grid has resulted in overloading the distribution system 
with too many stages of transformation, improper load management and inadequate 
reactive compensation in substations. Over the last years, it appears to us that emphasis 
has been placed on increasing household access to the grid in rural areas and low-
income urban areas through long 11kV low-tension lines and haphazard sub-
transmission/distribution systems. Moreover, since resistive losses in transmission 
lines are proportional to the square of power flows, periods of peak demand make a 
disproportionately large contribution to overall losses. As a result, electric power 
transmission and distribution losses have more than doubled in the last decade (+119 
percent), increasing at a faster pace than electricity consumption (only 42 percent).36  
                                                        
31 CRU report, 2011 
32 World Bank, 2010, Project Appraisal Document for the Energy Sector Strengthening Project, Report No: 
57459-PY 
33 World Bank, 2010, Project Appraisal Document for the Energy Sector Strengthening Project, Report No: 
57459-PY 
34 ANDE, Resumen Estadístico 2011 
35 Using the average domestic tariff of US¢7.59/kWh 
36 World Bank data, 2000-2009 
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Figure 4: Annual Electricity Sales and Distribution Losses in 2005 
 
Source: World Bank, Benchmarking Data of the Electricity Dist. Sec in LAC 95-05 
 
Commercial losses are non-technical losses caused by actions external to the power 
infrastructure. These consist of electricity theft through illegal connections to the grid 
and/or consumption meter tampering, errors in accounting and record-keeping and 
non-payment by customers. Bill collection rates are also low and even large consumers, 
including public sector entities, are not always billed for their electricity use. 
 
Electricity service provision also faces significant reliability constraints, with frequent 
outages and voltage fluctuations. The transmission system, estimated by ANDE to be at 
1,700MW37 (2,261MW in 201238), has reached its maximum capacity. Maximum peak 
demand reached 1,810MW in 2009, grew to 2,384MW in 2012 and is currently 
estimated at 2,576MW for 2013, requiring the backbone 220 kV transmission lines to 
carry heavy loads well above their nominal capacity. Since the transmission 
infrastructure is operating close to its thermal technical limits, shock or excess demand 
cause constant outages and shutdowns. Warm summer weather, heavy rains and 
thunderstorms regularly result in the activation of the transmission line protection 
devices, causing interruptions. In 2010 customers in the Asunción metropolitan area 
faced 16.3 interruptions for an average of 10.7 hours per interruption,39 and there has 
been no sign of improvement in the last decade according to ANDE’s figures (see Figure 
5). Additional transformation and reactive compensation capacity to support ANDE’s 
transmission network is therefore critical to avoid a supply crisis and prevent the 
further deterioration of the quality and reliability of the electricity. 
                                                        
37 World Bank, 2010, Project Appraisal Document for the Energy Sector Strengthening Project, Report No: 
57459-PY 
38 ANDE, Plan Maestro de Obras de Generación, Transmisión y Distribución 2012-2021 
39 ANDE, Resumen Estadístico 2011 
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Figure 5: Number of Power Cuts and Estimated Duration 
 
 
Current Electricity Situation in Numbers 
 Generated Electricity: 54,685 GWh in 2011 
 Supplied Electricity: 11,161 GWh in 2011 
 Electricity Demand: 7,583 GWh in 2011 
 Transmission Capacity: 2261MW 
 Peak Demand: 2384 MW in 2012 – 2576 MW in 2013 (est.)  
 Cost of generation: US¢ 2.57/ kWh on average in 2010 
 Average cost of electricity: US¢ 6.63/kWh  
 Average tariff of electricity: US¢ 7.59/kWh  
 Electricity Subsidies: US$ 12.6 million in 2011 
 Overall System Losses: 30.9 percent in 2012 (shortfall for ANDE of US $ 265 
million) 
 
1.3 Planned Investments and Energy Strategy 
 
1.3.1 Electricity demand projections 
 
Peak power demand has grown at an average rate of 8 percent per year from 425MW in 
1990 to 1,892MW in 2010. In 2012 it reached 2,384 MW and, according to Ande’s 2012-
2021 Master Plan, is expected to increase further in 2013 to 2,576MW.40 
 
ANDE has prepared an energy market study for the period 2010-2020, which led to 3 
growth scenarios for peak demand (see Figure 6). The Master Plan 2012-2021 uses the 
high growth scenario as the baseline for the necessary investments.  
 
                                                        
40 ANDE, Plan Maestro de Obras de Generación, Transmisión y Distribución 2012-2021 
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Figure 6: ANDE’s Peak Demand Growth Projections 
 
Source: ANDE projections 
 
In order to estimate electricity availability for the potential RTA project, the RTA and 
CRU Strategies (CRU)41 have also made electricity demand projections. RTA based its 
electricity consumption projections on an annualized long-term growth rate of 5.2 
percent drawn from ANDE’s plans. This assumption leads to an estimated consumption 
of nearly 43,000 GWh in 2040. CRU projected client growth rates42 in Paraguay based 
on residential client to population growth rates and commercial client to GDP per capita 
growth rates between 2001 and 2010. For the baseline scenario it used a total 
consumption growth rate based on the log correlation between GDP per capita in 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms and the consumption/GDP per capita ratio (1990-
2010). For the high consumption scenario CRU changed the last estimation by assuming 
that client consumption growth rates would be similar to the average growth rate of 5 
countries that had a similar GDP per capita to Paraguay in 1990.43 
 
For the baseline scenario, the model estimates an annualized growth rate of 5.1 percent 
between 2011 and 2040, leading to a projected demand of 42,131 GWh – similar to 
RTA’s estimations. CRU also took into account an estimate of unmet demand provided 
by ANDE (300 MW between 2012 and 2017), leading to a slightly greater projected 
demand of 45,089 GWh in 2040 for the baseline scenario. For the high growth scenario, 
CRU estimates that Paraguay will consume 59,713 GWh by 2040. 
 
                                                        
41 To provide initial insights into the aluminum sector and the proposed RTA project, the Government of 
Paraguay contracted CRU Strategies, a London based consultancy that has specialized on metals, mining 
and fertilizer advice (including the aluminum industry). For more information see - 
http://www.crugroup.com/Consulting/ 
42 These are divided up by residential consumers – client/population growth (2001-2010) and 
commercial consumers – client/GDP per capita (2001-2010)  
43 The historical relationship is based on Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, South Africa and Uruguay 
between 1990-2008 
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Figure 7: CRU and RTA’s Annual Energy Demand Growth Projections 
 
Sources: CRU, 2011, and RTA, 2012 
 
Converting these projections into peak demand projections, CRU obtains lower 
estimates for its baseline and high scenario than ANDE. According to CRU, peak demand 
will reach 4000 MW under the high growth scenario in 2020 and around 3500 MW 
under the baseline scenario. 
 
1.3.2 Power generation projects 
 
Paraguay currently has a nominal installed generation capacity of 8,816MW. Several 
hydroelectric projects planned by ANDE will increase the installed generation capacity 
by 18 percent to 10,440MW by 2030. The main contribution to this will be the planned 
construction of the Corpus Christi dam. Electricity generation is expected to increase 
from 54,685GWh in 2011 to 64,273GWh in 2030.44 
 
Table 7: Planned Electricity Generation Projects 
Project Type of project   Date 
Additional power for 
Paraguay (nominal MW) 
Acaray  Modernization (currently 210MW) 2013 42 
Yguazu  
New hydropower plant on existing 
dam 
2014 200 
Ana Cua  
New hydropower plant on existing 
dam (shared with Argentina) 
2016 126 
Corpus Christi  
New dam and hydropower plant 
(shared with Argentina) 
2030 1,256 
Source: CRU report, 2011 
 
 
                                                        
44 CRU report, 2011 
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1.3.3 Brief analysis of ANDE’s Master Plan 
 
The increased outages and voltage fluctuations in the summer of 2009-2010 forced 
Paraguay to launch an US$80.5 million Emergency Plan, which included the purchase 
and installation of low voltage transformers, equipment to enhance reactive 
compensation, generators, and fuel acquisition.  
 
Since then, ANDE has developed an ambitious plan to expand the 500kV transmission 
network, improve power supply reliability and meet electricity demand growth. Three 
500kV transmission line projects have been proposed in ANDE’s 2012-2021 Master 
Plan: two 345km lines between Itaipú dam and Villa Hayes and a 300km line between 
Yacyretá dam and Villa Hayes. The Master Plan is expected to cost around US$2.57 
billion.45 To date, 47 percent of the financing has been secured through a US$200 
million bond issue and loans from international institutions (such as IDB, CAF, EIB, 
JICA).46  
 
Table 8: Secured Donor Funding for Electricity Master Plan 
 
 
Source: World Bank47, Inter-American Development Bank48 
 
To reduce distribution losses, the Master Plan foresees to adapt the distances of the 
23kV feeder lines and increase the number of substations. Further emphasis should be 
placed to reduce distribution losses, as these represent 75 percent of total electricity 
losses in Paraguay.  
 
 
 
                                                        
45 ANDE 
46 ANDE, Plan Maestro de Obras de Generación, Transmisión y Distribución 2012-2021 
47 World Bank, 2010, Project Appraisal Document, Energy Sector Strengthening Project, Report No: 
57459-PY 
48 Inter-American Development Bank, 2012, “Multipower Transmission Program Phase II”, PR-L1058, 11 
December 
Project Donor Amount
Electric	distribution	system	and		transmission	network	improvement:	
-	installation	of	66kV	and	23kV	advanced	metering	system	(for	remote	
consumption	metering	and	disconnection	or	reconnection	of	large	
customers).	
-	construction	of	two	new	220/23kV	and	66kV	substations,	the	
expansion	of	the	transformation	capacity	for	ten	existing	substations	
across	the	country,	and	the	installation	of	reactive	compensation	at	
the	Guarambaré	substation.
World	Bank
US$125	million	
(US$100	million	from	
the	WB	and	US$25	
million	from	Ande)
Multipower	Transmission	Program	:																																																													
1st	phase	completed	in	2012:	325,000	single	phase	and	three-phase	
electronic	meters	(25	percent	of	all	meters	in	use),	the	construction	of	
198km	of	220kv	transmission	lines,	and	the	construction	of	70km	of	66	
kv	transmission	lines.
2nd	phase:	construction	of	296km	500	kV	transmission	lines	from	
Yacyreta	to	Villa	Hayes	and	replacement	of	625,000	obsolete	
electromechanical	meters.
IDB	(first	
phase),	IDB,	
EIB,	
Development	
Bank	of	Latin	
America	(CAF)
US$267	million	(not	
including	the	first	
phase)
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1.4 Overcoming the Problems Identified Above 
 
1.4.1 Institutional recommendations 
 
The creation of a strong Ministry of Energy should help define a better-integrated 
strategy for the energy sector. With a greater budget allocation, the Ministry should 
have the financial means to drive public investment in the energy sector, coordinate 
with ANDE to elaborate the electricity Master Plan taking into account national energy 
policies (including strategy for biomass and hydrocarbons), and have better integrated 
projections. ANDE’s current Master Plan, for instance, does not take into account 
policies that might be in place to reduce biomass consumption or to promote energy 
efficiencies. A performance contract between the Ministry of Energy and ANDE could be 
signed, setting out the performance objectives expected from the utility company. 
Performance contracts are written agreements clarifying objectives and motivating 
managers to achieve them. The scope of such contracts generally includes tariffs, 
investments, subsidies, social objectives, and funding. 
Performance indicators can be designed to reward good managerial performance and 
sanction non-performance.49 According to the World Bank, performance indicators 
could include: net income, return on assets, debt and equity ratios, interest cover, 
dividend policy, productivity improvements, customer satisfaction indexes, connection 
targets, human resource issues, procurement policy, and environmental adherence. 
However, it should be noted that performance contracts are not the solution to all 
problems and can be defeated by politics. They should therefore only be used if the 
Government is willing “to deal with the challenges of information asymmetry, effective 
incentives, and credible commitments.”50  
Increasing incentives in the distribution sector could improve bill collection rates and 
system performance. Given the characteristics of the electricity sector in Paraguay, 
addressing the deficiencies in this sector are paramount to curb high distribution and 
commercial losses. Opening distribution to competition through a performance contract 
as described above, also called a Management Contract (MC) model, would allow ANDE 
to retain full ownership of the electricity assets and grant a private contractor the 
responsibility to run operations without acquiring equity or incurring commercial risk. 
 
Box 1: Efficiency of the Management Contract in Tanzania 
 
Under an MC in Tanzania, from mid-2002 to mid-2005, collection rates rose from 67 to 
93 percent, system losses fell by 5 percent, 30,000 new connections were installed (at a 
pace far greater than the previous expansion rate), costs fell by 30 percent, and annual 
revenues rose by 35 percent. A “poverty tariff” was introduced for consumers using 
50kWh or less.51  
 
MCs give private sector managers the power to lay off excess staff, cut services to 
delinquent customers and raise tariffs to rationalize the use of energy. These are 
                                                        
 
50 Ibid 
51 World Bank, 2008, “Underpowered: The State of the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa”, AICD 
Background Paper 6 
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unpopular measures that managers in publicly-owned utility companies try to avoid. 
While potential gains are distributed over time, layoffs and service cuts to delinquent 
customers might come at a political cost.  
 
In Bogota, Colombia, the restructuring process of the distribution company CODENSA in 
the late 1990s is a relevant case.52 
 
Box 2: Curbing distribution losses in Bogotá, Colombia  
 
Through a combination of downsizing and outsourcing a variety of technical services,53 
CODENSA significantly increased the customers per employee ratio to 2,100 
(compared with 653 customers per employee working in ANDE’s distribution and 
commercial sector).54 It also improved the quality of services. Average interruption 
times dropped from 6.3 hours in 1997 to 2 hours in only five years.55 To address 
distribution losses, CODENSA adapted lines’ voltage rates (high, medium, low) for each 
market segment (large industrial or commercial customers, medium industrial or 
commercial customers, residential customers, and irregular users in low-income 
areas). CODENSA also invested in the installation and replacement of meters, the 
regularization of power supply in low-income areas and the upgrading of distribution 
networks. 
Overall, distribution losses steadily decreased from 22 percent in 1997 to 10 percent 
in 2000 and to 9 percent in 2007. Equally important, non-technical losses were halved. 
The combined economic impact of those effects was estimated to come to 
approximately US$82.4 million.56 
 
On the assumption that improving the distribution management model in Paraguay 
would halve distribution and commercialization losses, and that half of the electricity 
saved would result in a permanent reduction in demand, this strategy would increase 
annual revenues by around US$50 million per year, while lowering peak power 
demand. 
 
To improve the electricity planning mechanism, municipal zoning would help to 
optimize grid investments. Promoting the identification and definition of residential, 
commercial and industrial areas would ensure that investments meet the voltage needs 
required for each zone. In the absence of zoning, industries do not locate themselves 
accordingly, increasing uncertainty in terms of electric investment needs and making it 
more difficult to optimize grid expansion. This leads to an increase in average 
connection times and distribution costs. 
                                                        
52 World Bank, 2009, “Reducing Technical and Non-Technical Losses in the Power Sector”, Background 
Paper, July 
53 By 2002, around 7,000 people were working for Codensa under outsourcing contracts. Source: David 
Hall, 2005, Electricity privatization and restructuring in Latin America and the impact on workers, Public 
Services International Research Unit (PSIRU), University of Greenwich 
54 Calculation based on ANDE, 2012, Resumen Estadístico Año 2011 (In 2011, 1 089 employees were 
working in the distribution sector, 789 in the commercialization sector, and ANDE was providing 
electricity to 1 226 630 customers) 
55 World Bank, 2009, “Reducing Technical and Non-Technical Losses in the Power Sector”, Background 
Paper, July 
56 World Bank, 2009, “Reducing Technical and Non-Technical Losses in the Power Sector”, Background 
Paper, July 
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Finally, the Government could envision creating Independent Power Producer (IPP) 
opportunities in the electricity sector in the long-run. Since electricity tariffs are 
relatively low and most of the power generation comes from low-cost hydroelectric 
sources, supplying the total consumption of the metropolitan area of Asunción (which 
accounts for 57 percent of national consumption57), IPPs have few incentives to enter 
the generation market. A 2006 law,58 approved by Paraguay’s Congress in 2008, sets a 
regulatory framework for IPPs in the electricity sector. According to the law, ANDE has 
a preferential position for all generation sources above 2MW, and public bidding and 
partnership with ANDE is required. To date, only five project proposals have been 
proposed to ANDE and have remained at a very early stage of development. There is no 
immediate need for the entry of IPPs in the market because of the excess supply as 
compared to the demand. However, this could be considered once Paraguay enters a 
phase of energy deficits.  
 
1.4.2 Technical approach 
 
Most of the investments in the Master Plan address the transmission infrastructure gap. 
These are crucial to reduce power outages and cut transmission losses. However, 
transmission losses only account for one quarter of overall system losses. More needs to 
be done to tackle the technical and non-technical distribution losses. While 15 percent 
of the total losses stem from electricity theft and illegal connections,59 over half of total 
losses stem from technical and management deficiencies both at the distribution and 
commercial level. Furthermore, it seems that greater emphasis should be placed on 
smoothing electricity consumption during the day and slowing electricity consumption 
growth rates over time.  
 
a) Supply-side approaches 
 
The expansion of an advanced metering system applied to medium and large consumers 
through smart grids allows optimization of electricity consumption by informing users 
of real-time prices, peak hour start and end times, accumulated consumption, alerts, etc. 
Recent experience, both in developed and developing countries, shows that medium 
and large consumers are responsive to clear and timely information on pricing options. 
The rate of return and payback periods for installing an advanced metering system for 
large consumers are usually attractive. The World Bank estimates that, subject to 
average tariff levels and electricity theft levels, the installation of an advanced metering 
device, including a component allowing remote disconnection and reconnection, 
requires an investment of US$50 for large low-voltage consumers and between US$300 
and US$400 for high and medium-voltage consumers.60 In Paraguay, this is equivalent 
to an electricity consumption of about 660 kWh and 4,000-5,300 kWh respectively at an 
                                                        
57 Inter-American Development Bank, 2012, “Multipower Transmission Program Phase II”, PR-L1058, 11 
December 
58Ley N° 3009 De La Producción y Transporte Independiente de Energía Eléctrica (PTIEE). 
http://www.ssme.gov.py/vmme/pdf/leyes/Ley%203009%20PTIEE.pdf 
59 http://www.americaeconomia.com/negocios-industrias/paraguay-entidad-de-electricidad-pierde-
us180m-al-ano-por-robo-y-causas-tecnicas, accessed 2013-03-01 
60 World Bank, 2009, “Reducing Technical and Non-Technical Losses in the Power Sector”, Background 
Paper, July 
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electricity price of US¢7.57 per kWh. The investment is therefore rapidly recovered 
through billing previously unmetered customers. While these estimations do not 
account for recurrent costs associated with field meter readings, these are likely to be 
minimal since labor costs in Paraguay are low compared to the recovered electricity and 
associated revenues. 
 
b) Demand-side approaches 
 
On the demand side, policies could aim to optimize electricity use and reduce power 
demand during peak hours. This is the time when the highest transmission losses occur. 
Smoothing energy consumption could help to partially offset the yearly increase in 
electricity demand and thus delay required infrastructure investments. 
 
Direct Load Control programs can be used to reduce peak loads by remotely switching 
off specific appliances. This type of program would be particularly appropriate for 
Paraguay, given the problems faced during peak hours in the summer months. Typical 
demand reductions are around 1kW for air conditioners and 0.6kW for water heaters of 
commercial customers.61 The switch can be operated through radio signals or digital 
paging. Depending on the duty cycle selected, the switch turns off the condensing unit 
or element for a specific period or various fractions of a period (e.g. 10 minutes every 
hour). Direct Load Control programs also typically limit the number of times or hours 
that a customer’s appliance can be turned off per year or per season.  
 
Box 3: Direct Load Control Program in Vietnam and in the United States 
 
In a Direct Load Control pilot program implemented in Vietnam, the load control was 
exercised only when the electric grid was experiencing a significant imbalance 
between supply and demand. The 2,000 participating customers were guaranteed that 
the load control would not be imposed more than 60 times in a year.62  
 
While Direct Load Control is not widespread in emerging and developing countries, it 
has been in operation for several decades in the United States. A variety of utilities 
started to develop and deploy large programs in the late 1960s and expanded them 
significantly in the 1980s and 1990s. So far, Florida Power & Light has implemented 
the largest program with 740,570 customers.63 
 
Dynamic pricing. Since the transmission and distribution infrastructure has to be 
designed so the network can handle the maximum instantaneous power demand, 
smoothing electricity consumption around peak hours allows the grid to bear growing 
electricity consumption without additional infrastructure requirements. This can save 
ANDE significant investment costs and spread these over a longer time-span. Dynamic 
pricing also has potential benefits for the customers, since a shift in consumption 
patterns can lead to lower electricity tariffs.  
                                                        
61 Thomas Weisel Partners, 2007, A Primer on Demand Response. The Power Grid: Evolving from a 
“Dumb” Network to a “Smart” Grid 
62 Charles River Associates, 2005, “Applications of Dynamic Pricing in Developing and Emerging 
Economies”, prepared for the World Bank 
63 Thomas Weisel Partners, 2007, A Primer on Demand Response. The Power Grid: Evolving from a 
“Dumb” Network to a “Smart” Grid 
 29 
 
Box 4: Dynamic Pricing in the United States 
 
According to McKinsey and Company, U.S. consumers could save up to US$15 billion 
per year if everyone would participate in a demand-response program by shifting 5-8 
percent of their electricity consumption from peak to off-peak periods and decreasing 
consumption by 4-7 percent. These shifts would also avoid 250 power plants handling 
a peak capacity of 31,250MW (equivalent to an investment of US$16 billion needed to 
meet the peak demand).64 In California, a study following the energy crisis of the 
summer of 2000 showed that peak hour price levels could have been reduced from 
US$750 per MWh to US$517 per MWh if hourly market-based prices had been in place, 
causing Californian consumers to lower peak demand by 193MW.65 
 
The introduction of Time-of-use Rates or Critical Peak Pricing in Paraguay could also 
have a significant impact on peak hours’ electricity demand.  A study analyzing the 
impact of 70 pilots among residential customers across three continents has shown that 
the introduction of dynamic pricing has led to a median peak demand reduction of 14-
18 percent.66 Assuming a peak demand reduction of 16 percent among residential 
consumers only, the total peak demand in Paraguay would decrease by 150 MW, 
bringing the maximum peak demand closer to the current system capacity. 
 
1.5 Summary of Findings and Recommendations 
 
1. The electricity sector is suffering from high inefficiencies. At the institutional 
level there is limited regulatory supervision of the monopoly state-owned power 
utility. As a result, the power utility company does not seem incentivized to cut 
losses in the system, increase operational efficiency and increase its low 
execution rate. There has also been a lack of investment in the transmission 
lines, which are loaded above capacity, and there is a lack of payment 
enforcement, as well as high incidence of electricity theft. 
 
2. The creation of a strong Ministry of Energy should help define a better-
integrated strategy for the energy sector and monitor the efficiency of the public 
power utility. The Ministry would also be responsible for coordinating the 
energy plans with other institutions. Municipal zoning by residential, commercial 
and industrial zones would help the planning process for electricity 
infrastructure in the country. 
 
3. While it is important to build new transmission lines to accommodate higher 
demand, emphasis also needs to be placed on reducing transmission losses at the 
distribution level, as these account for 75 percent of total losses. The 
Government could expand the advanced metering system so consumers can 
                                                        
64 McKinsey and Company, 2001, “White Paper: The Benefits of Demand-Side Management and Dynamic 
Pricing Programs”, May 
65 GAO, 2005, Electricity Markets. Consumers Could Benefit from Demand Programs, but Challenges 
Remain. August. 
66 Faruqi, 2010, “The Case for Dynamic Pricing”, presented in Sao Paulo, Brazil, 23 August 
http://www.brattle.com/_documents/uploadlibrary/upload870.pdf 
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optimize consumption. Direct Load Control programs and dynamic pricing can 
be used to reduce consumption during peak hours. Improving the distribution 
management model by outsourcing technical services to the private sector could 
increase bill collection rates and system performance. While this may lead to 
higher tariff rates, it could potentially halve the system losses and increase 
annual revenues by about US$50 million. 
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2.  Industrial Development and the Domestic 
Electricity Sector 
 
Solving the constraints addressed in Chapter 1 will unlock the potential for domestic 
development. The first section of this chapter provides an overview of the existing 
manufacturing sector, explains the channels through which reliable access to electricity 
will be growth-enhancing and provides a framework under which the Government can 
plan its industrial development. Seeing that reliable access to clean electricity at 
competitive prices will act as an incentive for energy intensive projects to install 
themselves in Paraguay, the second section focuses on these industries. It outlines the 
type of analysis the Government needs to undertake prior to accepting an energy 
intensive investment proposal such as the proposed Rio Tinto Alcan aluminum smelter 
and outlines the policies that need to be put in place to foster linkages to the local 
economy if the Government accepts such a proposal.  
 
2.1 Industrial Development 
 
Electricity is identified as a major constraint by businesses operating in Paraguay. 
Among the 361 firms surveyed in the country in 2010,67 37.7 percent identify electricity 
as a major business environment constraint (up from 27.5 percent in 2006) and 5.2 
percent estimated that electricity is the most important constraint; overall, electricity 
was ranked as the 6th most important constraint to business. It puts Paraguay in a 
situation comparable to Colombia or Uruguay.68 However, the impact of electrical 
outages on manufacturing and/or exporting activities is much higher in Paraguay than 
in these two countries as shown in Table 9.  
 
Table 9: Impact of Electricity Constraints on Businesses 
 
                                                        
67 World Bank Enterprise Survey Database, 2010 
68 Electricity as the most important constraint: Colombia (6.2 percent, rank 6th), Peru (3.6 percent, rank 
9th), Argentina (3.9 percent, rank 7th), Uruguay (4.6 percent, rank 7th), Chile (7 percent, rank 6th), Brazil (0 
percent, not in the top 10) 
Paraguay Colombia Uruguay
Surveyed: 361 firms 942 firms 607 firms
% of firms identifying electricity as a major constraint 37.7% 37.9% 33.7%
Manufacturing 47.5% 39.5% 34.7%
Retail 32.4% 25.4% 35.5%
Other services - 40.3% 29.4%
Exporter (at least 10% of sales) 40.6% 9.6% 29.4%
Non-exporter 37.5% 40.2% 34.1%
Losses due to electrical outages, as % of total annual sales 0.8% 0.5% 0.0%
Manufacturing 1.1% 0.5% -
Retail 0.3% 0.3% -
Other services - 0.5% -
Exporter (at least 10% of sales) 2.0% 0.2% 0.0%
Non-exporter 0.7% 0.6% 0.0%
Source: Enterprise Surveys (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org), The World Bank, 2010
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Frequent power outages result in significant losses from forgone sales and damaged 
equipment. It is estimated that in 2010, such losses represented around 1.1 percent of 
total annual manufacturing sales in Paraguay. Furthermore, Paraguay stands out as the 
country with the highest “percentage of firms expected to give gifts to get an electrical 
connection” as shown in Table 10.  
 
Table 10: Electricity Related Questions from the Business Survey 2010 
 
Source: Enterprise Surveys (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org), The World Bank, 2010 
 
Resolving the electricity constraints outlined in Chapter 1 will have a direct impact on 
the growth of the manufacturing sector. Using data from India’s Green Revolution years, 
Rud (2007) shows that 15 percent of the differential level in manufacturing output of 
the different states in India could be explained by the adequacy of the electricity 
supply.69 Chakravory et al. (2012) provide evidence that while a connection to the grid 
increased incomes in India, it was the availability of reliable power supply, which had a 
stronger impact.70 Access to reliable electricity is likely to increase manufacturing 
output through four channels: (1) Sales of existing manufacturing firms are increased as 
losses from outages are reduced; (2) productivity increases as manufacturing 
companies can produce without interruptions; (3) companies are more likely to invest 
in new machinery, as there is less fear of damaged equipment; and (4) new 
manufacturing firms are likely to spring up due to an improved business environment.  
 
To guide manufacturing investments in the future, the Government needs to define the 
goals it aims to achieve. Figure 8 gives an overview of Paraguay’s manufacturing sector 
                                                        
69 Rud, Juan Pablo (2007) Electricity Provision and Industrial Development: Evidence from India 
70 Chakravorty et al (2012) Impacts of Reliable Electricity Supply: Evidence from India 
Indicator Paraguay Argentina Brazil Bolivia Chile Colombia Ecuador Peru Uruguay
Venezuela,	
R.B.
South	
America
Percent	of	firms	owning	or	
sharing	a	generator
13.4				 								27.3	 								9.4	 								7.7	 					40.5	 							10.8	 					38.4	 					19.6	 						15.1	 										14.6	 19.68
Proportion	of	electricity	from	a	
generator	(%)
0.1						 										0.7	 								0.7	 								0.9	 								1.1	 										1.6	 								1.9	 								0.4	 									0.1	 												0.6	 0.81
If	a	generator	is	used,	average	
proportion	of	electricity	from	a	
generator	(%)
3.1						 										5.9	 								7.4	 					25.0	 								8.6	 							67.2	 					21.1	 								7.0	 									1.6	 										30.4	 17.73
Days	to	obtain	an	electrical	
connection	(upon	application)
23.2				 								54.2	 					36.8	 					21.2	 					21.1	 							20.9	 					10.7	 					33.4	 						15.5	 										13.9	 25.09
Percent	of	firms	identifying	
electricity	as	a	major	constraint
37.7				 								43.3	 					41.8	 					37.6	 					30.1	 							37.9	 					35.9	 					14.8	 						33.7	 										54.2	 36.7
Number	of	water	insufficiencies	
in	a	typical	month*
0.3						 										0.1	 								0.5	 								0.5	 										-			 										0.1	 								0.1	 								0.2	 									0.1	 												0.6	 0.25
Proportion	of	products	lost	to	
breakage	or	spoilage	during	
shipping	to	domestic	markets	
(%)*
1.1						 										1.1	 								0.8	 								1.0	 								0.7	 										1.3	 								1.0	 								0.7	 									0.9	 												1.2	 0.98
Percent	of	firms	identifying	
transportation	as	a	major	
constraint
25.1				 								26.1	 					30.2	 					30.2	 					27.2	 							25.9	 					31.1	 					15.0	 						18.6	 										20.5	 24.99
Percent	of	firms	expected	to	
give	gifts	to	get	an	electrical	
connection
21.2				 										0.8	 								6.1	 								0.7	 								0.6	 										1.9	 								1.1	 								1.3	 									0.1	 												3.4	 3.72
*	This	indicator	is	computed	using	data	from	manufacturing	firms	only
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in 200871  and shows that while the meat-processing industry was the largest 
contributor to industrial GDP, the textiles/apparel sector was the largest industrial 
employer and oil processing accounted for almost half of industrial exports. This 
exemplifies how different industrial sectors contribute to different goals.  
 
Figure 8: The Paraguayan Industrial Sector in 2008 
 
Source: Porto & Vallarino (forthcoming) Política Industrial e Institucionalidad productiva en Paraguay 
 
By the same token, the energy intensive industries are likely to have a large impact on 
GDP and exports, but will create few employment opportunities given that the sector is 
capital intensive.  
 
While it is beyond the scope of this report to provide a detailed analysis of which 
sectors the Government could prioritize if it aims to diversify its economy, the selection 
of the sectors should be based on Paraguay’s employment situation, comparative 
advantages, policy goals and future prospects of the specific sectors. In terms of the 
employment situation in 2011, 181,000 people were actively looking for a job and 22 
percent of the working population was sub-employed.72 Employment creation can be 
expected to become increasingly important considering that the country has the 
youngest working age population73 and highest population growth rate in the region.74 
 
                                                        
71 For the decomposition of the industrial sector for all three indicators no data was found post-2008. The 
2012 Economic Census provides updated employment figures, but groups the industrial sectors 
differently. 
72 Source: Central Intelligence Agency 
73 Source: REDIEX 
74 Source: Central Intelligence Agency 
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As for the comparative advantages, apart from cheap and abundant electricity (once the 
constraints set out in Chapter 1 are addressed), the country benefits from several other 
comparative advantages, as outlined in annex A. These include a relatively inexpensive 
labor force (although not highly skilled75), its location next to the largest economies in 
the region and its free trade access to these markets through the Mercosur agreement. 
The regional dynamics of rising production costs in Brazil, and investors in Argentina 
facing an increasingly difficult business environment, might also play a role when 
companies decide where to establish themselves in the region. While it could be argued 
that the low tax burden and fiscal incentive provisions act as an additional incentive for 
companies to invest in Paraguay, this has not been assessed for the 60/90 and Maquila 
laws. “The balance of evidence from developing countries suggests that fiscal incentives 
do not effectively counterbalance unattractive investment climate conditions.”76 
 
The composition of the industrial sector shown in Figure 8 already gives a good 
indication of the industries that place more importance on Paraguay’s comparative 
advantages. The textiles sector, for example, is labor intensive and does not require a 
highly skilled workforce. The exports of processed meat reflect the value chain 
opportunities from the agriculture sector and regional demand for this product. The 
current industrial sector composition also provides a good starting point to analyze 
where the Government is most likely to attract investment in the future. It is easier for a 
company to set up where vertical, upstream and/or downstream linkages already exist.  
 
As agriculture still plays a key role in the Paraguayan economy and expertise already 
exists in this area, the agro-processing sector could be the starting point for 
industrialization. This sector creates employment opportunities and does not require a 
highly skilled labor force. The latest economic census estimates that in Paraguay, 21 
percent of industrial employment in 2010 was attributed to agro-processing77 (almost 
triple the employees than in furniture manufacturing, which was listed as the second 
largest employment sector). Furthermore, the agribusiness sector connects farmers to 
markets, thereby reaching some of the poorest parts of the population and contributing 
to geographically balanced economic development.78 As an off-taker of produce, 
successful agribusiness investments in turn stimulate agriculture growth. Agro-based 
industries, especially when clustered, can also create the skills, services and 
infrastructure needed for further industrial development.79  
 
                                                        
75 See Annex A – labor force competitiveness 
76 World Bank (2009) Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications 
77 Censo Economico National 2011: Resultados Oportunos 
78 UNIDO (2013) Agribusiness for Africa’s Prosperity – Country Case Studies 
79 World Bank (2013) Africa: Unlocking the Potential of Agribusiness 
 35 
Box 5: Thai Agribusiness Model80 
 
Apart from exporting agriculture commodities such as rice, rubber, cassava and sugar, 
Thailand has successfully moved into higher-value products over time. Today, the 
country has become a leading exporter of poultry, pineapple, fruit, vegetable and other 
processed and prepared foods. It has its own multinational agribusiness, Charoen 
Pokphand, which is an animal feed, poultry, aquaculture, food processing, seed, and food 
retailing enterprise.  
 
This was achieved through strong Government support to the farming and agribusiness 
sectors. A consistent policy of giving a leading role to the private sector was maintained 
and the state bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives provided financial 
support. After acquiring its initial competitive edge through land and labor expansion, 
Thai agribusiness has maintained a competitive position since the 1990s through sharp 
increases in agricultural productivity. 
 
Medium-scale farmers with 5–15 hectares have led the commercialization of the sector 
and stimulated a vibrant agribusiness sector consisting of small and medium 
enterprises. In central Thailand, these enterprises include construction operations, rice 
and sugar mills, cassava brokers, producers of cassava pellets for export, metal 
workshops and agricultural equipment manufacturers, as well as livestock feed mills 
and village shops. 
This successful agro-industry support model has helped to reduce rural poverty sharply 
from 60 percent in the 1960s to 10 percent in recent years.  
 
By looking at linkages between products with international trade data, Hidalgo et al. 
(2007) have built a theory of proximity between products showing this graphically as 
the ‘product space’.81 Without going into detail on the theory, the basic argument is that 
some products are more likely to be produced in tandem than others. If, for example, a 
country produces apples, it is quite probable that it will also be producing pears, seeing 
that the expertise, inputs and weather conditions are similar. Some products have 
closer and more numerous linkages than others, making spillover effects more likely 
and enabling economic diversification. While agro-processed products could be 
prioritized in the short term given the current competitive advantage of Paraguay in 
this sector, they have fewer connections and less spillover possibilities to other sectors. 
Paraguay also exports apparel, leather, furniture, medicaments and plastics. These are 
more ‘complex’ products according to the product space theory and have higher 
spillover possibilities. Hence, these could be additional sectors that the Government 
might want to consider prioritizing.  
 
The prioritization will require a national industrial policy, which is aligned to the 
broader objectives of the Government and sets out clear objectives and instruments to 
support the selected sectors. Resources will have to be spent to support the policy. 
Areas of support include sector specific infrastructure, training programs, research and 
                                                        
80 World Bank (2013) Africa: Unlocking the Potential of Agribusiness 
81 For more information on this theory and an interactive map of Paraguay, see 
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/ 
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development, access to finance and technical assistance in standards and market access. 
Chile’s experience in drafting an industrial policy and driving diversification contain 
some valuable lessons that could be adapted to the Paraguayan context.  
 
Box 6: Chile’s Pillars for Diversification: Innovation and Knowledge82 
By the end of the 1990’s after implementing several industrial policies to be less 
dependent on the copper industry, opening up to international capital flows and trade 
and improving its macroeconomic fundamentals, Chile realized that more reform was 
needed to achieve higher levels of development. In 2005 this awareness led to the 
creation of the National Strategy of Innovation for Competitiveness (NSIC). The NSIC is 
a public-private advisory board for the president of Chile, whose goal was to prepare a 
strategic plan for Chile’s productive sector for the following 15 years. The NSIC aimed 
to increase Chile’s knowledge-based productivity while achieving sustainable and 
inclusive long-term growth. NSIC’s view was that Chile should not move away from its 
competitive advantages in natural resource extraction, but should use the revenues to 
help diversify its economy.  Finland, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand were to serve 
as model countries. These developed economies have achieved sustainable and 
inclusive growth as a result of skilled human capital, innovative capacities, new 
technology in their productive process, high investments in R&D and above all solid 
institutions and economic incentives to foster and promote entrepreneurship and 
innovation.  
On that basis NSIC commissioned a research study identifying key competitive sectors 
with the potential to help Chile achieve a per capita income of $25,000; increase 
Chile’s contribution to total-factor productivity; reach 80 percent enrollment in 
secondary education for the 18- to 24-year-old population; reach 2.5 percent of GDP in 
R&D expenditures; increase diversification according to international rankings; and 
improve Chile’s place in relevant international competitiveness indices by 2021. The 
study came up with 7 clusters based on current importance in GDP; a 10-year forecast 
on the importance of each sector relative to GDP; opportunities and challenges that 
each sector may present (geographical location, presence of natural resources, human 
capital, FDI, access to technology, infrastructure, associability, environmental 
sustainability, regulatory framework etc.); and degree of state intervention needed to 
achieve its potential.  The clusters chosen were: aquiculture, fruit cultivation, mining, 
swine and aviculture, global services, specialty tourism and functional foods. Logistics 
and transport, telecommunications and financial services were considered strategic 
pillars.  
The entrepreneurs and SMEs belonging to these clusters have been benefiting from 
special support and incentives in innovation and technology. The funding of this new 
industrial policy has mostly come from copper revenues through a new royalty tax on 
mining. 
The national consensus around the need to diversify and to move up to a more 
sophisticated, productive base was instrumental in the implementation of the national 
strategy. Public sector, private actors and academia worked to achieve the strategic 
goals enunciated in the strategy. In 2010, an international evaluation report stated 
                                                        
82 Varas, M. E. (2008). Economic Diversification: The Case of Chile. New York: Revenue Watch Institute 
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that the NSIC was a driving force in achieving higher level of growth and innovation, 
but that there were still challenges in the diversification process. For instance, the 
workforce is still not educated enough to meet the needs of a higher added-value 
production base. Also tailored and coordinated programs are needed to support a 
higher level of SME participation in the economy, since SME development has been 
hampered by uncoordinated and sometimes duplicative public and semi-public 
programs, instruments and subsidies. To solve this problem the international expert 
panel suggested that the NSIC strengthen its role in coordinating the different public 
policies in place. 
 
Industrial zones and parks have been used as a tool in the past to provide better 
infrastructure and targeted support to industries in defined areas. The agglomeration of 
industries can also increase economies of scale, as industries are located close to 
upstream and downstream companies. The expectation is that the knowledge spillovers 
eventually translate into private sector development and productivity increases for the 
entire economy.  
 
There are just as many success stories as failures for industrial zone programs. In China, 
Taiwan and Bangladesh, for example, industrial zones have attracted investment, 
created employment opportunities and are seen as key drivers in the diversification 
process of the respective economies. In Latin America, Costa Rica is often cited as the 
country that has successfully implemented an industrial zone program.83 After setting 
up its special economic zone close to the capital (due to good infrastructure access) in 
the mid-1980’s, the country managed to attract large-scale garment investments that 
generated 37,000 jobs by the end of the decade.84 To move into more advanced 
manufacturing sectors, the investment promotion agency was restructured and linked 
to the national education programs. As a result, training courses were provided for 
technical skills needed in the semiconductor, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment 
industries. In the mid-1990’s Intel invested in a large semiconductor plant in the 
country with many investors following suit. It is interesting to note that both Chile and 
Costa Rica’s experiences evidence the need for a Government-led educational program 
leading to an educated workforce. 
At the same time, many industrial parks have failed. This is particularly true for Sub-
Saharan African countries.85 Investments in industrial park infrastructure have resulted 
in “white elephants” that have failed to attract companies or have appealed only to 
enterprises that take advantage of tax breaks with little contribution to the 
Governments’ goals of employment creation or value addition. Even if employment 
opportunities were created in the short term, in some cases these were unsustainable 
once labor costs increased and/or trade access ceased to exist, because the companies 
were attracted by fiscal incentives rather than real comparative advantages. When 
industrial zone investments were detached from the comparative advantages and 
existing value chains, the spillover effects were non-existent, as there was no room for 
                                                        
83 World Bank 2011, Special Economic Zones in Africa: Comparing Performance and Learning from Global 
Experience 
84 CDE 2012, Special Economic Zones: Lessons for South Africa from International Evidence and Local 
Experience 
85 World Bank 2011 - Cluster Based Industrial Parks: A practical framework for action 
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transfer of skills and technology to the local economy. The World Bank concluded that 
the industrial zone programs in Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania 
have not led to structural changes in export patterns and have failed to provide good 
quality, upgradeable job opportunities.86 
 
Past experiences show that industrial zones can only play a role in attracting 
sustainable investment if they are part of an overarching industrial strategy that is 
based on the comparative advantages of the country. The commercial case should be the 
basis of any industrial park development plan. Bangladesh, for example, only reaped the 
rewards of its industrial zone program once it switched from aiming to attract 
investment in high-technology sectors (for which there was a lack of a qualified labor 
force at the time) to the garments sector. Basing the selection process on comparative 
advantages is also important to guarantee the long-term sustainability of the industries 
that setup in the zone.  
 
If the Government of Paraguay opts to include industrial parks in its industrial policy, it 
will need to guarantee the provision of serviced land and supporting infrastructure 
within the defined area. Core infrastructure includes an internal road network, drainage 
system, sewage and solid waste collection, power-substation and distribution system, 
water storage and distribution system, and information and communication network. 
Depending on the specific industries that the Government aims to attract, supporting 
infrastructure will differ. Food-processing industries, for example, will require cold 
storage facilities, warehouse facilities and/or milk chilling plants.  
 
The infrastructure development does not stop at the gates of the industrial zone and the 
location of the zone will be a defining factor for its success. The location decision should 
be based on the access to quality infrastructure that links the zone to input and output 
markets, access to the labor force intended to work in the zone and areas where the 
Government expects the most linkages and spillover effects to take place. Hence the 
industrial zone should lie along the major trade gateways and close to the largest 
metropolitan areas. This is especially true if the Government aims to attract 
manufacturers that require imported inputs, business services, large pools of labor and 
transport networks. Industrial zoning should not be viewed as a regional development 
tool, but rather be based on the attractiveness to potential investors.  
 
To better plan for such industrial zoning, the Government could adopt a spatial 
development corridor approach. Spatial Development corridors are transport/trade 
corridors characterized by under-utilized economic potential in their environs, but that 
could be unlocked with spatial planning. “They are therefore seen as a means of 
configuring, prioritizing and promoting inter-related infrastructure and large-scale 
economic sectoral investments in defined geographic areas so as to promote trade and 
investment led economic growth; optimize the use of infrastructure; encourage value-
added processing; and enhance the competitiveness of the country. At the regional level 
the [Spatial Development Corridor] model encourages integrated development within a 
given space defined by its economic potential rather than by political boundaries.”87 
                                                        
86 World Bank 2011, Special Economic Zones in Africa: Comparing Performance and Learning from Global 
Experience 
87 Thomas, R. H. (2009, January). Development Corridors and Spatial Development in Africa. Washington, 
D.C. 
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Spatial development corridor planning could cover the route of the 500kv line given 
that the route is often close to main roads and trade corridors. For instance, the first 
segment of the line going from Puerto Botanico through Carayo and Itakyry to Itaipú, 
will pass slightly above roads 2 and 7 and therefore cross the industrial areas of Central 
and Cordillera departments.  In the Central Department, there are several 
manufacturing industries including food processing, wood furniture, fabrics, footwear, 
pharmaceuticals, graphic, plastics and metals. Also the main offices and distribution of 
multinational companies are settled here, such as Praxair, Air Liquid, Exxon, Unilever, 
Watts, Parmalat and Coca Cola. In the Cordillera Department, small food and 
agribusiness industries have installed themselves, including spirits, sweets, leather and 
construction materials.88 
 
The goal would be to intensify SME involvement in this area, given SMEs’ importance 
for job creation, by providing improved electricity and infrastructure access. The 
principal elements of a corridor development strategy include: (i) coordination of both 
public and private sector investments in the corridor; (ii) ensuring political buy-in to 
enable focused planning; and (iii) the recourse to publicized opportunities (such as road 
shows and investor conferences) to market opportunities in the corridors. Such 
opportunities will need to be identified and economically viable for potential 
investors.89 
Apart from the location decision and infrastructure provision, the Government will need 
to create a clear legal and regulatory framework that defines the rules of the game for 
all stakeholders involved in the industrial zone development program. Private 
participation in ownership and management of the industrial park should be 
encouraged to share the risk of infrastructure investments and create profit-driven 
incentives. Successful models have included a variety of public private partnerships 
with equity shifting arrangements where the private company is allowed to purchase 
options once pre-defined performance targets have been achieved.90 Furthermore, 
there should be a clear legal framework in place for investors. To minimize the 
distortions of incentives, foreign and local investors are encouraged to be treated 
equally, and any incentives offered should be irrespective of whether the investment is 
located within or outside the industrial zone. It should be noted that on a global basis, 
incentives have not had a measurable effect on the success of special economic zones.91 
Implementing the basic rules of a successful setup for an industrial park as described 
above helps to ensure that industrial zones are integrated in the local economy, thereby 
driving the diversification process of the whole economy rather than only within the 
borders of the zone. The Government should further encourage the interaction between 
companies within and outside the zones to maximize the spillover effects and positive 
externalities (as described in the following section). 
 
                                                        
88 http://www.abc.com.py/articulos/el-paraguay-produce-33722.html 
89 Thomas, R. H. (2009, January). Development Corridors and Spatial Development in Africa. Washington, 
D.C. 
90 World Bank 2011 - Cluster Based Industrial Parks: A practical framework for action 
91 World Bank 2011, Special Economic Zones in Africa: Comparing Performance and Learning from Global 
Experience 
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2.2 Energy-Intensive Industries 
 
The section above highlights the need to base the prioritization of industrial 
development on Paraguay’s comparative advantages. Clean and abundant electricity at 
competitive prices will be a large incentive for energy intensive industries to invest in 
Paraguay once the Government overcomes the problems identified in Chapter 1. This 
will especially be the case once more stringent worldwide environmental regulations 
and carbon tariffs are introduced for products with environmentally harmful 
production processes. 
 
Energy-intensive industries are characterized by being capital intensive and using large 
amounts of heat/energy to physically or chemically transform materials. Figure 9 shows 
the eight industries where energy costs make up more than 10 percent of operational 
costs.  
 
Figure 9: Average Energy Use as a Percentage of Operating Costs of Energy-
intensive Industries 
 
Source: Team analysis, European Commission-Enterprise and Industry, US Department of Energy-Advanced 
Manufacturing Office, CRU 
 
In some countries these industries consume up to half the energy of the entire industrial 
sector. The energy sources vary depending on cost and availability. For example, 90 
percent of the energy used by Aluar (Argentinian aluminum smelter) comes from 
natural gas, while coal is most widely used for aluminum smelting in China and 
geothermal power in Iceland. Table 11 shows that all industries identified in Figure 9 
can use electricity, which is the energy of choice in the case of Paraguay.  
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Table 11: Energy Sources for Production by Industry 
 
 
Since energy intensive industries are not labor intensive, the real reward from these 
investments are 1) the potential Government revenues and/or 2) the extent to which 
they act as an anchor to attract further companies to the country, thereby supporting 
the diversification process. These are the two key variables that the Government needs 
to analyze when it assesses an investment proposal by an energy intensive industry. 
The section below exemplifies such analysis for the proposed Rio Tinto Alcan project 
proposal. 
 
2.2.1 Proposed Rio Tinto Alcan (RTA) Project  
 
Rio Tinto Alcan has approached the Government of Paraguay to invest in a $4bn 
aluminum smelter in the country. The proposal foresees the production of 670,000 
metric tons of aluminum per annum and would consume 1,100MW of Paraguay’s 
electricity (compared to a peak demand of 2,137MW in 2011). This investment proposal 
can provide the opportunity for Paraguay to diversify its economy if it attracts 
downstream beneficiation industries and creates linkages to the local service economy 
thereby fostering the transfer of skills to its local population. However, it might also 
present a substantial risk to the Government of losing out on revenues from electricity 
exports to neighboring countries. Paraguay would have to commit a large proportion of 
its electricity to one single company for many years to come whereas Paraguay’s large 
net export capacity will shrink considerably within 20 years even without the RTA 
project.  Table 12 lists potential benefits and drawbacks of the RTA project and provides 
an overview of Government actions that could help to minimize the risks and maximize 
the benefits.  
 
Table	1.	Energy	sources	for	production	per	industry
Energy-Intensive	Industries Fuel	Oil Electricity Biomass Natural	Gas Coal
Glass	Industry x x
Cement,	lime	and	plaster	industry	 x x
Iron	and	steel	industry	 x x x x
Ceramic	products	industry	 x x
Bricks,	tiles	and	construction	products	 x x
Pulp,	paper	and	paperboard	industry	 x x x x
Aluminum	Casting	Industry x x x x
Chemical	products	industry	 x x x x x
Source:	Team	analysis,	European	Commission-Enterprise	and	Industry,	
US	Department	of	Energy-Advanced	Manufacturing	Office,	CRU
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Table 12: Potential Benefits and Risks of the Proposed RTA Project 
Factor Potential Benefits Potential Risks Actions to maximize potential benefits and lower potential risks 
Government 
revenues 
Higher Government 
revenues resulting from tax 
receipts 
Lower Government revenues 
due to preferential electricity 
tariffs and fiscal incentives  
• Compare Government revenues resulting from electricity sales to RTA with 
alternative options using a fiscal model over the lifetime of the project 
• Drive a hard bargain and avoid accepting a deal where the opportunity cost of 
selling the electricity to RTA instead of alternative options is too high. 
Employment Job creation Employment of expatriates 
• Discuss local employment targets with investor 
• Carefully draft the contractual language on local content provisions (define an 
employment plan with reporting/monitoring mechanisms and ensure annual 
review mechanisms of the plans) 
Transfer of 
knowledge and 
technology 
Increased skill level of 
Paraguayan employees and 
companies serving the 
smelter 
Lack of transfer due to 
employment of expatriates and 
contracting foreign firms due 
to human capacity constraints 
in Paraguay and lack of clear 
and explicit contractual 
requirements 
• Discuss local content targets over time (employment and training) with the 
investor and the possibility of joint venture with local companies (most effective 
way of knowledge transfer) 
• Map out labor and services demand projections and create/provide training 
courses accordingly  
• Carefully draft the contractual language on local content provisions (clearly 
define the employment and training plan, decide what knowledge and technology 
transfer consists of, setup reporting/monitoring mechanisms and implement an 
annual review) 
Diversification of 
the economy 
Economy less reliant on 
agriculture 
Enclave production without 
downstream processing and 
imported services 
• Discuss what proportion of the aluminum is going to be processed locally  
• Discuss local content targets (procurement) with the investor during the 
planning phase to ensure these are included in the design of the investor’s plan 
• Identify potential companies that could serve the primary/secondary industries 
and provide technical support to guarantee necessary quality 
• Provide access to finance 
• Draft the contractual language of local content provision (clearly define what 
“local company”, “local sourcing”, “competitive goods and services” mean; describe 
the tendering process for local companies; setup reporting/monitoring 
mechanisms for local content provisions and agree on review mechanisms) 
Infrastructure 
Improved port, road and 
electricity infrastructure 
around the investment 
Enclave infrastructure model 
• Ensure multi-user and multi-purpose access to infrastructure 
• Take into account regional infrastructure demand/opportunities during the 
conceptualization phase 
GDP 
Increase in GDP during 
construction and operation 
period 
GDP impact felt only by a small 
minority of the population 
• Foster backward linkages to the local economy by a strong SME development 
program  
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Institutional 
capacity 
Increased institutional 
capacity to negotiate and 
manage big international 
investments 
Conflict of interests and 
corruption 
• Ensure a transparent negotiating process, publish contracts and tariff 
agreements 
• Establish a multi-ministerial team, including environmental and social expertise 
capable of assessing the long-term impact of the investment 
• Consult the civil society in the negotiation process and provide regular updates 
on the negotiation process 
Investor 
confidence  
Lower perceived risk by 
investors due to large 
investment 
Worries that political attention 
is focused on large investment 
rather than smaller players 
• Use investment as marketing tool 
• Prepare strategic development plan that involves all actors in the economy based 
on multi-stakeholder consultations 
• Create an agency to carry out the strategic development plan and that 
coordinates all Government actions and policies around that strategic plan- the 
goal is to avoid the multiplication of uncoordinated duplicative policies seeking the 
same objective 
Electricity tariffs 
Constant, guaranteed and 
easily projected tariff 
revenues 
• Lower tariff revenues than 
exports 
• Lower tariff revenues than 
from sales to other users 
• Negotiate an acceptable electricity tariff for both parties taking into account that 
the investor will also include infrastructure and fiscal payments into account when 
deciding whether to invest 
Aggregate 
demand  
Increased demand of local 
goods and services 
Inflation 
• Coordinate with investor to estimate the potential demand for goods and 
services during the construction phase  
• Invest in a SME development program to boost productivity and increase supply 
Balance of 
Payments 
Net Increase in balance of 
payments because of high 
value-added exports  
Decrease in balance of 
payments during construction 
period because of imports 
• Promote downstream and backward linkages to limit imports in the construction 
phase and increase value –added exports 
 
Local impact 
• Higher employment 
• Better infrastructure 
• Transfer of knowledge 
• Rise in inequality 
• Environmental damage 
• Displacement of population 
• Contractually request participatory and detailed social and environmental impact 
assessments and resettlement policies if needed 
• Setup monitoring mechanisms  
• Discuss development tax with the investor 
 
Exchange Rate 
 Cheaper imports as a 
result of the appreciation 
of the real exchange rate   
 
• Less competitive exports as a 
result of the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate  
 Harmful impact on the non-
tradable economy resulting 
from cheaper imports 
• Increase productivity of the domestic productive sector  
• Careful macroeconomic management 
Source: Team analysis, CRU     
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The remaining section analyzes several of the benefits/risks highlighted in Table 
12.  
 
Opportunity Cost of Selling Excess Electricity to RTA  
 
In 2011, CRU Consulting provided the Government of Paraguay with a detailed 
study on the RTA project. The CRU model was used to estimate the quantifiable 
opportunity cost of selling the 1,100MW to RTA compared to continued sales to 
Brazil under different tariff scenarios.92 The first sub-section below models the 
highest electricity tariff that RTA would be willing to pay without turning the net 
present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR) negative for the company. 
The second sub-section will maximize the Government’s NPV by including taxes, 
while still ensuring that the NPV and IRR for RTA are positive. The following 
changes were made to the CRU model: 
 
 Where accessible, prices and macroeconomic variables were updated 
with 2011 and 2012 data. Variables include: US GDP deflator, US CPI, 
aluminum prices (LME cash history) and Paraguay’s CPI changes. The 
LME, 3-month aluminum history prices were also updated using CRU’s 
latest forecasts, which foresee an aluminum price of around 
US$3,500/ton in 2030. 
 All associated infrastructure costs in the model were assigned to the 
Government rather than being shared 50/50; reducing the front-loaded 
costs to RTA will enable the Government to ensure multi-user access to 
the infrastructure and to charge higher taxes/tariff rates during the 
operational phase. This includes the Parana river-dredging cost, the 
electricity substation cost and the port upgrade cost. By financing this 
upfront investment, the Government will be able to increase the 
taxes/tariffs charged at a later stage and increase RTA’s overall NPV. This 
change in assumption can be justified if the Government has access to 
concessional loans for such infrastructure investments.  
 
In addition to the changes above, this scenario also assumes zero taxes. This is 
not to suggest that not charging taxes is desirable. This report would argue the 
contrary (as explained below), but eliminating taxes can usefully illustrate the 
maximum electricity tariff that RTA would be willing to pay according to CRU’s 
model. 
 
On the basis of these assumptions, the blue columns in Figure 10 represent the 
yearly estimated revenues from electricity sales to RTA for 9,567GWh93 taking 
into account 3 percent transmission losses.94 Under an inflation- escalation 
power contract linked 100 percent to US CPI95 and assuming no other taxes, RTA 
                                                        
92 It should be noted that the estimated tax revenues and electricity tariffs are purely based on 
the model and are not a reflection of proposals by either RTA or the Government of Paraguay. 
Negotiations are at a very early stage and these issues are yet to be discussed. 
93 1,100MW≈9576450MWh/year 
94 Proyecto Planta de Aluminio y Complejo Industrial en Paraguay PPT (June 2012) 
95 IMF: International Financial Statistics 
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would pay a tariff of US$36.1/MWh in 2011, which increases to US$41.38/MWh 
in 2017 when operations commence according to the model. This maximum 
tariff estimate is consistent with other studies that were submitted to the 
Government. 
 
The three black lines represent the revenues the Government would receive 
from selling the electricity to Brazil under a low (opp. cost 1), medium (opp. cost 
2) and high-tariff scenario (opp. cost 3).96 Until 2022, it is assumed that Brazil 
will pay the average electricity cost of US$37.5/MWh plus the compensation of 
US$8.9/MWh. The average electricity cost is adjusted by 0.95 percent per 
annum97 and the compensation by US CPI.98 Thereafter, the opportunity cost 
diverges, as revenues depend on the post-Itaipú debt tariff agreement. Currently, 
the Itaipú tariff is largely made up of debt servicing. This will cease to be the case 
when the debt is fully repaid, which the current treaty agreement stipulates to be 
in 2023. In the low-tariff scenario it is assumed that Brazil and Paraguay share 
the amount of the tariff that is currently going into debt repayment. According to 
CRU, this would translate into a tariff of US$35.1/MWh in 2023. Assuming that 
this tariff is linked to the US CPI thereafter, Figure 10 shows that the Government 
is likely to receive higher revenues from selling the 1,100MW to RTA rather than 
to Brazil. 
 
Figure 10: Electricity Tariffs RTA Would be Willing to Pay if No Taxes are 
Imposed 
 
Source: CRU’s model, Proyecto Planta de Aluminio y Complejo Industrial en Paraguay PPT (Junio 2012)  
 
                                                        
96 It could be argued that exports with current and planned power capacity will not continue 
until 2050. However, the opportunity cost needs to be estimated for the lifetime of the aluminum 
smelter. Once exports seize to exist, the opportunity cost will be relative to domestic industries. 
97 Annual increase of cost of energy according to ‘Proyecto Planta de Aluminio y Complejo 
Industrial en Paraguay’ PPT (Junio 2012). While, 3 out of the 5 factors determining the tariff and 
the compensation payments are directly linked to the US CPI, debt servicing is not and therefore 
the tariff increase until 2023 is expected to be below US inflation. 
98 Annex C of Itaipú Treaty 
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The medium-tariff scenario assumes that the debt servicing component of the 
guaranteed energy tariff will go to Paraguay rather than being shared (inflating 
2011 guaranteed electricity tariff of US$43.8/MWh by 0.95 percent until 2022 
and compensation of US$8.9/MWh by US CPI). Under this scenario the revenues 
from electricity sales to Brazil will always be higher than revenues from sales to 
RTA.99 Finally, the high-tariff scenario assumes that Paraguay can sell the 
electricity in Brazil at market price. In the first half of 2012, the average contract 
price at point of generation in Brazil was US$59.87/MWh (see Table 17). 
Inflating this price by 2.5 percent100 until 2022 and linking it to the US CPI 
thereafter shows that sales to RTA would result in large revenue losses.  
 
Metal Linked Power Contract with a Resource Rent Tax 
 
The previous sub-section gives an indication of the maximum electricity tariff 
RTA is willing to pay with no other taxes in place. However, the electricity tariff 
weighs heavily on RTA’s NPV analysis, as these costs are incurred early on in the 
project. By granting RTA a lower electricity tariff, but charging taxes on 
revenues, the Government can increase its overall take without harming RTA’s 
NPV analysis. This sub-section shows that overall revenues for the Government 
increase by charging a lower tariff rate, but also charging taxes. 
 
For this purpose, all taxes in the CRU model are activated (1 percent gross 
revenue tax on exported share of sales, 9 percent taxes on wages paid by the 
employee, 10 percent personal income tax, 1 percent property tax, 0.05 percent 
commercial license tax on book value of plant, 10 percent corporate profit tax, 5 
percent tax on all dividends, 16.5 percent of employee benefits). Furthermore, an 
additional 1 percent environmental tax on total investment, the 14.3 percent tax 
on dividends paid abroad and the 10.7 percent on interest from bank loans are 
imposed. The environmental tax is included on the grounds of the adverse 
environmental impacts resulting from this investment. The dividend tax, with a 
relatively smaller negative impact on the NPV of the company compared to the 
positive impact on Paraguay’s NPV, acts as a disincentive to full profit 
repatriation, and the 10.7 percent tax rate on interest from bank loans is 
included to discourage transfer pricing.  
 
Finally, the model also includes a resource rent tax (RRT), which was not part of 
the original CRU model. 101 The RRT allows the Government to increase its 
returns once the company has become profitable. The main advantage of the 
resource rent tax is its “neutrality.” A company’s calculation of a project’s 
profitability (which in turn influences the decision of whether to invest) 
discounts future cash payments more heavily than early payments; therefore, 
                                                        
99 This is also the case when using the average electricity price of US$35.1/MWh as a starting 
point. 
100 This is a conservative inflator as prices are expected to grow faster than inflation as explained 
in section 3.2 
101 While such a tax has been used in the mining industry, we are unaware of its implementation 
in the aluminum-smelting sector. This can largely be traced back to smaller profit margins. It is 
unlikely that RTA would be willing to accept a RRT. However, it has been included in this paper 
for illustrative purposes to compare the maximum possible revenue streams from RTA with 
potential revenue streams from electricity exports. 
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RRT payments that would be made many years after the initial investment only 
have a minimal impact on calculations of profitability, and thus do not alter 
investment decisions. 
The disadvantage of the RRT is its complexity in terms of assessment and 
monitoring. The administrative cost of maintaining a RRT largely depends on the 
capacity of the host country to monitor the company’s output and audit the 
accounts, capacity that should be built by the tax administration irrespective of 
the resource rent tax implementation (to audit the corporate income tax 
payments for instance). 
In the model, the first threshold of the RRT is chosen to be 7 percent of IRR 
followed by a second threshold of 11 percent as shown in Figure 11. 
Figure 11: Resource Rent Tax 
 
 
Including the taxes described above and using a metal linked power contract at a 
rate of indexation of 1.33 percent102, Figure 12 shows that overall Government 
revenues increase compared to the example in the previous sub-section 
(although the electricity tariff in 2017 is only US$33.3/MWh). This is especially 
the case once the RRT takes effect. Overall the NPV of the Government is 
increased by 15 percent, while the IRR of RTA remains unchanged. 
 
                                                        
102 I.e. the price of electricity is always 1.33 percent of the price of aluminum. If the price of 
aluminum were to be US$1500/ton, the electricity price would be US$20/MWh. 
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Figure 12: Projected Revenues from RTA Under the Best Possible Scenario 
 
Source: Model projections, Proyecto Planta de Aluminio y Complejo Industrial en Paraguay PPT (Junio 
2012)  
 
As in the previous figure, the three Government revenue scenarios are modeled. 
Under the low-revenue scenario, the Government can expect higher revenues 
from selling the electricity to RTA, rather than to Brazil. Under the medium-
revenue scenario, it could be argued that the opportunity cost is offset by 
employment creation and downstream/upstream linkages.103 Under the high-
revenue scenario the Government would significantly lose out on revenues as a 
result of selling the electricity to RTA rather than exporting it. To put this in 
perspective, a US¢1/kWh difference in electricity tariff would result in yearly 
Government revenue loss worth US$96 million (or US$47,882 per employee if 
2000 direct jobs were to be created by the RTA project).104 We believe that such 
revenue losses would probably not be made up by non-monetary benefits such 
as employment creation and linkages. Instead, the Government could use higher 
revenues to build up its infrastructure and human capital, both factors that are 
rated highly when companies decide to invest. A better-educated workforce and 
lower infrastructure bottlenecks will incentivize investment in the future and 
hence create more employment opportunities in the long run than a capital-
intensive mega-investment such as RTA. Countries that are successfully focusing 
on attracting mega-investments and building linkages are already advanced in 
terms of their infrastructure and human capital. The return and multiplier effect 
on improved infrastructure and education for Paraguay would probably be 
higher than the return on the RTA investment. Furthermore, with additional 
revenues, the Government can itself create jobs in the public sector such as 
health and education. 
                                                        
103 Using the average rather than the guaranteed electricity price, the revenues from RTA in the 
simulation would be marginally higher from 2032 onwards due to the RRT 
104 Based on CRU’s calculation that RTA will be consuming 9,576,450MWh (1,100MW)  
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We are optimistic that Paraguay can secure a good sales price for its electricity 
abroad, higher than today’s tariff. Thus we consider that the high and medium 
scenarios are highly probable whereas employment creation and 
downstream/upstream linkages are not guaranteed.  Paraguay’s neighbors are 
all experiencing rapid increases in electricity demand, and at marginal 
generating costs that are typically far above the US$52.7/MWh that Paraguay 
receives for its guaranteed electricity exports (see Section 3.2).  
Paraguay will most likely absorb its current electricity capacity with its own 
domestic use within the next 25 years, moving from a large net exporter of 
electricity to a situation where domestic demand is roughly balanced with 
supply (see Section 3.2).  Of course by then Paraguay will likely have developed 
new hydroelectric capacity.  Nonetheless, we emphasize that Paraguay’s large 
net export capacity will shrink considerably even without the RTA project.  This 
merely underscores the importance of considering the true opportunity costs of 
Paraguay’s electricity supplies. 
During our consultations, it was raised that revenues from foreign direct 
investments such as RTA are more likely to be spent responsibly than ‘windfall’ 
revenues from electricity exports. However, it is unlikely that the country will be 
able to reap the upstream and downstream benefits of the RTA investment 
without strong institutional leadership and coordination. Experience has shown 
that capital-intensive FDIs have lead to institutional mismanagement and hence 
institutional improvements should be a goal in either scenario. Section 3.3. 
suggests revenue management systems that could help address these issues. 
 
Potential Macroeconomic Impact of the RTA Investment 
 
The RTA investment will have an impact on macroeconomic variables. GDP is 
expected to grow by 0.5 percent during the construction phase and 1.5 percent 
during the operation phase.105 During the construction phase, the project will 
have a temporary negative impact on the balance of payments, as a large 
proportion of the materials will be imported. Once production commences and 
aluminum is exported, the project will have a positive impact on the balance of 
payments. The larger the value added to the aluminum prior being exported, the 
larger the positive impact on the balance of payments. Inflationary pressure 
could also be experienced during the construction phase resulting from a sudden 
rise in demand in the construction sector. During this time period, the 
Government also needs to monitor the exchange rate movements. Capital inflows 
combined with rising prices could put upward pressure on the Guarani, thereby 
hurting other exporting sectors. During the operational phase these problems 
are unlikely to persist, as the RTA project will not employ and pay workers 
sufficiently to disrupt the labor market and/or cause demand-pull inflation.  
 
To estimate the direct employment opportunities from RTA, it is best to look at 
similarly-sized aluminum smelters around the world. Table 13 demonstrates 
that direct employment figures vary, but excluding Venalum, which is an 
                                                        
105 Using CRU’s estimate and IMF’s GDP & deflator estimates to adjust to 2013 
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exception due to the Venezuelan Government employing uncharacteristically 
high number of workers, the average employment is 0.0032 workers per ton of 
produced aluminum. Multiplying this by the proposed output of the RTA project, 
the Government can expect around 2,000 direct employment opportunities 
during the operational phase of the plant. The publicly available data on national 
employee percentages is rather scarce, but it can be expected that expatriates, at 
least during the early years of operation will fill most high skilled jobs. This will 
continue until Paraguay has a larger pool of educated and experienced engineers. 
 
Table 13: Aluminum Smelters with a Capacity over 350,000Mtpa106 
 
  
 Since direct employment opportunities are relatively small, the most 
important potential contributor of the RTA project is the creation of linkages to 
downstream industries that process the aluminum and backward linkages to 
                                                        
106 Excluding China, India and Russia 
Country Plant Shareholders
Capacity	
(Mtpa)
Direct	
employees
Employees	
per	ton
National	
Employees
Industrial	
Park
%	of	output	
for	national	
market
GDP	
contribution
Abu	Dabi Emal
•	Dubal	(50%)
•	Mubadala	(50%)
750000 2000 0.0027 - No - -
Australia
Boyne	
Smelters
•	Rio	Tinto	alcan	(59.4%)
•	Partners	(40.6%)
559000 1300 0.0023 - No 0% -
Australia
Portland	
aluminum
•	Alcoa	(55%)
•	CITIC	(22.5%)
•	Marubeni	(22.5%)
350000 600 0.0017 - No 0% -
Australia Tomago
•	Rio	Tinto	Alcan	(52%)
•	Gove	Aluminium	(36%)
•	Hydro	Aluminum	(12%)
533000 1200 0.0042 - No 0% -
Bahrein Alba	
•	Mumtalakat	Holding	
Company	(69%)
•	SABIC	Investment	Company	
(21%)
•	General	Public	(10%)
890000 2730 0.0031 87% No 48% -
Brazil Albras
•	Hydro	(51%)
•	NAAC	(49%)
460000 1950 0.0042 98% No 3% -
Brazil
Votorantim	
Metais	-	
CBA
•	CBA	(100%) 475000 5638 0.0119 - No 50% -
Canada Alouette
•	Rio	Tinto	Alcan	(40%)
•	AMAG	(20%)
•	Hydro	Aluminum	(20%)
•	SGF	(13.33%)
•	Marubeni	(6.67%)
572000 1000 0.0017 - - 50%* -
Canada Alma •	Rio	Tinto	Alcan	(100%) 438000 780 0.0018 - No - -
Canada Becancour
•	Alcoa	(75%)
•	Rio	Tinto	Alcan	(25%)
430000 1075 0.0025 - - - -
Dubai Dubal •	Dubal	(100%) 1207000 3800 0.0031 16% No 8% 2.5%
MozambiqueMozal
•	BHP	Billiton	(47%)
•	Mitsibushi	(25%)
•	IDC	(24%)
•	Government	(4%)
500000 1150 0.0023 - Yes 0% 3%
Oman
Sohar	
Aluminium
•	Oman	Oil	Corporation	(40%)
•	ADWEA	(40%)
•	Alcan	(20%)
360000 1000 0.0028 70% Yes 60% 0.6%
Qatar Qatalum
•	Qatar	Petroleum	(50%)
•	Hydro	(50%)
585000 1500 0.0026 - No - -
Saudi	Arabia
Ma’aden	
(2014)
- 740000 - - - No 52% -
South	Africa Hillside •	BHP	Billiton	(100%) 700000 2000 0.0029 - No 0%* 0.9%
Venezuela Venalum •	Venalum	(100%) 430000 5000 0.0116 - No 25% -
Source:	Team	analysis,	Emal,	Alcoa,	Rio	Tinto,	Alba,	Albras,	Votoratim	Metais,	Alouette,	Dubal,	World	Bank,	Shoar,	Qatalum,	Maadem,	Bhp	Biliton,	Venalum
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national providers of goods and services (SMEs). These may provide additional 
employment opportunities, foster the transfer of knowledge and diversify the 
economy.107   
 
As Figure 13 shows, there are several layers of potential linkages in the value 
chain of the aluminum industry. These will be addressed in more detail in the 
next sub-section. 
 
Figure 13: Structure of the Global Aluminum Industry 
 
Source: Adapted from NEDLAC (2006) – China Metals, Report#11 
Downstream Beneficiation 
The benefit for downstream industries to place themselves close to the smelter is 
associated with lower transport costs of the prime input. Depending on the 
arrangements with RTA, there are also possibilities for the smelter to provide 
the industries in close proximity with aluminum in its liquid form. This can 
reduce the production cost of the downstream industries, as these do not have to 
re-melt the aluminum for processing purposes.108 However, the sourcing of 
aluminum is only one part of the equation when downstream industries choose 
where to invest. Other factors such as the availability of skilled labor, the market 
location of the finished product, the availability of infrastructure to operate in 
and transport the product to market, and the ease of doing business are of equal 
                                                        
107 According to RTA’s submission to the Earth Institute (July 08, 2013), RTA reports that “on 
average, an operating smelter will lead to the creation of over 300 SMEs required to provide the 
smelter with essential goods and services.” RTA estimates that as a result, 13,125 direct, indirect 
and induced jobs will be created. The report goes on to argue that the industrial park has the 
potential to create an additional 55,000 direct, indirect and induced jobs after 10-15 years of 
operation. While we did not have access to the underlying study, we urge the Government to 
analyze these numbers with care. Especially the induced number of jobs can vary widely 
depending on the assumptions and methodology used.  
108 In country consultations 
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or greater importance. The biggest concern in the Paraguayan context is the 
availability of skilled labor. Especially when moving further down the value 
chain, this factor will be of greater importance. 
 
Table 13 shows that only about one third of the large aluminum smelters in our 
sample process 50 percent or more domestically.  Those projects are located in 
Saudi Arabia, Oman, Brazil and Canada, and benefit from strong government 
intervention. In most cases, the aluminum is exported in ingot form and 
processed elsewhere. This is a sobering statistic seeing that the Paraguayan 
Government is placing much hope on the establishment of downstream 
industries in the proposed industrial park. In Mozambique, for example the 
Government has not been able to attract industries that process the 
500,000Mtpa aluminum from BHP Billiton’s MOZAL smelter, which was built in 
1999. Only now, 14 years after its construction, there are prospects for domestic 
aluminum processing following Midal’s announcement that it had come to an 
agreement with BHP Billiton to process 10 percent of the aluminum locally.109  
 
The Government of Paraguay has signed a memorandum of understanding with 
RTA to include an industrial park around the aluminum smelter, with the 
objective to attract downstream companies that use aluminum as the primary 
input in the production process and provide the right infrastructure framework 
for other industries that want to set up in Paraguay. Table 14 shows that 13 
companies with 14 projects have submitted letters of interest to the Government 
to install themselves in the proposed industrial park. Seven projects are 
interested in using RTA’s aluminum in liquid form for primary processing and 5 
projects are unrelated to the aluminum smelter.  
 
While it is a positive sign that companies have expressed an interest in investing 
in the industrial park, these letters should be interpreted with caution. There are 
many factors that will ultimately influence the final decision to proceed with an 
investment and many are not dependent on the creation of the industrial park 
and/or access to the primary input. One way to encourage domestic processing 
of aluminum is the introduction of an export tax on unprocessed aluminum. 
Processing targets could be part of the negotiation process with RTA, with the 
export tax being applied on any unprocessed aluminum above the agreed 
targets. If the Government can reach such an agreement with RTA, it should 
include the tax revenues and employment creation variables resulting from the 
downstream beneficiation in the opportunity cost analysis. However, based on 
experiences of other large aluminum smelters around the world, we believe that 
it would be erroneous to include these variables purely based on a non-binding 
memorandum of understanding on an industrial park and letters of interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
109 http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/2011/09/01/investments-in-beluluane-industrial-park-
in-mozambique-are-increasing/ 
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Table 14: Companies That Have Submitted a Letter of Interest to Invest in 
the Industrial Park 
 
Source: GTN 
 
SME Linkages 
 
To maximize the impact of the aluminum smelter investment, the Government 
should aim to foster backward linkages to local SMEs. Apart from increased 
economic activity, these linkages also have the potential to increase the transfer 
of knowledge and technology. However, international companies such as RTA 
have certain standards that need to be fulfilled and in many developing 
countries, local service providers cannot meet these. This mismatch of demand 
and supply can lead to an enclave model where the international investment is 
detached from the country of operation and even basic services are imported. 
When local communities feel excluded from the benefits the investment was 
intended to bring, the situation can escalate and lead to local tensions and 
protests. 
 
To avoid such a scenario, the Government needs to enforce local content 
provisions. The contract should set out the percentage of domestically acquired 
goods and services over an agreed time period. As local providers learn to meet 
the standards and new suppliers are trained, the local content plan could be 
updated and targets increased. Tender procedures have to be adapted to local 
standards and reporting and monitoring mechanisms need to be put in place to 
ensure commitments are met. To support local service providers, a linkages 
program could be established, which helps the local SMEs fulfill the quality 
standards. Mozambique’s Mozal aluminum smelter is a good case study showing 
how difficult it was to create backward linkages and the importance of 
Government-led support programs to encourage these.  
 
Contry	of	
origin
Name Activity
Aluminum	
requirement	(mT)
Electricity	demand
Bahrein Midal	Cables	Ltd. Cables 50,000-100,000
Brazil Phelps	Dodge	International	Ltd. Cables 40,000
Brazil Alpex	Aluminio	Ltda. Extrusion 20,000
Brazil Inbra	Metais Aluminum	Alloys 25,000 4GWh	p.a.
Brazil Inbra	Metais Oxide	&	Zinc	Alloys 1.5GWh	p.a.
Brazil Inbra	Metais Scrap	recycling 500	MW
Brazil Mextra	Engenharía	Extractiva	de	Metais Alloys 25,000
Brazil CDA	Comercio	Industria	de	Metais	Ltda Extrusion	and	laminates 100,000
Brazil Delp	Engenharía	Mecánica	SA Metalware 2MW
Brazil Metalur Secondary	aluminum
Germany Linde	Gas Industrial	gases 20MW
Brazil Sipet	Agropastoril	Pecuaria Ferroalloy	plant 100MW
India Novelis	do	Brasil	Ltda. Cement 35MW
India Novelis	do	Brasil	Ltda. Laminates 42,000
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Box 7: Linkages Program for the Mozal Aluminum Smelter in Mozambique 
 
With a view to creating greater benefits from foreign direct investment, the 
Mozambican Government created the policy platform for SME linkage 
programs. In 1998/1999, prior to the start of operation of Mozal, the Center of 
Investment Promotion (CPI) conducted a survey to identify potential backward 
linkages. It concluded that 90 percent of the 370 identified SMEs did not have 
the quality standards, technological capacity or experience to provide the 
necessary services. 110  In cooperation with the International Financial 
Corporation (IFC), Mozal launched its SME development program in 2001 to 
build local capacity in order to fulfill Mozal’s procurement requirements. 
During the first construction phase the linkages to the Mozambican economy 
were minimal, mainly because the contracts were bundled with components 
that Mozambican SMEs could not fulfill and because the procurement contracts 
were in English.111 During the second construction phase and subsequent 
operational phase, the program identified specific contracts, which could be 
sourced locally. Mozal increased its monthly spending from US$5 million with 
40 local firms in 2002 to US$17 million with 250 firms in 2007.112 Between 
2006 and 2009, over 140 SMEs were trained in management and technical 
skills, and 75 SMEs were actively enrolled in the program.113  
There has been criticism that many of the SMEs, while registered in 
Mozambique, were importing most goods from South Africa and not 
manufacturing them in Mozambique. On average, about two-thirds of 
expenditure spent on “Mozambican” companies has gone into imports of raw 
materials and intermediate goods, spare parts, equipment, energy, and fuel 
from South Africa. The value-added therefore had a limited impact on the local 
economy.114 
 
Mozambique’s experience shows that it is necessary for the Government to work 
closely together with the investor to ensure the creation of backward linkages. 
The first step involves identifying the goods and services that could potentially 
be demanded by the RTA project and secondary industries during the 
construction and operation phases. Table 15 could be used as a reference 
example considering three key factors that impact employment and income 
generation at a local level: (1) whether the goods or services could be sourced 
from the local, regional or national market; (2) the potential level of demand; 
and (3) the workers’ capacity requirements. This type of analysis will help 
identify the gap between the supply and demand and help to set up a training 
                                                        
110 Castel-Branco and Goldin (2003) – Impacts of the Mozal Aluminum Smelter on the 
Mozambican Economy 
111 Robins, et al 2009 – TNC FDI Firms and Domestic SME linkages: Reflecting three SADC Case 
Studies 
112 IFC 2007: Developing SMEs through Business Linkages 
113 IFC: The IFC Mozlink Program  
114 Castel-Branco and Goldin (2003) – Impacts of the Mozal Aluminum Smelter on the 
Mozambican Economy 
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program that addresses the particular needs.  Such analysis should be the 
product of a joint-effort between RTA and the Government. 
 
Table 15: Business Opportunities for Local Procurement 
 
Source: Team analysis 
 
Apart from discussing these issues with the investor, the Government 
institutions also need to coordinate with each other. The Vice-Ministry of SMEs 
must be in close contact with REDIEX to project investments and better 
understand investor requirements. Together with the Ministry of Education it 
needs to design and implement capacity building programs. A long term SME 
support strategy should be drafted that trains local suppliers on international 
standards, quality certification, access to credit, management skills, knowledge 
sharing and access to market information. These training programs need to be 
tailored to projected investments and existing standards of local suppliers. 
Figure 14 shows the model that was adopted in Mozambique after years of 
struggling to increase linkages to the local economy.  
 
In addition, investors should be encouraged to set up Enterprise Centers/ 
Centers for Knowledge Transfer and Business Incubators. Rio Tinto115 has 
experience using enterprise centers or business incubator models to provide 
one-stop shops for SMEs to access contract opportunities, e-procurement 
systems, training courses, information and communications technology tools, 
and business development services. These centers can also serve as business 
incubators for micro-entrepreneurs.116 
 
 
 
                                                        
115 Such as BP in Azerbaijan, Exxon in Chad and Rio Tinto in Australia 
116 Paragraph adapted from 
http://www.ccsi.columbia.edu/files/vale/content/Zambezi_Resource_Based_Development-
_Final_Consultative_Draft.pdf 
Type Supply	Location Level	of	Demand Capacity	Required Goods	&	Services
Goods*	(no	food) National Medium Medium-Skill Automotive	parts
Goods*	(no	food) National Medium Medium-Skill Small	motor	vehicles
Goods*	(no	food) National High Medium-Skill Fuels,	lubes	and	greases
Goods*	(no	food) National High Medium-Skill Cleaning	supplies
Goods*	(no	food) Local High Medium-Skill Uniforms
Goods*	(no	food) Local High Medium-Skill Furniture	and	fixtures
Goods*	(no	food) National High Medium-Skill Health	Supplies
Goods*	(no	food) Local High Medium-Skill Laundry	equipment
Goods*	(no	food) National High Medium-Skill Machined	tools	and	spare	parts
Goods*	(no	food) Local High Medium-Skill Office	equipment	and	stationary
Goods*	(no	food) Local Medium Medium-Skill Appliances	and	electrical	goods
Goods*	(no	food) National Medium Medium-Skill Construction	supplies
Goods*	(no	food) National Low High-Skill Software	and	Hardware
Goods*	(no	food) National Low Medium-Skill Explosives
Goods*	(no	food) National Low Medium-Skill Agricultural	Inputs
Food	|	Cereal Regional High Low-Skill Maize
Food	|	Cereal Regional High Low-Skill Rice
Food	|	Legumes/Vegetables Regional High Low-Skill Beans
Food	|	Legumes/Vegetables Regional High Low-Skill Onion
Food	|	Legumes/Vegetables Local High Low-Skill Tomato
Food	|	Legumes/Vegetables Local High Low-Skill Peppers
Food	|	Legumes/Vegetables Local High Low-Skill Carrots
Food	|	Legumes/Vegetables Local High Low-Skill Lettuce
Food	|	Livestock/Fish Regional High Low-Skill Beef	(cow,	pork,	goat)
Food	|	Livestock/Fish Regional Medium Low-Skill Fish
Food	|	Livestock/Fish Local High Low-Skill Poultry
Food	|	Oilseeds Regional Low Low-Skill Sesame
Food	|	Oilseeds Regional Medium Low-Skill Peanut
Food	|	Roots/Tubers Regional Medium Low-Skill Cassava
Food	|	Roots/Tubers Regional Medium Low-Skill Sweet	Potato
Food	|	Roots/Tubers Regional Medium Low-Skill Irish	Potato
Food	|	Tree	crops/Fruits Regional Medium Low-Skill Cashew
Food	|	Tree	crops/Fruits Regional High Low-Skill Banana
Food	|	Tree	crops/Fruits Regional High Low-Skill Orange
Food	|	Tree	crops/Fruits Regional High Low-Skill Mango
Food	|	Tree	crops/Fruits Regional Low Low-Skill Pineapple
Food	|	Tree	crops/Fruits Regional Low Low-Skill Coconut
Source:	Team	Analysis
Continue,	Table	?,	Business	opportunities	for	local	procurement
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Figure 14: Developing SMEs Through Business Linkages – The Mozlink 
Model 
 
Source: IFC (2007) – Developing SMEs through Business Linkages 
 
Finally, it is important for the Government to carefully draft the local content 
provisions. The specificity of the provisions will ensure better enforcement of 
the requirements. Table 16 describes common legal challenges in local content 
provisions that may be interpreted differently by the investor and Government 
officials and may therefore lead to loopholes. 
 
Table 16: Legal Challenges for Local Content Provisions 
Challenges Loophole Solution 
Definition of “local 
company” 
If no adequate definition is agreed 
on there is the possibility of 
having suppliers that are locally 
registered but with no local 
ownership or local employment  
“Local Company” = significant 
participation of “locals” in ownership, 
management and employment 
(significant to be defined) 
Definition of “local 
sourcing and local goods” 
Possible to source from locally-
owned or locally-registered 
trading company– instead of 
locally manufacturing 
“Local Goods” =  “high level of local 
value additions”  (high level to be 
defined) 
Definition of 
“competitive” 
It is easy to hide behind the 
argument that local goods and 
services are not competitive when 
the clause includes “source goods 
locally when prices are at 
competitive international terms 
and goods and services of quality 
comparable with international 
It is more efficient to require local 
sourcing “except in circumstances 
where the Company can demonstrate 
it is not economically reasonable to 
do so” 
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standards” 
Local Content Plan 
If no requirement for periodic 
review of the plan is put in place, 
the mega-project will always use 
the same targets established at the 
beginning of the project. 
Establish mechanisms for periodic 
updating of the list of foreign goods/ 
local goods on a time scale 
Timing for Local Content 
Planning 
If not done at the feasibility study, 
it will not be part of planning and 
financing 
Require a local content plan prior 
approval of the feasibility study 
Source: Team Analysis 
 
Beyond ensuring tight contractual local provisions, the Government should 
ensure that the investment framework for Paraguay as described in Annex B is 
updated to maximize the investment impact on the local economy. 
 
2.3. Summary of Findings and Recommendations 
 
1. Reliable access to clean electricity at competitive prices will drive growth 
and investment in the manufacturing sector. To guide these investments, 
an industrial strategy and policy could be prepared based on Paraguay’s 
comparative advantages and the goals the Government aims to achieve. In 
the short term, the agro-processing sector could be prioritized, seeing 
that it would add value to agriculture goods and has the potential to 
provide many employment opportunities. The Government could use the 
product space approach to choose a ‘diversification path’ thereafter. 
Spatial corridor planning and industrial parks can be used as a tool to give 
targeted support to the manufacturing sector, but the Government needs 
to ensure private sector participation to share the risk; choose the right 
location based on access to infrastructure, markets and labor; plan for 
educational programs to build the skills of the workforce serving the 
park; and put in place a regulatory framework that guarantees linkages to 
the local economy. 
 
2. Energy-intensive industries, and particularly the aluminum-smelting 
sector, do not by themselves create many employment opportunities, and 
linkages to the local economy are not guaranteed. In considering the sale 
of electricity to energy-intensive foreign investors such as the proposed 
RTA aluminum smelter, the Government should be careful to consider the 
opportunity cost of the electricity. Unless there are truly significant 
spillovers from the RTA project, the proposed project should not pay less 
in tariffs and taxes than Paraguay would receive from selling the 
electricity directly to Brazil or other foreign markets. We believe that 
such revenue losses are unlikely to be made up by non-monetary benefits 
such as employment creation and cross-sector linkages.  The Government 
could and should use the higher revenues to build up its infrastructure 
and human capital, both of which are rated highly by foreign companies 
deciding where to invest. Countries that are successfully focusing on 
attracting mega-investments and building linkages are already advanced 
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in terms of their infrastructure and human capital. A better-educated 
workforce and lower infrastructure bottlenecks will incentivize 
investment in the future and hence tend to create even more employment 
opportunities in the long run than a capital-intensive mega-investment 
such as RTA.   
 
3. The decision of the Government to accept the potential RTA investment is 
highly dependent on the expected post-Itaipú debt negotiation with Brazil 
and the price that Paraguay can expect to receive from future electricity 
exports. Under current and anticipated aluminum prices, and given the 
business model of the aluminum industry, it is likely that the Government 
would need to sell its electricity to the smelter at a lower price than if it 
were exporting it to neighboring countries at market prices.  We express 
our caution over any such arrangement. If the Government moves 
forward with the proposal, it is recommended that: (1) it accepts the 
project proposal only if Government revenues from the project are not 
significantly lower than the revenues from electricity exports; (2) it 
creates the right regulatory and business environment to attract 
downstream industries; (3) it includes local content provisions in the 
contract to establish technology upgrading and backward linkages to the 
local economy, (4) it requires RTA to setup a training/business incubator 
program to help local SMEs meet the quality standards for goods and 
services to the smelter, and (5) it ensures that high environmental 
regulations are in place and adhered to.  
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3.  Fair Pricing of Electricity Sales 
 
This chapter will address Paraguay’s past and potential future electricity 
revenues from Itaipú.  As Paraguay’s single most important resource, the 
hydroelectricity sold to Brazil must be properly priced.  The evidence suggests, 
however, that electricity sales have been systematically underpriced for three 
decades, leading to significant losses of earnings by Paraguay. In the future, 
Paraguay should sell its excess electricity from the Itaipú dam at regional market 
prices. 
3.1. Past Itaipú Electricity Sales 
 
Itaipú was built on the assumption that both Brazil and Paraguay would share 
equally in the benefits of the hydropower.117 It was recognized that Paraguay 
would have a lower domestic use than its allocation of half of the hydropower, so 
that it would sell its excess electricity to Brazil and earn export revenues on 
those sales.  The original Itaipú Treaty calls for a just price (“precio justo”) on 
those export sales.  In our estimation, Paraguay has not been receiving a fair 
market price during the life of the project.   
 
To estimate a fair market price, we need to understand the Itaipú pricing model.  
Itaipú’s electricity production is jointly owned by Brazil and Paraguay on a 50-50 
basis.  Itaipú Binacional (IB) sells the electricity to the two countries at a given 
US-dollar price per MWh.  In addition, when Paraguay exports a part of its 
electricity to Brazil, Brazil makes an additional payment to Paraguay known as a 
compensation payment.  Once IB receives the revenues for its sales to both 
countries, it uses the revenues for three main purposes: to service the 
outstanding IB debt (costo de cargas financieras de préstamos + costo de 
amortizaciones de préstamos), to pay operations and maintenance (costo de 
cargas de administración y supervisión + costo de gastos de explotación), and to 
make a royalty payment (costo de royalties) to each country each year on a 50-50 
basis.  A small proportion is also used to repay the initial capital investment of 
the utility companies (costo de utilidades de capital).  
 
Let us define variables as follows: 
 
GWh       IB annual gigawatt-hours sold by IB  
GWhP    IB annual production owned by Paraguay  (= 50% of GWh) 
GWhD    IB annual production used domestically by Paraguay  
GWhX    Electricity exports from Paraguay to Brazil (GWhX = GWhP – GWhD) 
P              Price of Electricity sold by IB to Brazil and Paraguay per gigawatt-hour 
DS           Debt service of IB per gigawatt-hour 
OM          Operations and Maintenance costs per gigawatt-hour 
R              Royalties per gigawatt-hour 
C              Compensation paid by Brazil per gigawatt-hour of imports  
FMP        Fair market price of a gigawatt-hour sold to Brazil by Paraguay 
T              Transmission cost per gigawatt-hour to Brazil Market 
                                                        
117 For an overview of the Itaipú debt history, please refer to annex C. 
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PW          Wholesale price of electricity to Brazilian power distributors  
NE           Paraguay net earnings per gigawatt-hour of exports 
 
We have the following key relationships. 
 
First, Brazil pays  P  +  C  +  T  per gigawatt-hour of imports from Paraguay, equal 
to the price paid to IB plus the compensation paid to Paraguay plus the 
transmission cost from Itaipú to São Paulo. Paraguay, on its part, receives the 
sum of royalties R and compensation payments C per gigawatt-hour of electricity 
exports:  R  +  C.      
 
A fair market price FMP for Brazil’s purchase of Paraguay’s electricity exports 
would be the lowest alternative cost to Brazil of electricity from a non-Itaipú 
source, in other words the opportunity cost of Itaipú energy.  A rough 
approximation of this alternative cost is the wholesale price of electricity 
purchased by the distributors in the São Paulo market, PW. 
 
Thus, in a fair market arrangement, PW = P + C + T.  Paraguay would get 
compensation payments equal to: 
 
C = PW -  P -  T 
 
Since the price received by Itaipu, P, is equal to debt service (DS) plus operations 
and maintenance (OM) plus royalties (R), we can say that the compensation that 
should be received by Paraguay equals: 
 
C  = PW  -  DS  -  OM  -  R   -  T 
 
Moving R to the other side, the total fair value of Paraguay’s receipts per 
gigawatt-hour of exports, C + R, is therefore given by: 
 
C+R  = PW  -  DS  -  OM  -  T 
 
This formula means that  in total Paraguay should receive the wholesale price of 
electricity in Sao Paulo minus the cost of debt servicing minus operations and 
maintenance minus transmission costs.   
 
Let’s put some numbers on this.   
 
To calculate the debt servicing, we take the direct investments per year t in the 
Itaipú Project starting in 1974, denoted as DI(t) and measured in inflation-
adjusted 2012 prices.  We assume that the project is financed over 50 years 
(1974-2023) by US-dollar-denominated debt at a 5% real interest rate, using the 
US Consumer Price Index as the deflator. Each year t, IB sells the amount GWh(t) 
gigawatt-hours. Then, the capital cost of the project per gigawatt-hour may be 
calculated as the debt-service per gigawatt-hour DS (in 2012 prices) that pays off 
the debts exactly in 2023.  In other words, we find DS that solves the following 
equation:  
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When we calculate the actual debt-servicing cost of the project, we find that it 
comes to $31,200 per GWh.  Using a similar calculation for OM, we find that on 
average the operations and maintenance of the project has come to $6,500 per 
GWh.  For the year 2010, the OM was $12,170/GWh.  We estimate transmission 
costs as around $4,400 per GWh.   
  
Consider the situation as of 2012.  The wholesale price in Brazil for electricity 
was around $85,000 per gigawatt-hour.118  On this basis, Paraguay should have 
received compensation plus royalties, C+R, equal to: 
 
$37,230 per GWhX   =    $85,000 - $31,200 - $12,170 - $4,400 per GWhX 
 
In fact, Paraguay received far less than this.  In 2012, compensation payments 
from Brazil to Paraguay were only $9,350 per gigawatt-hour and royalties were 
$5,060 per gigawatt-hour, for a total of $14,410 per gigawatt-hour. 119 The 
difference is of course considerable.  Since Paraguay exported 32,805 GWhX to 
Brazil, the difference between $37,230 and $14,410 per GWhX amounts to a loss 
of earnings to Paraguay of $748.6 million in 2012 alone.   
 
It is our contention that Paraguay has been dramatically undercompensated for 
its electricity exports to Brazil since the start of Itaipú.  For example, before 
2011, compensation payments to Paraguay were only $3,064 per GWh (in 2012 
prices). During the entire period, the sum of royalties and compensation 
payments was consistently very low, seemingly far below a fair market price for 
Paraguay’s export earnings.  If carefully calculated, the lost earnings in Paraguay 
would come to many billions of dollars.  We have not made that calculation since 
we were not privy to an accurate assessment of the wholesale market price of 
electricity in Brazil (i.e. the alternative price to IB electricity), yet we suspect that 
a careful accounting of all costs and prices would show that Brazil has underpaid 
Paraguay very significantly for decades.   
 
We do not expect that the past underpayments will all be made up through 
increased compensation.  Paraguay did, in the past, agree to these low tariffs, 
even if the bargaining power was on Brazil’s side.  Still, we do believe that the 
compensation now paid to Paraguay by Brazil should be increased considerably, 
in view of both the fair market price to Paraguay of its electricity sales, and the 
history of past underpayments.  This will of course reduce the surplus earned by 
Brazilian energy companies that are obtaining IB electricity at sub-market prices.  
                                                        
118 According to ANEEL, the average electricity tariff in the South Eastern region of Brazil in 2012 
was G294.87/MWh. Using ANEELs decomposition of the tariff, generation and transmission 
charges made up 35.8% and 6.7% respectively. Adding these two components makes up PW.  
119 Calculations based on data received by the Central bank on electricity consumption, royalty 
revenues and compensation revenues  
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Still, there is no reason why Paraguay should be subsidizing the Brazilian 
market.   
 
In order to calculate a fair market price, the two countries might consider 
establishing an independent commission to support a new pricing structure.  
This commission could draw on advice from international organizations such as 
the IMF, which might review past pricing as well as energy prices in third 
markets, such as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay as additional evidence of the fair 
market value of Paraguay’s electricity exports. After 2023 Paraguay’s electricity 
exports should also be directed at those alternative markets.   
 
Note as well that the calculations in this section cast further doubt on the 
proposed terms of the aluminum project, since the appropriate price for 
comparison of that project might not be today’s prevailing price but the price 
that Brazil and Paraguay will agree in the future in view of the evidence that 
today’s compensation tariffs need to be readjusted upward.   
 
3.2.  Regional Demand and Tariff Negotiations 
 
Figure 15 shows the estimated electricity supply and demand in Paraguay for the 
next three decades. The blue line represents the demand growth estimated by 
CRU, which is based on historical client growth rates120 in Paraguay, GDP growth 
projections, population growth projections, and client consumption growth rates 
similar to those experienced in countries that had a similar GDP per capita as 
Paraguay in 1990.121 
The red line adds the additional electricity demand resulting from the 
substitution of fuel wood/charcoal consumption and the transport 
transformation (see chapter 4). Finally, the green line adds the energy demand 
that would be incurred resulting from the RTA investment. On the supply side, 
the light yellow line shows the supply of electricity if no further energy sources 
are built and the dark yellow line shows the projections including the planned 
Corpus Christi (CC) project. 
                                                        
120 These are divided up by residential consumers – client/population growth (2001-2010) and 
commercial consumers – client/GDP per capita (2001-2010)  
121 The historical relationship is based on Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, South Africa and 
Uruguay between 1990-2008 
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Figure 15: Domestic Electricity Demand and Supply 
 
Source: Cru, Team analysis 
 
When taking into account fuel wood/charcoal substitution and public transport 
transformation, Paraguay will cease to have excess energy 3-4 years prior to the 
scenario that does not take these aspects into account (depending on whether 
Corpus Christi is built). With the RTA project in place, Paraguay will absorb all its 
energy even 4-5 years earlier. 
 
Based on these estimates, Figure 16 shows that Paraguay will be exporting 
excess electricity for at least the next two decades.  
 
Figure 16: Electricity Available for Exports With and Without the RTA 
Project 
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It is imperative for the country to receive a fair price for these exports. Table 17 
shows that current market prices at point of generation in the region are 
relatively high compared to Paraguay’s, which is around US$29/MWh.122 Under 
the right negotiation approach, Paraguay could therefore reap the rewards of 
higher electricity sale revenues. 
 
Table 17: Contract Price and Spot Prices for Electricity (1st semester 2012) 
in Paraguay’s Neighboring Countries 
 
Source: Comisión de Integración Energética Regional 
 
In the future, it is expected that electricity prices in the region are going to rise 
even further. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts, Latin 
America’s electricity consumption is going to grow at an average rate of 2.9 
percent until 2035123 resulting from high economic growth and per capita 
consumption growth rates. The World Bank forecasts even higher electricity 
demand growth rates. While GDP in Latin America is assumed to grow at around 
3 percent between 2008 and 2035, the electricity demand will grow at 3.7 
percent. Growth in the Southern Cone Countries124 is expected to average 2.8 
percent, and Brazil is expected to have the highest electricity demand growth 
rate averaging 4.7 percent.125 By 2030, consumption is forecast to be around 
2,500 TWh, nearly double current consumption. Figure 17 gives an overview of 
the electricity demand projections of the countries in the region and shows that 
Brazil is by far the largest consumer and will take up an even larger market share 
in the future.  
 
                                                        
122 PPT Ministros (2012): Proyecto Planta de Aluminio y Complejo Industrial end Paraguay 
123 Energy Policy Group (August 2012): Latin America’s Energy Future  
124 Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay 
125 World Bank (2010): Meeting the Electricity Supply/Demand Balance in Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Argentina Bolivia Brasil Chile Uruguay
Average	Contract	Price	at	Point	of	
Generation	(US$/MWh)
73.69 37.74 59.87 139.77 165.00
Average	Spot	Price	at	Point	of	
Generation	(US$/MWh)
69.64 46.44 57.69 276.09 249.02
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Figure 17: Regional Electricity Demand/Supply Projections Until 2030126 
Source: World Bank, 2010 
 
The paper by the World Bank does not project the gap between electricity supply 
and demand, but it does calculate the cost-minimizing generation mix to meet 
the demand using country specific historical data. Figure 18 shows the energy 
breakup for Brazil and the Southern Corn Countries for 2008 and 2030.  
 
Figure 18: Brazil and Southern Corn Electricity Generation Mix (2008 & 
2030) 
 
Source: World Bank 2010 
                                                        
126 It should be noted that the World Bank methodology does not take into account exports and 
imports. Paraguay’s demand does not increase in the graph, as it assumes that the demand is met 
by increasing consumption from the Itaipú dam.  
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While hydropower will still be the largest source of energy for Brazil and the 
Southern Corn Countries, the total ratio falls as the share of nuclear, gas and coal 
power sources increases. In Brazil the biomass source is also expected to 
increase. The cost by resource type varies, but on average natural gas is 
approximately 1.45, and coal and nuclear energy 1.8 times more expensive than 
hydropower.127  
Rising demand and more expensive energy sources for neighboring countries 
provide good prospects for higher returns for Paraguay’s electricity exports. 
Market prices should be the basis for export tariff negotiations. It is 
recommended that the Government negotiates autonomy over its share of 
electricity to benefit from market price differentials among countries. Apart from 
re-negotiating the tariff, Paraguay and Brazil should also consider a more 
balanced treaty in terms of the structure of Itaipú. The Salto Grande treaty 
between Uruguay and Argentina can serve as an example.128  There, the 
Governments are the signatories and the power utility companies do not hold 
equity. Instead, Salto Grande only considers the constitution of a bi-national 
governance body called Comisión Técnica Mixta. This structure reduces the 
number of players involved and therefore is less prone to institutional conflicts 
of interest. Salto Grande also provides a dynamic and flexible mechanism at the 
outset, which preserves the small country’s sovereignty over the energy and 
maintains the principle of equality. The debt assumed by Uruguay was in relation 
to the energy it consumed. Since 1993-95 Uruguay has taken its full part of the 
energy (50 percent) and hence the debt burden is equally shared. However, until 
then, Uruguay only consumed 16.6 percent and the debt was allocated 
accordingly. In those years Argentina was mainly servicing the debt. 
 
3.3. Summary of Findings and Recommendations 
 
1. We do not believe that Paraguay has been receiving a fair price for its 
exported electricity to Brazil. Paraguay’s neighbors, including but not only 
Brazil, are experiencing rapid increases in electricity demand, and at 
marginal generating costs that are typically far above the US$52.70/MWh 
(US¢5.27/kWh) that Brazil is currently paying IB for the guaranteed 
electricity it is importing from Paraguay. The compensation now paid to 
Paraguay by Brazil should be increased considerably, in view of both the fair 
market price to Paraguay of its electricity sales, and the history of past 
underpayments. The two countries might consider establishing an 
independent commission to support a new pricing structure.  This 
commission could draw on advice from international organizations such as 
the IMF, which might review past pricing as well as energy prices in third 
markets. 
                                                        
127 http://www.cowlitzpud.org/pdf/electricity101/8%20Fuel%20Sources%20-
%20rate%20comparison.pdf 
128 A more extensive comparison of the Itaipú and Salto Grande agreement is in annex D. 
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2. Electricity prices are significantly higher in neighboring countries and are 
expected to continue to increase in the future as the energy sources become 
more expensive. These prices should serve as a guideline for future tariff 
negotiations. Paraguay should also pursue autonomy over its share of 
electricity to ensure it can sell to third parties. Furthermore, we suggest that 
payments be based on actual consumption rather than contracted power. 
We also suggest that the power utility companies do not hold equity in the 
bi-national entity under the new treaty in order to lower the number of 
players and potential institutional conflicts of interest. 
  
  68 
4.  Towards a Green Economy 
 
As a result of rapid environmental degradation and global warming, future 
economic development plans will need to take into account environmental 
sustainability. Paraguay, having access to abundant clean hydropower energy, 
could be a front-runner in green economic development based on four pillars: 
renewable energy; green building and energy efficient technology; energy 
efficient infrastructure and transportation; and waste-to-energy and recycling.129 
In particular, transport transformation and charcoal/fuel wood substitution 
could be profitable drivers in such a strategy.  
 
4.1. Transport transformation 
 
According to the Vice Ministry of Transport, Paraguay’s car fleet totals 1 million 
vehicles and 13,500 buses. In 2012 the country’s fuel imports amounted to $1.5 
billion,130 and $27.5million was spent on fuel subsidies for registered buses. 
Table 18 provides a statistical overview of Paraguay’s transport sector. 
 
Table 18: Overview of Paraguay’s Transport Sector 
 
 
Source: the Vice Ministry of Transport, Vice Ministério de Minas y Energía 2012, Banco Central, 
Ministério de Obras Públicas y Comunicaciones 
 
a) Transport Transformation: Cost and Challenges  
 
Traffic congestion is worsening in Paraguayan cities due to the increasing 
number of vehicles. The Government is looking to address the public transport 
issues in Asunción with the Pya’e Porâ BRT131 project. The US$137 million 
project132 foresees the construction of a 28km133 electric BRT system from 
Asunción’s city center to San Lorenzo and Capiatá, combining the advantages of a 
subway system (exclusive right of way, punctuality and frequency) and an urban 
bus system (lower costs of construction, maintenance and operation). Additional 
                                                        
129 NACO 2010: Growing a Green Local Economy 
130Source: Vice Ministry of Energy 
131 Bus Rapid Transit 
132 Source: Vice Ministry of Transport 
133 Source: Asociación Latino Americana de Sistemas Integrados y BRT 2011 
Fleet	of	private	vehicules 1	million
Includes	cars,	trucks,	omnibus,	motorbikes	and	machinery	vehicles
Public	buses 13500
Imported	fuel US$1.5	Bn
Diesel	and	gasoline 87.2%	of	imported	fuel
Motor	petrolem	consumption	growth 12.5%/year
Daily	fuel-dependent	motorized	trip	in	Asuncion 2.25	million
Coverage	of	the	above	daily	trips	by	buses	in	Asuncion
52%
Number	of	buses	in	circulation	in	Asuncion 3600
Number	of	companies	owning	the	buses 70
Annual	subsidies	for	registered	buses US$	27.5million
of	total	demand	for	daily	
motorized	trips
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corridors are also being studied totaling 111km with a total estimated 
investment of US$ 873 million.134  
 
The railway plans put forward by the Ministry of Public Works also show the 
Government’s willingness to move towards more efficient and cleaner transport 
models. The plans involve the rehabilitation of the 69km abandoned Asunción-
Encarnación corridor and the construction of the 568km Paraguayan branch of 
the Bioceánica linking São Paulo, in Brazil with Antofagasta, in Chile.135 The 
capital investment for the project is estimated to be around US$2.6 billion, 
exclusive of rolling stock. Of the several alternatives studied, the preferred 
option uses electro-diesel locomotives, permitting a dual operation of the 
railway.136  
 
Drawing on current transport plans and the petrol imports made every year, 
Paraguay could consider basing the new projects on electricity-based systems. 
Apart from significantly improving the environmental footprint of the transport 
sector in Paraguay and thereby raising the wellbeing of the population, an 
electric-run system could also be cost effective in the long run. The following 
analysis will provide rough comparative costs for new investments in an electric-
based system versus a petroleum-based one. A more in-depth analysis would be 
required to assess the challenges and opportunities for Paraguay. 
 
The Government is planning to update its aged bus fleet. Figure 19 shows that 
while the purchase of electric buses137 would be roughly 1.7 times more 
expensive than buying diesel run buses, the operational costs are roughly 5.7 
times cheaper. Taking into account the provision of the fuel subsidy for 
registered buses, the electric alternative is even 6.5 times cheaper. For Asunción, 
this would translate into yearly operating expenses of US$222 million for diesel 
run buses compared to US$34 million for the electric run system.  Those are of 
course rough estimates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
134 Source: Vice Ministry of Transport 
135 Source: Vice Ministry of Transport 
136 Source: Vice Ministry of Transport 
137 The calculations are based on electric buses costing US$ 559,200 and diesel buses costing 
US$326,000. These are the market prices according to US’s Proterra and China’s BYD, which are 
two of the main electric bus manufacturers in the world Source: EESI 2005, SFMTA, Left Lane 
2012, Clean Biz Asia 2012, Proterra 2013, BYD 2013 
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Figure 19: Investment and Operation Comparison, Asunción (3,500 buses) 
 
Source: EESI 2005, SFMTA, Left Lane 2012, Clean Biz Asia 2012, Proterra 2013, BYD 2013 
 
Using these estimates, Figure 20 plots the cumulative costs of these alternatives 
and shows that the electric run system becomes more profitable after five years 
when accounting for fuel subsidies.  
 
Figure 20: Cumulative Costs of an Electricity-based Transport System 
Versus a Petroleum-based Transport System in Asunción 
 
Source: Team’s own calculations 
 
Similar results are obtained when introducing the national data. If the whole 
Paraguayan fleet of 13,500 buses was to be replaced, the total initial investment 
would accumulate to US$ 7.5 billion for new electric buses and US$ 4.4 billion for 
new diesel buses. Despite the higher capital cost of the electric fleet, a much 
lower operational cost would make the electric-bus system more profitable after 
five to six years of operation. Furthermore, with a well-functioning and punctual 
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public transport system in place, demand for these services is likely to increase, 
further lowering the need for expensive fuel imports.  
 
A long-term and transformative plan could also include transforming private 
cars to using electricity. This option may be expensive and challenging today but 
could become tangible within 10 years, once technological advances make 
electric vehicles cheaper. In order for Paraguay to be ready to transform the 
private fleet within 10 years, the country needs to plan ahead of time and be 
aware of the challenges and issues that need to be solved.  To facilitate this 
exercise, the following will shed light on current obstacles, drawing on analyses 
from the United States (US) and France, countries that already plan to implement 
such a transformation. 
 
Up-front cost and total cost of ownership will decrease over time 
It is important to note that, today, the comparatively higher purchase cost of a 
grid-enabled vehicle offsets the lifetime fuel savings for consumers. This is 
certainly true in the absence of government financial incentives, which, for 
instance in the US currently includes a maximum $7,500 ARRA138 tax credit139 
for the purchase of a plug-in electric drive vehicle. Figure 21 shows that even 
with the maximum tax credit, a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) with 40 
miles of all-electric range would only offer a marginal economic benefit over the 
lifetime of the vehicle when compared to a similarly sized internal combustion 
engine (ICE) car. The margin is even smaller for a fully electric vehicle (EV) with 
100 miles of driving range as shown in Figure 22. Excluding the tax credits, these 
electric alternatives are not yet financially profitable in the US. Similarly, a study 
in France indicates that, without any purchase subsidy, an EV’s lifetime usage 
cost is around 15-20 percent higher than a traditional diesel-engine car.140 
 
The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reports that the lifetime costs of an 
electric vehicle (EV) are higher than those of a vehicle with an internal 
combustion engine or of a hybrid, even with a federal tax credit. CBO suggests 
that the federal tax credit would have to be set at $12,000 to equalize the lifetime 
costs. CBO estimates that the current $7,500 tax credit, together with other 
electrification grant programs and the Advanced Technology Vehicle 
Manufacturing program, will have a budgetary cost of $7.5 billion by 2019.141 
 
                                                        
138ARRA refers to 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act  
139 The tax credit for new plug-in electric vehicles is worth $2,500 plus $417 for each kilowatt-
hour of battery capacity over 4 kwh, and the portion of the credit determined by battery capacity 
cannot exceed $5,000. Therefore, the total amount of the credit allowed for an EV is limited to 
$7,500 (source: Internal Revenue Bulletin 2009-48, New Qualified Plug-in Electric Drive Motor 
Vehicle Credit, Notice 2009-89, November 30, 2009  
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2009-48_IRB/ar09.html) 
140 Crist, Philippe, 2012, Electric Vehicles Revisited – Costs, Subsidies and Prospects, Discussion 
Paper 2012-03, OECD/ITF 
141 Congressional Budget Office, 2012, Effects of Federal Tax Credits for the Purchase of Electric 
Vehicles , September 
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However, by 2030, the total cost of ownership for EVs in the US is expected to be 
around $8,000 less than the ownership of a traditional vehicle142. Under another 
scenario,143 a French consumer could save about €4,520 (US$6,000) over the 
lifetime of an EV (compared to its conventional gas-powered ICE vehicle 
counterpart).144   
 
Figure 21: Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEVs) Total Cost of 
Ownership (Including ARRA Tax Credit)145 
 
 
Figure 22: Pure Electric Vehicles (EVs) Total Cost of Ownership (Including 
ARRA Tax Credit)146 
 
                                                        
142 Westcott, Robert, and Werling, Jeffrey, 2010, Economic Impact of the Electrification Roadmap. 
April. 
143Assumptions: ICE vehicle costs increase by 20 percent, BEV vehicle costs decrease by 20 
percent, battery costs decrease by 30 percent, oil prices grow by 6 percent per year from $120 
Bbl, fuel taxes increase by 2 percent year as do electricity prices, and ICE efficiency increases by 
50 percent and BEV efficiency by 30 percent. 
144 Crist, Philippe, 2012, Electric Vehicles Revisited – Costs, Subsidies and Prospects, Discussion 
Paper 2012-03, OECD/ITF 
145 Westcott, Robert, and Werling, Jeffrey, 2010, Economic Impact of the Electrification Roadmap. 
April. 
146 Westcott, Robert, and Werling, Jeffrey, 2010, Economic Impact of the Electrification Roadmap. 
April. 
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Table 19: Federal Incentives Available to Buyers or Producers of Electric 
vehicles (EV)147
 
 
Cost of charging infrastructure 
EVs can be charged directly from most household electricity circuits in France 
and it is assumed that this will be the principal recharging mode (93 percent of 
charging points148) used by EV owners through 2020 (though this might not be 
the case if fast-recharging technology becomes widespread). Renault 
recommends that EV owners install a home charging point (cost of 
approximately €800) and that they equip themselves with a dedicated recharge 
cable (around €400). The remaining 7 percent of charging stations are projected 
to be public fast- (23 kVA) and ultrafast- (43 kVA) charging points with total 
costs ranging from €7,000 to €55,000 per charging point.149 The costs for these 
points will be shared amongst a number of actors including local authorities, 
electricity companies, parking garage owners and private workplaces. On 
average, the total cost for charging facilities is estimated to amount to around 
€3,000 per EV in 2010 and to decrease to €2,000 per EV in 2020.150 To meet a 
forecast of 2 million EVs in France in 2020, around 2.2 million charging points 
                                                        
147 Congressional Budget Office, 2012, Effects of Federal Tax Credits for the Purchase of Electric 
Vehicles , September 
148 Depoorter, Stéphanie, and Assimon, Pierre-Marie, 2011, Les véhicules électriques en 
perspective: Analyse couts - avantages et demande potentielle. Commissariat Général au 
Développement Durable, available at http://www.developpement-
durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/ED41.pdf 
149 Depoorter, Stéphanie, and Assimon, Pierre-Marie, 2011, Les véhicules électriques en 
perspective: Analyse couts - avantages et demande potentielle. Commissariat Général au 
Développement Durable. 
150 Depoorter, Stéphanie, and Assimon, Pierre-Marie, 2011, Les véhicules électriques en 
perspective: Analyse couts - avantages et demande potentielle. Commissariat Général au 
Développement Durable. 
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are required, which represents an investment totaling €3 billion over the period 
2010-2020.151  
 
Job creation of such transformation 
In the U.S, a study estimated that implementing a package of EV policies would 
increase total employment by 1.9 million jobs by 2030 (equivalent to a reduction 
of unemployment by 1.1 percent). There would be 560,000 additional 
manufacturing jobs by 2030, 276,000 additional jobs in travel and tourism, and 
73,000 additional jobs in professional services. 106,000 employment 
opportunities in the motor vehicle industry could be created. Employment in the 
industries that supply key electric and electronic components to electric vehicles 
could increase by 112,000 jobs.152  There might be a concern that this 
employment creation will be at the expense of job losses in the petroleum-based 
car industry. This might be valid but a strong government training policy to 
facilitate industrial reconversion of the job market could help mitigate this 
concern. 
 
We recommend that the Government pursue the possibility of an initial 
deployment of electric vehicles in Asunción and other cities, with one or more 
international producers of such vehicles, on a competitive basis.  We suspect that 
some of the international firms will be interested in supporting Paraguay’s 
investments in the needed infrastructure and early deployment of electric 
passenger vehicles.  
 
 
b) Electricity consumption of transport transformation (railways, 
buses and private cars) 
 
Figure 23 provides a rough estimate of the use of electricity if the above 
described electric-bus system is implemented. It also estimates the potential 
energy demand from converting the private cars to use electricity. Given the 
relative high cost of electric cars, this option may be difficult to implement in the 
short term, but may be viable in the medium term as prices of private electric 
cars continue to fall.  
 
The estimates in Figure 23 are based on: 
- The Bioceánica project being implemented (based on figures provided by 
the Vice Ministry of Transport) 
- All private cars switching to electricity  
- All public buses switching to electricity  
 
The assumptions for the electricity demand are based on: 
- 300 trips along the Bioceánica per year 
                                                        
151 Depoorter, Stéphanie, and Assimon, Pierre-Marie, 2011, Les véhicules électriques en 
perspective: Analyse couts - avantages et demande potentielle. Commissariat Général au 
Développement Durable. 
152 Westcott, Robert, and Werling, Jeffrey, 2010, Economic Impact of the Electrification Roadmap. 
April. 
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- 2.34 million daily trips of buses with an average distance of 60 km per 
trip within the country 
- 2.16 million daily trips for private cars with an average distance of 20 km 
per trip within the country 
- For buses: an average trip distance of 250 km without charging for a total 
electricity consumption of 300 kWh per trip 
- An average trip distance of 160 km without charging for a total electricity 
consumption of 34 kWh per trip 
- A diversity factor153 of 0.8 for private fleet 
- A diversity factor of 0.9 for public buses 
 
The results show that under the largest-consuming alternative –that is, if all 
buses and private fleet shifted to electricity– the transport sector would 
consume 39,028 GWh, with most of it being made up by public buses. 
 
Figure 23: Additional Electricity Consumption from the Transport Sector 
 
Sources: Paraguay census 2011, Vice Ministry of Transport, Tesla & BYD. 
 
4.2. Replacing biomass consumption in Paraguay 
 
Despite being a net exporter of hydroelectric power, almost half of Paraguay’s 
domestic energy consumption is made up of biomass. Figure 24 shows that 
Paraguay has the highest percentage of biomass consumption in the region.  
 
 
 
                                                        
153  A diversity factor allows to take into account that not all vehicles can charge at the same time 
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Figure 24: Sources of Energy Consumption in Paraguay and Neighboring 
Countries in 2010 
 
Source: WB Development Indicators154 
The two pie charts in Figure 25 divide up the biomass consumption in Paraguay 
by economic sector and source. The industrial sector is the largest consumer 
with biomass-fired boilers being the norm. Industries using fuel wood for 
processing purposes include the grain, oil, ceramics, cassava starch and dairy 
sectors. Agriculture processing industries use the waste of crops, such as coconut 
husk, rice husk and bagasse, as energy inputs. Large industries such as the 
CERVEPAR beer brewery and the ACEPAR steel maker rely on charcoal. The FAO 
estimates that ACEPAR roughly uses 130,000 tons of charcoal per year.155 The 
second largest biomass consumer is the residential sector, which makes up for 
the majority of the fuel wood and charcoal demand for cooking and heating 
purposes.156  
 
Figure 25: Biomass Consumption by Sector (2009) and Source (2011) 
 
Source: Vice Ministry of Energy (2012): Balance Energético Nacional 2011  
                                                        
154 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
155 http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/AD390S/AD390s07.htm 
156 Vice Ministério de Energía (2012), Balance Energético National 2011 
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 The main reason for the relatively high biomass consumption is the availability 
of fuel wood at a low cost.157 Table 20 shows that fuel wood only costs a fraction 
of the electricity tariffs when converted into kWh. 
 
Table 20: Average Cost of Fuel Wood 
Fuel wood*  2007 Price 
US¢/kWh 
Electricity  2007 Tariff  
US¢/kWh 
2011 Tariff  
US¢/kWh 
Good quality/m3 1.13 Residential 7.00 8.64 
Medium quality/m3 0.94 Commercial 8.00 8.19 
Low quality/m3 1.07 Industrial 5.00 5.75 
*The density of the wood defines quality. 
Source: IADB (2008) Herramientas para mejorar la efectividad del Mercado de combustibles de 
Madera en la economica rural, Resumen Estadístico 2011 (using the average 2011 exchange rate of 
1US$=G4,191.42) 
 
According to the United Nations (UN) Energy Statistics, Paraguay was the largest 
per capita fuel wood producer in the region, producing three times the amount of 
Brazil and fourteen times the amount of Argentina in 2009.158 Low fuel wood 
prices coupled with its ease of access creates a strong disincentive for the private 
sector to switch to cleaner energy sources and has had a devastating effect on 
the forests of Paraguay. It is estimated that 50,000 hectares per year are cut 
down just to satisfy fuel wood and charcoal demand on its own.159 Demand and 
supply estimates show that only 12 percent of the demand is covered by 
managed/reforested forests and 73 percent of the supplied wood is unaccounted 
for.160 The alarmingly high deforestation rates and informality of the sector have 
prompted the Government to introduce laws, which aim to curb illegal logging 
and commercialization of forest products. All forestry related laws and the 
responsible institutions are summarized in Box 8. 
 
Box 8: Forestry Laws/Regulations and Responsible Institutions 
 
Law No. 422/1973: Establishes the principal legal framework for forestry policy 
in Paraguay. One of the objectives of this law is to protect, conserve, increase, 
renovate and promote the rational use of the country’s forestry resources. 
Article 42 of Law 422/73 states that: “All rural properties with over twenty 
hectares in forest areas shall maintain twenty-five percent of their natural forest 
areas. In the event that they do not have this minimum percentage, the owner 
must reforest an area equivalent to five percent of the surface area.”  
  
Law No. 536/95: To incentivize landowners to reforest identified areas, the “De 
Fomento a la Forestación y Reforestación” law provides the following benefits 
for forestry related activities:  
 (a) A one-time 75 percent uplift on the total capital cost to implement the 
project 
                                                        
157 50 percent of the country was forested in the 1960s. Secretaria Técnica de Planificación 2012. 
158 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/energy/edbase.htm. 
159 Vice Ministério de Minas y Energía 2012 
160 Paul Borsy & Rafael Ortiz (19.09.2012), Oferta y Demanda de Biomasa sólida en el Paraguay 
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 (b) A 75 percent uplift on the operational cost for the first three years of 
the project 
 (c) Long-term preferential loans at low interest rates from the Banco 
Nacional de Fomento161 
 (d) Tax and tariff exemptions on seedling imports 
 (e) The exemption of additional fiscal, municipal or departmental tax 
regimes 
 
Law No. 3001/06: The “De valoración y retribución de los servicios ambientales” 
law provides owners and purchasers of rural properties with environmental 
projects with the possibility to obtain tradable environmental service 
certificates. At the same time, this law enforces that projects that have not 
adhered law No. 422/1973 to pay for environmental service certificates up to 
the value that offsets the environmental damage caused. Furthermore, future 
projects that are harmful to the environment (including polluting industries and 
infrastructure projects) will have to invest at least 1 percent of the project’s 
capital cost in environmental service certificates.  
 
Law No. 2524: The Zero Deforestation Law (Ley de Deforestación Cero) was 
implemented in 2004. This law temporarily prohibits the deforestation of the 
Eastern region for agricultural or livestock purpose until December 2013. There 
is pressure from the World Wide Fund to extend this law until 2018. 
 
The Instituto Forestal Nacional (INFONA)162 is the enforcement authority of 
Forestry Law 422/73, Law 536/95 and all other forestry related guidelines. It is 
a decentralized entity with administrative autonomy that succeeded the Servicio 
Forestal Nacional (SFN), an agency under the Ministério de Agricultura y 
Ganadería (MAG). INFONA is also in charge of approving the forest management 
plans, which need to be submitted before exploitation. For projects with a 
surface area of more than 50 hectares, these plans can only be approved once the 
Environmental Secretariat (SEAM 163 ) issues an environmental impact 
declaration. Furthermore, INFONA issues forest transport permits that allow the 
transportation and the commercialization of wood and other forestry products. 
This permit identifies the amount, species, weight/volume, origin and 
destination of the load.164 
 
While Paraguay’s forestry laws provide a good basis to reduce deforestation in 
the country, there seems to be a lack of regulation and monitoring tools in place 
to implement them. For example, the regulatory norms do not require INFONA to 
perform a prior audit before granting exploitation permits. This makes it difficult 
to ensure that forest products covered by the forest transport permits actually 
come from properties that have an approved forest management plan. 
Furthermore, law No. 515/94 prohibits INFONA from issuing forest transport 
permits for exportation. More regulations are also necessary to establish the 
conditions under which the SEAM can issue environmental impact certificates.  
                                                        
161 State Bank 
162 Instituto Forestal Nacional (National Forestry Institute) 
163 Secretaría del Ambiente, (SEAM) 
164 Art. 26 Law No. 422/73 
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While the Zero Deforestation Law has reduced deforestation in the Eastern 
Region of the country, national deforestation rates are still high. Table 21 shows 
that Paraguay has consistently had the second highest yearly deforestation rates 
in the region since 1990. This can largely be traced back to the weak structures 
and mechanisms in place to enforce the laws on illegal logging and the informal 
trade of forest products. 
 
Table 21: Yearly Rate of Gain or Loss of Forest Area During Given Period 
 
Source: Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010, Global tables 
 
Apart from slowing the deforestation rates for the environmental wellbeing of 
the country, we consider that more stringent forestry regulation enforcement in 
Paraguay will drive up the price of fuel wood and charcoal, thereby incentivizing 
the private sector to switch to electricity as the main source of energy. Wood 
prices in Paraguay have already seen a steady increase since 2007165 due to 
higher demand from population and economic growth and a fall in the quantity 
of trees available to cut down. This trend is illustrated in Figure 26 and can be 
expected to continue without Government intervention.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
165 Paul Borsy & Rafael Ortiz (19.09.2012), Oferta y Demanda de Biomasa sólida en el Paraguay 
1990-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010
Uruguay 4.38 1.48 2.79
Chile 0.37 0.26 0.23
Colombia -0.16 -0.16 -0.17
Peru -0.14 -0.14 -0.22
Brazil -0.51 -0.57 -0.42
Bolivia -0.44 -0.46 -0.53
Venezuela -0.57 -0.59 -0.61
Argentina -0.88 -0.81 -0.80
Paraguay -0.88 -0.94 -0.99
Ecuador -1.53 -1.73 -1.89
Average of Region -0.036 -0.366 -0.261
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Figure 26: Forest Coverage vs. Population Growth and Associated Increase 
in Demand for Wood 
 
Source: Mautner Markhoff 2008 
At some point the fuel wood/charcoal prices per kWh will cross those of the 
electricity tariffs and the private sector will be looking for alternative energy 
sources. The only question is whether this will occur when Paraguay has cut 
down all its forests or if this transition can be guided through Government 
intervention and regulations at an earlier stage. Such intervention will not only 
protect the forests of the country but also improve the air quality within 
households that are currently relying on fuel wood and charcoal for cooking 
purposes. This in turn will improve health statistics and lower the Government’s 
health expenses.166  
 
In 2011 the total fuel wood and charcoal consumption amounted to 1,300,930 
and 166,370 Tons of Oil Equivalent (TOE) respectively.167 This translates into 
17,065 GWh168 per year. If this amount of energy were to be covered by ANDE, it 
would triple 2011 electricity demand. 
 
4.3. Summary of Findings and Recommendations 
 
1) In 2010 Paraguay’s petroleum import bill was above $1.5bn with an upward 
tendency. This cost could be reduced or even eliminated, most likely at a 
significant gain in net present value, by putting an electricity-based transport 
system in place. The Government has ambitious transport infrastructure 
plans, including the Pya’e Porâ BRT in Asunción, that it should pursue. 
Paraguay’s excess electricity has to be taken into account when planning such 
projects. While the initial investment costs of an electricity-run public 
                                                        
166 Oda and Tsujita (2010) The Determinants of Rural Electrification in Bihar, India 
167 Source: Vice Ministry of Energy Presentation- Energy Balance 2011. 
168 IEA defines 1TOE=11.63MWh 
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transport system is thought to be around 1.7 times larger than for that of a 
petroleum-run one, the running costs are 6.5 times cheaper, making it 
profitable after 6 years. Such substitution would increase fivefold current 
electricity demand. 
 
2) Over time, there may also be the possibility of moving decisively to electric 
passenger vehicles as well, especially given that technological progress will 
lead to an accelerated decline in the cost of lightweight passenger vehicles for 
urban use. Investing in infrastructure for electric buses and cars can be a 
public investment that will infuse money in the economy and create 
employment opportunities.  We recommend that the Government pursue the 
possibility of an initial deployment of electric vehicles in Asunción and other 
cities, with one or more international producers of such vehicles, on a 
competitive basis.  We suspect that some of the international firms will be 
interested in supporting Paraguay’s investments in the needed infrastructure 
and early deployment of electric passenger vehicles. Further study should 
assess the opportunities and challenges of this transformation in Paraguay. 
 
3) High fuel wood and charcoal consumption of the residential and industrial 
sector have led to rapid unsustainable deforestation rates. The Government 
will need to enforce more stringent forestry and forest-commercialization 
regulations to prevent the country from losing its remaining forest assets. The 
energy demand can be met by electricity and the estimates show that a 
substation would increase threefold electricity demand in the country. 
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5. Proper Management of Electricity 
Revenues 
 
In the future, Paraguay can expect to receive increased revenues from electricity 
sales and therefore it is vital to manage these revenues accordingly.  
 
5.1. Existing electricity revenue management 
In September 2012, the Law 4758/2012 created the National Fund for Public 
Investment and Development (Fondo Nacional de Inversión Pública y Desarrollo, 
Fonacide) to manage the royalties and compensation revenues from the bi-
national entities Itaipú and Yacyretá. Fonacide received G936.5 billion in 2012169 
(around US$224 million170) and is expecting to receive around US$310 million in 
2013.171 According to the law, the resources of the fund are earmarked for 
infrastructure (28 percent), departments and municipalities (25 percent), 
education (30 percent), health (10 percent) and the capitalization of the 
Financial Agency for Development (7 percent).172 The funds earmarked for 
education are deposited in the ‘Fund for Excellence in Education and Research,’ 
which was also created under this law. The department and municipal 
governments are required to invest 50 percent of their respective share in 
education facilities and 30 percent in school meals programs. These allocations 
highlight the importance that the Government is placing on education.  
 
Fonacide’s distribution at the departmental and municipal level depends on 
whether the regions have been affected by the flooding of the Itaipú and 
Yacyretá173 projects.  The creation of Fonacide did not change the 2010 
allocation criteria174 for the transfers of the Itaipú and Yacyretá revenues from 
the Ministry of Finance to the local governments.175 
 
Table 22: Allocation of Fonacide Funds 
 Revenues allocated 
from Fonacide 
Allocation criterion 
within each sub-
category 
Affected departments (5) 10 percent Number of departments 
Non-affected departments (12) 10 percent Number of departments 
Affected municipalities  (55) 30 percent Municipal population 
Non-affected municipalities (185) 50 percent Municipal population 
Source: Decree 9966/2012 
 
                                                        
169 Ministério de Hacienda, Subsecretaría de Estado de Administración Financiera, Aplicacion Ley 
No 4758/2012 
170 1US$=G4,180 as of December 31st, 2012 
171 Meeting at the Vice Ministry of Economy, 13 February 2013 
172 Republic of Paraguay, 2012, Law 4758/2012 
173 Decree 9966/2012 
174 Law 3.984/2010 
175 Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (2011).  Diseño y desarrollo de un sistema de indicadores 
sobre  ingresos y gastos de finanzas departamentales y municipales, Inter-American 
Development Bank, Asunción 
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However, it seems that this distribution mechanism does not take into account 
the fiscal capacity of the municipalities and/or the track record of how efficiently 
the money has been spent in the past. Hence those municipalities that benefit 
most from Fonacide are not encouraged to improve spending efficiency. The 
reliance on guaranteed revenues from Fonacide is also thought to act as a 
disincentive for increasing tax collection rates at the local level. This is further 
enforced by the redistribution system from the municipality level to the 
departmental level.  For example, 70 percent of the property tax collected at the 
municipal level is transferred to departmental governments and to an equity fund 
helping municipalities with fewer resources.176  
 
Apart from the distribution of Fonacide’s resources at the decentralized level, 
there are few monitoring tools available for the Government to ensure that these 
resources are spent efficiently. Few municipalities have detailed short and 
medium-term investment plans, implementation timelines and/or procurement 
and evaluation guidelines. We understand that there is no financial management 
system connected to the SIAF (central administration system) with a sufficient 
level of disaggregation to monitor the use of resources. Some municipalities have 
not reported on the use of the resources.177 This has apparently led to an 
increasing misalignment between public spending at the municipal level and 
national development priorities.178 There also seems to be a lack of public 
participation in the decision-making process with little public information related 
to project implementation. 
 
Together, it looks like these factors have led to a sub-optimal allocation of 
revenues from the electricity sales. While law 3.984/2010 states that 
municipalities must invest 80 percent of allocated funds from electricity revenue 
transfers in capital and 20 percent in associated recurrent expenditures, these 
targets have not been met.179  
 
The enforcement of this law and the accountability of municipalities could be 
enhanced by increasing transparency. Municipal investment plans should be 
drawn up on a consultative basis with the population and the project costs and 
procurement contracts should be disclosed. Boxes 9 and 10 provide examples of 
such transparency initiatives in Peru and Brazil. To incentivize better planning at 
the municipal level and higher tax collection rates, the central Government could 
condition Fonacide transfers based on targets. Box 11 provides an example of 
how such a mechanism is applied in South Africa.  
 
                                                        
176 Art  culo 153. Impuesto Inmobiliario. Ley Orga nica Municipal. 
177 Interview in countries 
178  Ministry of Finance of Paraguay (2010). Royalties and compensation: Municipal performance 
report, third quarter - fiscal 2009, Asunción. And Controller General of the Republic (2007-2010). 
Special Consideration to the Budget Execution of Operations [different municipalities], Asunción.  
179  Ministry of Finance of Paraguay (2010). Royalties and compensation: Municipal performance 
report, third quarter - fiscal 2009, Asunción. And Controller General of the Republic (2007-2010). 
Special Consideration to the Budget Execution of Operations [different municipalities], Asunción.  
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Box 9: Canon Mineiro and Transparency in Peru 
 
Since 2002, municipalities and regional governments impacted by mining 
exploitation in Peru have been receiving 100 percent of royalties and 50 
percent of the income taxes paid by the companies (Ministry Resolution No. 
266-2002-EF/15 of May 1, 2002). Initially, the law established that that these 
funds could only be earmarked for capital investment. Today 20 percent can be 
used to pay for project design and the maintenance of public infrastructure. The 
transfer of funds to regional and local governments is done once a year after 
mining companies pay the income taxes of the previous year.  All transfers and 
expenditures have to be reported daily and monthly to the Ministry of 
Economy, which publishes these online on: 
http://ofi.mef.gob.pe/transparencia/mensual/. Thus, information is available 
to the public at any given time. Furthermore, the ‘Transparency and Access to 
Public Information’ Law states that anyone can request information from the 
regional and local governments, to be provided in a timely manner.180 
 
 
Box 10: Brazil and Participatory Budgeting 
 
Participatory budgeting introduced in Porto Alegre in 1989 is a process through 
which community representatives define their needs and determine the 
investment priorities to influence the municipal budget. Participatory budgeting 
has had a remarkable impact on the accessibility and quality of public service 
provision in the municipalities that have adopted it. In Porto Alegre, for example, 
water and sewage access increased from 75 percent of households in 1988 to 98 
percent in 1997.181 This transparency and accountability mechanism has created 
a healthy relationship between municipal administrations and their citizens. 
Citizens’ participation across income groups ensures people-oriented budget 
allocation decisions and timely implementation. 
 
                                                        
180 Interview with Revenue Watch Institute - Peru 
181 World Bank, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEMPOWERMENT/Resources/14657_Partic-Budg-
Brazil-web.pdf 
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Box 11: South Africa and the Municipal Infrastructure Grant 
 
In South Africa, the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) was launched to 
combine all the existing capital grants for municipal infrastructure into a single 
consolidated grant. MIG funds may be used for capital investment 
(construction, upgrade or rehabilitation), project management, project 
feasibility studies and/or project business plans. While allocation criteria for 
municipalities are linked to the number of inhabitants and infrastructure 
backlogs, municipalities only receive funding if a complete five-year integrated 
development plan is presented and it is demonstrated that sufficient capacity is 
available to manage the infrastructure investment program.182 A Municipal 
Systems Improvement Grant, complementary to the MIG, is designed to provide 
capacity building programs to municipalities lacking the necessary skills.183 
 
Apart from Fonacide, revenues from Itaipú’s electricity sales are also channeled 
through the Social and Environmental Fund that was created by the RDE-
109/2003 administrative resolution of the Board of Directors (Consejo de 
Administractión).184 This administrative resolution was enacted as part of 
Itaipú’s Strategic Plan 2004-2008 (Planeamiento Estratégico 2004-2008) and was 
later ratified in the 2010-2014 Strategic Plan. The purpose of the Fund is to 
execute Itapú’s social and environmental policy185 and it is thought to have a 
budget of around US$100 million.186 Our analysis concludes that complete 
discretion was granted to the management of the fund and there are no 
regulatory provisions within the treaty (including its annexes) or in the 
exchanged diplomatic notes. The idea to earmark Itaipú’s rent for capital, social 
and environmental expenditure is forward-looking and instrumental in 
achieving inclusive growth in Paraguay. However, the apparent lack of 
accountability and transparency mechanisms hampers the realization of the 
idea. 
 
At the central level, it is recommended that revenues be spent mainly on public 
investments in health, education, and infrastructure. The power of Congress187 
combined with a weak enforcement mechanism to recruit, select, promote, 
dismiss and define the wage rate of the public sector, might explain the relatively 
                                                        
182 Republic of South Africa, 2004, The Municipal Infrastructure Grant Program An Introductory 
Guide, Prepared by Department of Provincial and Local Government, March 2004 
183 Republic of South Africa, 2004, The Municipal Infrastructure Grant 2004 - 2007 From 
program to projects to sustainable services, Prepared by Department of Provincial and Local 
Government 
184 See art. 6 Itaipú Treaty. 
185 http://www.itaipu.gov.br/es/responsabilidad-social/gestion 
186 Interview in country 
187 Paraguay is the only country in Latin America where the Congress has the power, both by law 
and practice, to define pay policy in the public sector without reference to the level set in the 
Executive’s budget (LAFUENTE, Mariano and N. Manning. “Executive-Legislative authority over 
public servants pay: Lessons from Paraguay”, Working Paper 0210, Working Paper Series on 
Public Sector Management, World Bank. 2010). This is done through the Personnel Annex, which 
is part of the budget bill. Using this annex, Congress members can modify salaries of individual 
positions, therefore giving them the power to respond to their political constituency in the public 
service (ARROBBIO, Alexandre, M. Lafuente, J. Rinne, Paraguay Policy Notes, Note on Public 
Employment and Wage Bill. World Bank. 2008). 
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high wages for public servants. Paraguay’s public spending on employment 
compared to the size of the sector is relatively high (as a percentage of total and 
active population).188 At the same time, Figure 27 shows that public service 
performance does not justify the high wages. We understand that increases in 
recurrent expenditures have crowded out spending in public investments and 
limited the impact of policies.189 This allocation of resources has apparently 
resulted in pro-cyclical budgets, whereby wages are increased in boom years. 
Due to the difficulty of cutting wages in years with lower revenues, this has been 
compensated by lowering the allocation of resources to public investment 
programs.  
 
Figure 27: Quality of Public Administration and GDP per Capita (PPP) for 
Selected Latin American and Caribbean Countries (2006)  
Source: Echebarría, Koldo (2006). Informe sobre la situación del servicio civil en América Latina, 
Washington, DC, Inter-American Development Bank 
 
The Government has decided to tackle this problem with a Fiscal Responsibility 
Law (FRL). If well-designed, it will lead to more predictable and credible fiscal 
policies, improve governance and transparency, and create greater commitment 
among governments to improve fiscal discipline.  
FRLs may help to make the budget process more “hierarchical,” “by 
concentrating power in the hands of those who have incentives to deliver fiscal 
discipline, identifying weaknesses in fiscal institutions and procedures, and 
limiting agency problems by increasing accountability to voters.”190 
However, with the exception of Brazil, FRLs in Latin America have seen poor 
results in their first years of implementation. In Argentina, Peru, and Colombia, 
the FRLs were repeatedly modified after implementation, they were not 
designed to cover sub-national governments, and they were not elaborated 
                                                        
188 Paraguay’s public sector employs 7% of the active population, compared to 13% in Spain and 
14% in the United States. Source: Secretaría de la Función Pública (2010) 
189 Alarcón Safstrand, Manuel (2010). Sector Fiscal. Principales resultados producto del cambio e 
that n el Sistema Tributario. October. Foro Empresarial, Unión Industrial Paraguaya 
190 Source: IMF (2007) Kumar, Ter-Minassian: Promoting Fiscal Discipline 
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based on national consensus.  As a result, in each of those countries, the fiscal 
performance continued to deteriorate up until the last revisions of their FRLs. 
In Brazil the introduction of its FRL in May 2000 followed a “long process of 
consensus building in society and among key political actors.”  The law was 
introduced to capitalize on the fiscal efforts that were already underway: 
reforms of the public financial management system and legislation governing the 
fiscal relations between the federal and sub-national governments. This included 
the debt-restructuring program launched in 1997 that promoted transparency 
and reporting at the sub-national level.  Brazil’s FRL lays the emphasis on 
“procedural and transparency rules and also contains numerical ceilings on 
selected fiscal indicators” (see Table 23). After the adoption of the FRL, Brazil’s 
fiscal performance remained strong.  Those good results cannot be attributed 
entirely to the FRL but it has certainly contributed to the fiscal discipline.191 
Table 23: Brazil’s Fiscal Responsibility Law in 2000 
Procedural Rules and 
Transparency 
Requirements 
Numerical Targets Sanctions 
Escape 
Clauses 
The law sets detailed 
provisions on the 
formulation and 
implementation of the 
budget and regulates inter- 
governmental relations. 
The law also requires 
transparent fiscal reporting. 
The Government has to 
present a brief account of 
budget execution every two 
months and report on 
budget management every 
four months, identifying 
remedial policies to achieve 
fiscal targets if needed. 
The ratio of total 
personnel expenditures 
to net revenues cannot 
exceed 50 percent for 
the federal government, 
60 percent for states, 
and 60 percent for 
municipalities. There 
are also limits by 
branch within each level 
of government. 
Permanent spending 
mandates cannot be 
created without a 
corresponding increase 
in permanent revenues 
or cuts 
If wage expenditures reach 95 percent 
of the ceiling, wage increases, overtime, 
and new hiring (except in health, 
education, or social security) are 
suspended. If debt limits are not 
complied with, members of the 
federation are prohibited from receiving 
voluntary transfers, obtaining direct or 
indirect guarantees from other 
members, and contracting credit 
operations except aimed at re- financing 
securities debt and reducing personnel 
expenditures. Public officials can be 
sanctioned for noncompliance through 
dismissal, fines, and even jail, according 
to the Fiscal Crimes Law. 
Low 
economic 
growth 
(negative or 
below 1 
percent in 
the previous 
four 
quarters), 
national 
catastrophe, 
state of 
siege. 
Source: IMF (2007) Kumar, Ter-Minassian: Promoting Fiscal Discipline 
 
The IMF has noted that the key-success factors for FRLs are: 
- Broad political consensus  
- A good fiscal institutional framework (need for a good public financial 
management system to support the implementation of the law, as well as 
strong pre-existing institutions) 
- Good practice in transparency and accountability, such as clear and open 
budget formulation, clear execution procedures and an independent audit 
mechanism/institution. Clear accountability improves the law’s 
effectiveness and credibility. 
                                                        
191Source: IMF (2007) Kumar, Ter-Minassian: Promoting Fiscal Discipline 
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- Application of a consistent fiscal framework to all levels of government 
and to public entities/enterprises that are engaged in significant fiscal 
activities. 
5.2. Non-electricity revenue collection  
 
Higher Government revenues from electricity sales in the future should not 
result in reducing tax collection efforts that the Government has been 
undertaking. On the contrary, Paraguay needs to continue increasing its tax ratio 
to GDP, which is the lowest in the region (see Figure 28).   
Since the 2004 tax reform, the Government has tripled its tax collection rate by 
increasing its tax base (formalizing its economy). To achieve this, the 
Government reduced the corporate income tax rate from 30 percent to 10 
percent.192  The 10 percent flat tax the Government of Paraguay currently has in 
place for value-added (with the exception of food and drugs), personal income 
and corporate income taxes (see Figure 29), as well as the extensive fiscal 
incentives, result in the Government’s not having sufficient resources available 
for an adequate scale of public investments in human capital and infrastructure. 
However, these are the factors that investors rate most highly when making 
investment decisions.  
The decision to set an agriculture income tax and impose a 5 percent VAT on 
agricultural products will increase the tax ratio by 1 percent.193 With the lowest 
tax rates in the region and excessive fiscal incentives, we believe that the 
Government has some leeway to increase taxes without deterring investment. 
Furthermore, other means can help to formalize the economy. For instance, the 
Government could reduce its bureaucratic procedures, improve access to finance 
and increase institutional acceptance of the use of verbal agreements as forms of 
contracts.194 
Figure 28: Tax to GDP Ratio in Paraguay and Neighboring Countries 
 
                                                        
192 Ministry of Finance (April 2013): Tax system analysis and outlook  
193 Tax system analysis and outlook – April 2013 – Ministry of Finance 
194 Modernizing the informal sector, Victor E. Tokman, June 2007, DESA Working Paper No. 42 
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Source: IMF - 2012 
 
Figure 29: Tax Rates in Paraguay and Regional Countries 
 
Source: REDIEX 
 
Lastly, it is recommended that the incentives are framed under an industrial 
strategy that sets out the goals of attracting investment. Incentives should not be 
provided ex ante without monitoring the performance of the investment 
regarding employment creation, value added, diversification or 
competitiveness.195 10 years after its initiation, the Maquila196 regime had only 
created 5,000 employment opportunities. Tax incentives should be closely 
monitored and reclaimed “from firms that do not meet their investment or job 
creation commitments, requiring linkages with local enterprises.”197 Paraguay 
could also adopt regional incentive control rules like in the European Union. 
                                                        
195 (Masi and Ruiz Díaz, Lineamientos para una Estrategia de Crecimiento Económico Inclusivo) 
196 http://www.ultimahora.com/notas/424485-Maquila-avanza-como-motor-de-inversion-y-
generacion-de-empleo 
197 “Kenneth P. Thomas, ‘Investment incentives and the global competition for capital,’ 
Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 54, December 30, 2011. 
198 “Kenneth P. Thomas, ‘Investment incentives and the global competition for capital,’ 
Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 54, December 30, 2011. 
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Box 12: EU Regional Aid Policy Setting a Maximum Level of Subsidy for 
Every Region in the European Union 
 
The EU only allows the highest-level subsidies in the European Union’s poorest 
regions. Rich regions are banned from providing subsidies to companies. For 
investment over €50 million, incentives are progressively reduced. States have 
to report in advance to the Commission, which will approve or disapprove a 
proposed subsidy. As a result the EU member states have been given much 
smaller subsidies than the United States for similar investments. For instance, 
Hyundai received a US$ 117,000 subsidy per job from the Government of 
Alabama in 2002. This compares to a US$ 75,000 subsidy per job from the Czech 
Republic in 2007.198 
  90 
 
There is, in short, room to increase taxes in order to invest in infrastructure and 
human capital. These investments are paramount for sustainable inclusive 
growth and diversification of the economy. 
5.3. A planning strategy 
 
To guide future Government investment and align/coordinate the objectives and 
activities beyond the energy sector, a long-term development plan could be 
prepared. Such a plan should contain the vision of where Paraguay aims to be in 
20 years, with clear targets for all aspects of importance to the Paraguayan 
people, including education and training, health, social equity, environment, 
economic development and infrastructure development. 
Departmental/municipal plans and sector specific strategies (including those 
addressed in this report – energy, industry and environment) should be aligned 
to the overarching long-term development strategy.  
By breaking down the targets into shorter time frames and estimating the costs 
of necessary investments to achieve these goals, it will be clear what tax rates are 
needed to fund such a development plan. A Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) can serve as a tool for such an exercise.199An MTEF is used 
to “forecast the overall resource envelope [based on fiscal targets, estimated 
revenues and financial obligations], and to allocate spending among sectors for 
the medium term according to the policy priorities set out in [a] five-year 
plan.”200 MTEFs enable multi-year budgeting and planning, which almost all 
major public investment strategies 201  require, both for their design and 
implementation, and for their success. The objectives of an MTEF are:  
- Improved macroeconomic balance, especially fiscal discipline 
- Greater budgetary predictability for line ministries 
- More efficient use of public resources 
                                                        
199 Paragraph adapted from Lisa Sachs and Perrine Toledano, with Susan Maples, Resource-Based 
Development in the Lower Zambezi Basin (June 2011), 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/12/lowerzambezi.pdf 
200 “Minding the Gaps: Integrating Poverty Reduction Strategies and Budgets for Domestic 
Accountability,” The World Bank et al, April 2007, p. 96. 
201 “While annual budgets can be sufficient for annual consumption expenses, public investment 
strategies require a number of medium-to-long term considerations: a) the estimated social 
returns on various kinds of medium-term investments, b) the capacity of the government to 
carry out a multi-year public investment program, c) the possible excessive management costs of 
public investments if they are too concentrated within the same time-span (in terms of oversight, 
management, etc..), d) the dangers of illiquidity if large public investment programs are 
undertaken simultaneously without adequate medium-term expenditure planning, and e) the 
medium-to-long-term hidden operations and maintenance (O&M) costs associated with capital 
investments.” Lisa Sachs and Perrine Toledano, with Susan Maples, Resource-Based Development 
in the Lower Zambezi Basin (June 2011), 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/12/lowerzambezi.pdf. 
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- Greater political accountability for public expenditure outcomes through 
more legitimate decision-making processes and greater credibility of 
budgetary decision-making (political restraint)202 
 
An MTEF is only credible and meaningful if it is integrated into both the planning 
and the budgeting process.  The first step is defining an integrated sectoral 
strategy for realizing the priorities of a 5-year plan and then determining which 
public investments are necessary to achieve the priorities. Those public 
investments should be costed to determine the necessary resource allocation 
(both by sector and between capital and recurrent expenditures) over a medium 
term time frame. Based on these costed plans, the Government determines 
sectoral allocations, which in turn become both the guide and the budget ceilings 
for the sectors’ programs and budgets over the medium term.203 The annual 
budget would effectively be the first year of the MTEF, and the outer years of the 
MTEF would guide the budget allocations in subsequent years. Not only does this 
bring coherence to the planning and budgeting process, but it also makes budget 
allocation decisions more accountable, transparent and predictable.204 
5.4. Summary of Findings and Recommendations 
 
1. To manage increased electricity revenues more efficiently, better revenue 
management systems need to be put in place that guarantee transparency 
and provide monitoring opportunities at the centralized and 
decentralized level. Earmarking infrastructure and human capital 
spending from electricity exports, such as the FONACIDE and Fundo 
Social programs, is commendable but needs to be done in a transparent 
way to guarantee checks and balances. Requiring local development 
plans; publishing these plans, contracts and funds online; and rewarding 
departmental/municipal governments for improved tax collection and 
successful project implementation could help reduce inefficiencies at the 
decentralized level. 
 
2. At the central level, it is recommended that revenues be spent mainly on 
public investments in health, education, and infrastructure. Paraguay 
pays its public servants relatively high wages, but does not reap the 
benefits of quality public administration services. The Fiscal 
Responsibility Law currently being considered by the Government will 
partly address this issue and lead to more predictable and credible fiscal 
policies, improve governance and transparency, and create greater 
commitment among government institutions to improve fiscal discipline. 
Increased electricity revenues in the future should not deter the 
                                                        
202 Philippe Le Houerou and Robert Taliercio, “Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks: From 
Concept to Practice. Preliminary Lessons from Africa,” Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 
28, February 2002. 
203 Philippe Le Houerou and Robert Taliercio, “Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks: From 
Concept to Practice. Preliminary Lessons from Africa,” Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 
28, February 2002. 
204 Paragraph adapted from Lisa Sachs and Perrine Toledano, with Susan Maples, Resource-Based 
Development in the Lower Zambezi Basin (June 2011), 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/12/lowerzambezi.pdf 
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Government from its efforts to increase tax collection. On the contrary, 
these should be increased so the Government can spend on infrastructure 
and human capital – two areas where it performs relatively poorly in 
comparison to neighboring countries.  
 
3. To guide Government spending, we recommend that Paraguay adopt a 
20-year strategic plan for the country, which can be developed in close 
cooperation with the broad public and expert communities. Targets 
should be set for all aspects of importance to the Paraguayan people, 
including education and training, health, social equity, infrastructure, the 
environment and economic development. A Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework can be used to guide coherent planning with the budgeting 
process, and make budget allocation decisions more accountable, 
transparent and predictable. 
  93 
  
ANNEX A: Paraguay’s Comparative 
Advantages and Barriers to Sustainable 
Development  
 
While the report primarily focuses on the electricity sector, there is whole set of 
economic and institutional variables that will determine the attractiveness of the 
country from investors’ perspective. This annex is meant to provide an overview 
of the most important comparative advantages Paraguay has to offer and the 
barriers that are holding back development.  
 
Positive economic outlook 
 
With a GDP of US$41.1 billion,205 Paraguay is the third smallest economy of 
South America. The country witnessed significant economic growth rates 
between 2004 and 2008, during which time the economy grew at an average rate 
of 4.6 percent, representing the largest GDP increase in three decades. In 2009 
GDP contracted as a result of a severe draught affecting the agriculture sector. 
After rebounding in 2010, the economy slowed again in 2011 and contracted 
slightly in 2012.206 Much of the expansion and volatility of Paraguay’s GDP can be 
explained by commodity prices, as the country is a net exporter of agricultural 
products.207 In 2011 agriculture exports accounted for about 42 percent of its 
total US$5.5 billion export revenues (see Figure 30). As a relatively open 
economy (index of economic opening of 66 percent208), but not sufficiently 
diversified, the country is exposed to commodity price swings, climate 
conditions and other external factors that are out of the Government’s control. 
                                                        
205 GDP Purchasing Power Parity 
206 Central Bank (2012) Cuentas Nacionales de Paraguay 
207The World Bank. Energy Sector Strengthening Project. Project Appraisal Document, 
Sustainable Development Department Country Management Unit for Argentina, Paraguay and 
Uruguay, The World Bank, Washington: The World Bank, 2010 
208 CBP (2011) measured as the percentage of exports plus imports over GDP 
  94 
Figure 30: Primary Sector Exports 2003 – 2011 
 
Source: Central Bank of Paraguay 
 
The services sector (including Government) is the main contributor to 
Paraguay’s GDP and also provides the largest share of employment opportunities 
as shown in Figure 31. This can largely be traced back to Paraguay’s open 
economy, which has created many jobs in the commercial sector. Although the 
agricultural sector has seen a shift from subsistence small-scale farming to a 
more mechanized system, it still employs 26 percent of the population209 (down 
from 45 percent in 2005210). The industrial sector remains small, but has been 
expanding in recent years (growth rate of 6.5 percent in 2010211). Food 
processing and beverages make up the largest share of the industrial sector with 
wood processing, textiles, pharmaceuticals, hides and furs also of importance.212 
 
Figure 31: Structure of Paraguay’s Economy (2012) 
 
Sources: CIA, DGEEC  
 
                                                        
209 Dirección General de Estatística, Encuestas y Censos (2011) Encuesta Parmanente de Hogares  
210 Paraguay country profile. Library of Congress Federal Research Division (October 2005), 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Paraguay.pdf 
211 Central Intelligence Agency 
212 Dirección General de Estatística, Encuestas y Censos (2011) Censo Economico Nacional 
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There is a mismatch between the supply and demand for jobs. Many technical 
and engineering skills do not exist in the country to fill the demand from new 
investments to come. The official unemployment rate was 5.6 percent in 2011 
with 181,000 people actively looking for a job. 21.9 percent were 
underemployed,213 down from 26.6 percent in 2007.  
 
Data on the formal structure of the economy must be analyzed with care, since 
Paraguay has a relatively large informal sector. According to the World Bank, 
75.3 percent of the firms in Paraguay reported having informal or unregistered 
competitors.214 In 2010 “practices in the informal sector” were listed as the top 
obstacle for investments,215 and it is believed that a large percentage of the 
Paraguayan working population is employed informally.216  
 
The medium-term macroeconomic outlook is positive. The IMF projects GDP 
growth rates of 8.5 percent in 2013 and around 4.7 percent for the following four 
years. This economic expansion is expected to occur with inflation rates below 
the 5 percent target and accompanied with increasing foreign direct investment 
and a falling Government debt.217 
 
Labor competitiveness 
 
Paraguay has a relatively cheap, young and trainable218 labor force. According to 
the latest census data, 75 percent of Paraguayans are younger than 40219 and 
31.4 percent are between 20 and 40 years old. This represents the youngest 
working age population of South America.220 This trend is expected to continue, 
as Paraguay has the highest regional population growth rate of 1.26221 percent.   
 
                                                        
213 Dirección General de Estatística, Encuestas y Censos (2011) Encuesta Parmanente de Hogares  
214 World Bank (2012) Business Environment Snapshot for Paraguay - 
http://rru.worldbank.org/besnapshots/BecpProfilePDF.aspx?economy=paraguay 
215 http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Reports 
216Masi, Fernando. "Sector Informal y Cuentapropismo en el Paraguay." CADEP. 2002. 
http://www.cadep.org.py/uploads/2012/10/Sector-informal-y-cuentapropismo-en-el-
Paraguay_-FM.pdf  
217 IMF (2012) Article IV Mission 
218 Meeting with the Union Industrial Paraguaya 
219 Dirección General de Estadísticas, Encuestas y Censos 
220 REDIEX 
221 Central Intelligence Agency 
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Figure 32: Regional Labor Competitiveness 
 
 
Sources: ILO’s Global Wage Report 2012-13, the WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report 2012-13, The 
CIA’s World Factbook & Average Salary Survey 
 
Figure 32 compares Paraguay’s average wage and school enrollment rates with 
those of countries in the region. These two indicators can be used to get an idea 
of relative labor competitiveness. The average wage gives an indication of the 
cost per person employed and the enrollment rates can be used as a proxy for 
the productivity. While Paraguay’s labor force is relatively inexpensive, it is also 
less skilled than that of neighboring countries. According to the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey in 2010222 “Inadequately Educated Workforce” was listed as 
the second largest obstacle for firms investing in Paraguay. Furthermore, a 
relatively high ratio of minimum wage to average value added per worker (50 
percent compared to an average of 32 percent in Latin America), high barriers 
for hiring and firing employees (notice periods are twice as long as the regional 
average), and substantial rigidity of hours (such as days of paid annual leave  - 
one third higher than the regional average),223  are further obstacles for 
investors. 
 
Given that regional labor costs are significantly higher, Paraguay would benefit 
from better educating and training its workforce, even if this comes at the 
expense of slightly higher wages. The marginal return from education in 
Paraguay is thought to be among the highest in Latin America,224 and investment 
in human capital is paramount for the diversification of the economy. Tackling 
the rigidity of the labor market will encourage companies to hire and create 
competition among the labor market. 
                                                        
222 http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Reports 
223 IMF (2012) Article IV Consultation Report 
 224 ADB (2008), “Growing Pains. Binding constraints to Productive Investment in Latin America,” 
 Washington, D.C.  
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Regional market  
 
While being landlocked between the two largest economies of the region makes 
Paraguay dependent on the political and commercial dynamics of neighboring 
countries, it also presents an opportunity to act as a logistics hub connecting the 
regional transport, electricity and telecommunications network. The Mercosur225 
free trade agreement should act as a further incentive for investors that are 
looking to access the regional market.  
 
Mercosur is already the most important market for Paraguayan exports – 55 
percent of the agro-industry products and 88 percent of the manufacturing 
products went to these countries.226 The common market agreement involves the 
free circulation of goods, services and production factors through the elimination 
of custom laws and non-duty restrictions among the member states. It has a 
common commercial policy relative to non-member states227 and imposes a 
common external tariff for most products.228 Mercosur’s Decisión 01-2004 on 
origin agreements provides Paraguay with special advantages relative to the 
other members: while industries from non-member countries wishing to settle 
in one of Mercosur’s countries (thereby having their products labeled as of 
Mercosur origin) are permitted to import no more than 40 percent of production 
inputs from outside Mercosur, foreign companies establishing in Paraguay may 
import up to 60 percent of production inputs from abroad, making it easier to 
acquire origin from Paraguay relative to the other country members.229 
 
Each country can submit an exemption list of products that are not covered 
under the common external tariff. The exemption list has been subject to claims 
and modifications over the years. As of 2012, Brazil and Argentina are allowed to 
exempt up to 200 products, while Uruguay and Paraguay have 225 and 649 
exempted products respectively.230 This has created commercial triangulation, 
whereby Paraguayan companies import products at a low tariff and then re-
export them within Mercosur. According to the Paraguayan industrial 
association (UIP), an excessive reliance on this model has contributed to 
deindustrialization in recent years.231  
 
To become a logistics hub, Paraguay will need to invest in infrastructure. 
According to the IMF, investment in infrastructure is low by regional standards 
(below 19 percent of GDP) and large deficiencies in basic infrastructure (e.g. 
ports, river transport, utilities, roads) have increased production costs for 
                                                        
225 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela are member states, whereas 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Perú are non-member associated countries. 
226 Masi, Fernando, and Francisco Ruiz Díaz. "Lineamientos para una Estrategia de Crecimiento 
Económico Inclusivo." Paraguay Debate. December 12, 2012. 
http://paraguaydebate.org.py/?p=672 
227 Mercosur 2013 
228 US Office of Textiles and Apparels 
229 Source: REDIEX 
230 Periódico La Nación. Periódico la Nación Paraguay. July 1, 2012. 
http://www.lanacion.com.py/articulo/78833-mercosur-habilito-nueva-lista-de-excepciones-
.html 
231 Union Industrial Paraguaya 
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investors and consequently hurt growth prospects.232 The UIP estimated the 
costs of poor infrastructure connectivity (especially road connectivity) to 
amount to an equivalent of 4.3 percent of national GDP in 2006.233 
 
The truck overload and inefficient logistics network have prompted the 
Government to prepare infrastructure plans, which aim to connect roads and 
railways with the waterways and industry clusters. To finance these 
investments, the Government envisions public private partnerships, for which it 
will first need to pass appropriate legislation. 
 
Cheap access to electricity 
 
The lack of electric infrastructure, constant outages and high losses in the 
network mean that the electricity sector today is a constraint rather than a 
comparative advantage. However, if the Government implements ANDE’s Master 
Plan and addresses the problems identified in Chapter 1 of this report, access to 
reliable and clean electricity at competitive prices will become a major 
comparative advantage compared to neighboring countries where tariff rates are 
higher and are likely to increase further in the future.  
 
Fiscal incentives 
 
While it could be argued that the fiscal incentives provided to export oriented 
companies is a comparative advantage, this has not been analyzed in the 
Paraguayan context and “the balance of evidence from developing countries 
suggests that fiscal incentives do not effectively counterbalance unattractive 
investment climate conditions”.234 
 
The Maquila regulation and the ley 60/90235236 are the most prominent incentives 
for export-oriented companies.237 Maquila is a production system by which 
subsidiaries of international firms can locate within Paraguay to produce goods 
and services that are exported to the headquarters abroad. The maquilas do not 
pay tariffs on capital goods, raw materials or inputs. Only a 1 percent tax on 
turnover is charged. Similarly, ley 60/90 implies that national and foreign 
companies investing in Paraguay are exempted from paying duties on imported 
capital goods and VAT on domestically purchased capital goods. Furthermore, no 
taxes are paid on dividends or remittances.238  
 
Figures 33 and 34 show the investment flows associated with the 60/90 
regulations. Both figures reveal irregular trends of investment over the last 
                                                        
232 IMF (2012) Article IV Consultation Report 
233 http://www.uip.org.py/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=3ad38a38-4bbc-4e46-9950-
28ae8e56dfec&groupId=10192 
234 World Bank (2009) Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications  
235 Ley 60/90 has been modified by Law No. 2421/04 – available at 
http://www.mic.gov.py/v1/sites/172.30.9.105/files/ley2421_incidencia_ley6090.pdf 
236 (REDIEX) 
237 There are other incentives, including for tax-free zones, special regimes for mines, energy, 
forestry and exports. 
238 (REDIEX) 
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decade, with an upward tendency since 2010. Job creation has not grown as 
strongly as investments flows, suggesting that larger investments have been 
made recently that have not created many employment opportunities. Whether 
Paraguay’s economy has been benefiting from these fiscal incentives remains to 
be analyzed. The recent increase in investment could be a result of rising 
production costs in Brazil and a worsening business environment in Argentina, 
rather than Paraguay’s tax incentive itself. Such analysis should be prioritized to 
ensure the right balance is struck between Government revenues and a fiscal 
framework that attracts investors to the country.  
 
Figure 33: Investment 2000 – 2012 
 
 
Source: REDIEX 
 
Figure 34: Investment, Jobs and Number of Companies 2000 – 2012 
 
Source: REDIEX 
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Global indices of competitiveness 
 
Paraguay ranks 116th out of 144 countries in the World Economic Forum 
Competitiveness239 index and has risen by six positions compared to last year, as 
shown in Figure 35. While it benefits from a stable economic environment, its 
institutions, infrastructure and health & education indices pull down the overall 
index. 
 
Figure 35: Global Competitiveness 
 
Source: World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Reports 2011-12 & 2012-13. 
 
According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness report, 
Paraguay is now in the second stage of its development and “must begin to 
develop more efficient production processes and increase product quality as 
wages have risen and they cannot increase prices.”240 The report goes on to 
explain that the drivers during this second stage are higher education and 
training, a well-functioning labor-market, a developed financial market, the 
ability to harness the benefits of existing technologies and access to markets.  
 
On the institutional front, the international transparency indices show that 
Paraguay is performing worse than the regional average on judicial 
independence, corruption perception, voice and accountability, and rule of law 
indicators.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
239 The index uses 12 indicators to measure competitiveness: institutions, infrastructure, 
macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, higher education and training, 
goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market development, technological  
readiness, market size, business sophistication, innovation 
240 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.pdf 
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Figure 36 and 37: Transparency and Accountability Indexes for Paraguay 
and Regional Countries 
 
 
Source: Transparency International 
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ANNEX B: Mapping of the Investment Legal 
Framework 
 
I. Constitutional241 
 Art. 7. Right to a healthy environment 
Establishes the fundamental right to inhabit a healthy and ecologically balanced 
environment, and the public interest in the preservation, conservation and 
improvement of the environment. 
 
  Art. 8. Environmental protection 
Establishes that the law shall regulate any activity likely to have an impact on the 
environment; that environmental crimes shall be defined and punished by law; 
and that any damage to the environment shall entail the obligation to repair and 
indemnify. 
 
 Art. 64. Community property 
Establishes the right of indigenous people to community property of land, which 
shall be gratuitously provided by the State. The lands shall be indivisible and not 
susceptible to seizure, transfer, prescription, or any contractual right. 
 
 Art. 86. Labor rights 
Labor rights cannot be waived.  
 
 Art. 87. Employment 
The State shall promulgate policies to promote professional development. 
National employees shall be given preference. 
 
 Art. 88. Discrimination. 
Discrimination on any grounds shall not be permitted. 
 
 Art. 107. Free Competition 
Ensures a free market without monopolies and equality of treatment in 
commercial activities. 
 
 Art. 109. Private property 
Ensures private property within the limits established by law, taking into 
account its social function. Compensation shall be due in case of expropriation. 
 
 Art. 179. Taxes 
Taxes shall be enforced by laws and set according to fair economic and social 
principles, as well as following policies that favor national development.  
 
 Art. 276. Defensor del Pueblo (Ombudsman) 
The Defensor del Pueblo is a parliamentary commissioner whose functions are 
the defense of human rights, the enquiry of popular claims and the 
                                                        
241 This is a broad description of the relevant provisions contained in the Paraguayan 
Constitution.  
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implementation of the common interest.  
 
 Art. 283. Contraloria General de la República (Controller-General) 
The Contraloria General de la República is in charge of controlling economic and 
financial activities of the State, the Departments, and Municipalities. 
  
The Constitution sets the general principles on which the Paraguayan legal 
framework is founded. Constitutional provisions are not self-enforceable, as they 
require further provisions (created by law, decree, or administrative 
resolutions) in order to regulate their application. Constitutional principles are 
relevant insofar as the validity of any other normative act would be subject to its 
compliance within them. 
 
II. Administrative 
A. Public Procurement 
 Law No. 2051/02, “De Contrataciones Públicas” 
Establishes the Public Procurement general framework.  
 
 Law No. 3439/07, “Que modifica la Ley No. 2051/02 ‘De Contrataciones 
Públicas’ y Establece la Carta Orgánica de la Dirección Nacional De 
Contrataciones Públicas” 
Modifies some provisions of the Ley No. 2051/02, which sets the general Public 
Procurement framework; creates the Dirección Nacional de Contrataciones 
Públicas (DNCP—National Office of Public Procurement)242 and establishes its 
by-laws. 
 
 Decree No. 21909/03, “Por el cual se reglamenta la Ley No. 2051/03 ‘De 
Contrataciones Públicas’” 
Provides specific provisions for the application of the Law No. 2051/02. 
 
B. Public finance 
 Law No. 1535/99 
Sets the legal framework for the drafting and execution of the national budget, 
which, according to the law, must include all the income and expenses of all State 
and State-owned entities.  
 
C. Public Registry (Land) 
 Law No. 879/81 “Código De Organización Judicial” 
Regulates most of the Public Registries, among them the registry concerning land 
ownership. 
 
 Law No. 2424/2004 “Servicio Nacional De Catastro” 
Creates and regulates the Servicio Nacional de Catastro, a governmental branch 
that keeps a record of Paraguayan land. 
 
D. Municipal 
 Law No. 3966/10 “Organica Municipal” 
                                                        
242 The DNCP supervises all the tender process to contract with state or state-owned entities. 
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Establishes the general framework applicable to all municipalities. It sets the 
general standards for zoning, construction, tax, environmental protection, urban 
planning and development. 
 
Subject to RTA’s prospective facility’s location, the specific municipal and 
departmental regulations that might affect the project will have to be 
determined, i.e. the required municipal licenses, construction permissions, taxes, 
etc.  
 
III. Environmental 
 Law No. 422/73 “Ley Forestal” 
Regulates the exploitation and use of national forests. 
 
 Law No. 294/93 “Evaluación De Impacto Ambiental and Decreto No. 
14.281/96 and 4066/2010.  
Sets the requirements to obtain an environmental license. All projects that have 
a direct or indirect impact on the biodiversity, wellbeing, health, personal 
security, practices and customs, cultural heritage or legitimate means of 
livelihood, shall require an environmental license or “Declaración de Impacto 
Ambiental” (DIA—Declaration of Environmental Impact).  Every DIA requires an 
Environmental Impact Assessment. This assessment should identify all the 
environmental impacts that the project could cause. RTA will be required to 
obtain this license and it will need to submit the environmental assessment to 
the SEAM office. The SEAM evaluates the project and decides whether or not to 
grant the license.  
 
 Law No. 1561/00 “Que crea el Sistema Nacional del Ambiente, el Consejo 
Nacional del Ambiente y la Secretaría del Ambiente” 
Creates the SEAM, a state entity responsible for the issuance of environmental 
licenses.  
 
 Law No. 3464/08  ”Que crea el Instituto Forestal Nacional – INFONA” 
Creates the INFOMA, a state entity that enforces the provisions set in Ley No. 
422/73. 
 
IV. Tax 
 Law No. 125/91 “Que Establece el Nuevo Régimen Tributario” 
Establishes the Tax Regime. 
 
 Law No. 2421/04, “De reordenamiento administrativo y de adecuación 
fiscal.” 
Modifies some provisions of the Ley No. 125/91, regarding IRACIS (income tax 
for commercial, industrial and services activities) and IVA (value added tax) 
 
V. Customs   
 Law No. 2422/03 “Código Aduanero” 
Establishes the customs regime. 
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Art. 178 of the Código Aduanero, establishes the temporal admission regime for 
active improvement which permits the admission of foreign goods to the 
territory, with partial or total suspension of tax payment, to perform 
improvements and the subsequent re-exportation of the resulting product.  
 
Art. 203 of the Código Aduanero establishes the procedure for processing under 
customs control: it allows the entry of foreign goods into the customs territory, 
for processing, with full suspension of customs duty payments and it allows 
subsequent permanent importation of processed products. 
 
Art. 287 of the Código Aduanero addresses free zones, which are physically 
limited areas where imports and exports are not subject to custom taxes, as long 
as they are utilized, stored and consumed in accordance with the specifications 
set in the specific legislation  
 
VI. Labor 
 Law No. 213/93 “Código Laboral” 
Establishes the Labor regime. 
 
VII. Commercial (Contracts and Property) and Investment 
 Law No. 1183/85 “Código Civil” 
Sets the provisions that govern contractual relationships, property ownership, 
and the qualification of legal entities. 
 
 Law No. 117/91 – Foreign Investment Law 
Gives foreigners the same guarantees, rights and obligations enjoyed by 
Paraguayan investors. 
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ANNEX C: Itaipú Debt History 
 
Our understanding of the Itaipú debt history is as follows.243 The financial 
agreement for the Itaipú dam was made on the basis of a US$3.5bn capital 
investment and operations to begin in 1983 (with the last turbine coming on 
stream in 1989). The largest loan was signed with Eletrobras in November 1975 
worth US$2.5bn (in Brazilian Cruceiros) with a grace period until 1983 and an 
amortization period between 1985 and 2023.244 The interest rate was set at 10 
percent plus administration costs and an inflation adjustment factor. The parties 
opted to finance the majority of the construction through national loans to 
ensure local procurement. For example, FINAME’s loan for equipment for Itaipú 
required a minimum of 85 percent inputs from Brazil. Several smaller 
international loans were acquired from countries providing specialized 
equipment that could not be procured locally (Paris Club debt). These loans had 
shorter grace and maturity periods than the one with Eletrobras.  
 
During construction it became evident that new loans were necessary to cover 
costs. Under-budgeting was attributed to the first oil crisis in 1974, which had 
inflated costs for construction materials and the necessary machinery. To finance 
the rising construction costs, additional loans were sought on international 
markets. These were relatively cheap in the late 70s with interest rates of LIBOR 
+ 2-4 percent. Most had an amortization period of approximately 15 years and 
were backed by the Brazilian Central Bank.  
 
The unfolding Latin American debt crisis and escalating interest rates resulted in 
Itaipú being unable to repay the international loans. To exacerbate matters, the 
penalties for the defaulting short-term loans caused a rapid rise in Itaipú’s 
overall debt burden.245 Due to the lack of new credit lines available to refinance 
this debt, Itaipú had to slow construction. Ultimately Eletrobras provided 
additional loans to complete the construction. Those additional loans each had 
different interest rates, grace periods and maturity dates.246  
 
The debt with Eletrobras was consolidated in September 1990. Two credit lines, 
one in US Dollars and one in Brazilian currency, were agreed, but these still had 
interest rates of 10 percent plus the US inflation adjustment factor. The 
international debt of Itaipú was not being repaid and the Government of Brazil 
renegotiated this debt in 1993 with the agreement that new ‘Brady Bonds’ would 
replace the old ones. At this time the Paris Club debt was also refinanced.  
 
While the international debt renegotiations resulted in a decrease in Itapú’s net 
debt, the introduction of the ‘Plano Real’ by the Brazilian Government in July 
1994 had the opposite effect. Most of the debt with Eletrobras was held in 
                                                        
243 Based on Itapúa Binacional (2003), Prestación de los Servicios de Electricidad y Bases 
Financeiras: Compendio and interviews in Paraguay. 
244 Itaipú Binacional (2003), Prestación de los Servicios de Electricidad y Bases Financeiras: 
Compendio 
245 By 1990 the debt to tertiary countries made up 45 percent of total debt. 
246 By the end of 1992 Itaipú was managing 129 loan agreements with 33 institutions on top of 
those agreements with Eletrobras. 
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Brazilian currency. Prior to the implementation of the plan, high inflation in 
Brazil was offset by a depreciation of the Cruceiro. This was no longer the case 
and the debt with Eletrobras jumped from US$10.8bn on July 1, 1994, to 
US$15.4bn on December 31, 1994. 
 
The net debt continued to rise until September 1997 when Eletrobras and Itaipú 
signed a deal that would consolidate the outstanding debt, lower the interest 
rates of the loans, convert the debt into US dollars and adjust the tariffs to a level 
that guarantees the debt to be paid off by 2023 (when annex C of the original 
treaty terminates). New loans were agreed with Eletrobras between 1998 and 
2007 to conclude the construction of the dam and to install two additional 
turbines. In 2007 it was agreed to drop the US inflation adjustment factor, which 
had a significant impact on Itaipú’s debt. Figure 38 shows how Itaipú’s debt 
accumulated between 1979 and 2011 and marks key events during that time 
period.  
 
Figure 38: Itaipú’s Accumulated Debt 
 
Source: Itaipú Binacional (2003), Central Bank of Paraguay 
 
To summarize the above, the increasing debt of Itaipú can be traced back to the 
following: 
 
1. Increase in construction costs 
2. Delay of approximately 2.4 years in turbines coming on stream, thereby 
delaying repayment of the debt 
3. High interest rates + adjustment factors on loans 
4. Below cost-recovery tariffs for extended periods of time (5,340 GWh of 
free ‘transitional energy’ was provided to both countries between 1997 
and 2002) 
5. The implementation of the Plano Real causing a jump of the debt held in 
Brazilian currency in 1994 
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ANNEX D: Salto Grande 
 
I. Background 
 
In 1938 Argentina and Uruguay (the High Contracting Parties) agreed on the 
common hydroelectric exploitation of the Uruguay River247 and in 1946 the High 
Contracting Parties signed an agreement248 which created the Technical Mixed 
Committee (Comision Tecnica Mixta—CTM).249  The CTM’s objectives 250  and 
rules251 were agreed upon in 1972, and in 1974 the High Contracting Parties 
signed the specifications under which the Salto Grande dam would be built. 
 
II. Relevant provisions 
 
- Governance 
 
Salto Grande Itaipú 
- Art. 3 of the Agreement (1946) 
establishes that CTM’s decisions shall 
be adopted by a majority of all its 
members. In case a majority of votes 
cannot be reached, the High 
Contracting Parties shall reach an 
agreement. In case this is not possible, 
the issue shall be submitted to 
arbitration. Decision-making process 
confirmed in Art.20. 
Art. II 
ANDE and Eletrobras are the 
constituting parties of the bi-national 
entity, Itaipú, with equal participation 
on the equity. 
 
- Art. 16 
CTM shall be composed of an equal 
number of Delegates from each 
country (Art. 2) and it shall 
designate a President, a Vice-
President, a Secretary and a second 
Secretary within its members.  
- Arts. 7-11 Annex –A 
Itaipú’s Administrative Council is its 
most important government body. 12 
members, 6 of each State Party, 
compose it. Both Paraguayan and 
Brazilian General Directors are part, 
but they are not allowed to vote. 
The second government body is the 
Executive Board. It is composed of the 
Paraguayan and Brazilian General 
Directors, and the Divisional Directors 
(Directores de Area). The General 
                                                        
247 Document available at: 
http://www.saltogrande.org/interior.php?p=html/menulat/institucional/documentos_fundacio
nales/naturaleza_juridica/acta.html&id=68 
248 Document available at: 
http://www.saltogrande.org/interior.php?p=html/menulat/institucional/documentos_fundacio
nales/naturaleza_juridica/convenio.html&id=69 
249 Art. 2 of the Agreement. 
250 Art. 2 of the TA Rules. 
251 Document available at: 
http://www.saltogrande.org/interior.php?p=html/menulat/institucional/documentos_fundacio
nales/naturaleza_juridica/reglamentos_tecnico.html&id=74 
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Directors jointly exercise the legal 
representation. 
 
 
- Distribution of the electricity production 
 
Salto Grande Itaipú 
- Art. 4 of the Agreement (1946) 
establishes that, should the total 
installed capacity be allocated in a 
ratio different than 50 percent for each 
High Contracting Party, the common 
costs shall be covered in accordance 
with such proportion (e.g., if Argentina 
uses 70 percent of the capacity 
installed, it has to bear 70 percent of 
the costs) 
 
- Art. XIII of Itaipú Treaty 
The energy produced by the dam is 
divided in equal parts between the 
High Contracting Parties. This means 
that each party has the right to 50 
percent of the energy produced by 
Itaipú dam. 
The article also provides a purchase 
right, i.e. the prerogative of a High 
Contracting Party to purchase, for its 
own consumption, the energy that is 
not being used by the other.   
 Art. XV of Itaipú Treaty 
Additionally, it is provided that Itaipú 
shall include in its service cost, the 
amount required for the payment of 
utilities and the amount required to 
compensate the High Contracting Party 
for the assignment of its energy. 
 
- Art. 14 of the Rules of the Agreement 
(1972) 
Provides securities for the external 
leverage. It establishes that Argentina 
should guarantee 100 percent of the 
project’s obligations, whereas Uruguay 
would do so to the extent of 16.66 
percent. Uruguay’s ratio would 
increase in accordance with the 
proportion of the energy consumed.  
 
- Point III.8. Annex C– Itaipú Treaty 
(1973 text) 
The amount required to compensate 
one of the High Contracting Parties is 
equal to US$300 per gigawatt-hour 
assigned to the other High Contracting 
Party. The compensation shall be done 
monthly in the currency available to 
Itaipú.  
 
 
 
